RENEWABLE RESOURCES AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE:
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND NEGOTIATION OF AUTHORITY
IN WESTERN ELECTRICITY MARKETS

by
Stephanie S. Lenhart

A dissertation
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy and Administration
Boise State University

May 2017

© 2017
Stephanie S. Lenhart
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE COLLEGE

DEFENSE COMMITTEE AND FINAL READING APPROVALS
of the dissertation submitted by

Stephanie S. Lenhart

Dissertation Title:

Renewable Resources and Regional Governance: Policy
Implementation and Negotiation of Authority in Western Electricity
Markets

Date of Final Oral Examination:

28 April 2017

The following individuals read and discussed the dissertation submitted by student
Stephanie S. Lenhart, and they evaluated her presentation and response to questions during
the final oral examination. They found that the student passed the final oral examination.
Jen Schneider, Ph.D.

Chair, Supervisory Committee

Elizabeth Wilson, Ph.D.

Member, Supervisory Committee

Natalie Nelson-Marsh, Ph.D.

Member, Supervisory Committee

Gregory Hill, Ph.D.

Member, Supervisory Committee

Monica Hubbard, Ph.D.

Member, Supervisory Committee

The final reading approval of the dissertation was granted by Jen Schneider, Ph.D., Chair
of the Supervisory Committee. The dissertation was approved by the Graduate College.

DEDICATION
To Luci and Elise

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
For their support and encouragement, I would like to thank the many scholars I
have interacted with and express my appreciation to the School of Public Service for
creating and invigorating the Public Policy and Administration PhD program. I am
thankful to Jen Schneider for making herself available at critical turning points and her
openness to my interests. I would especially like to thank Dr. Elizabeth Wilson for being
endlessly generous of spirit while asking for my best work and Dr. Natalie Nelson-Marsh
for challenging the taken for granted. I thank Dr. Seth Blumsack for his insights, getting
our conversation going in California, and bringing me to the Santa Fe Institute
Workshop. I also thank Dr. Monica Hubbard and Dr. Greg Hill for invaluable clarifying
questions and my fellow students – Benjamin Stafford, Nick Johnson, and Jared
Kopczynski – for bringing their differences to our collaboration. Dr. John Freemuth gave
me confidence that this would be interesting and fun. Dr. Richard Hirsh provided wise
insight on the value of a monograph. Eric, Luci and Elise were irreplaceable questioners,
first readers, initial audience members, and technical advisors. Finally, I would not have
accomplished this without the inspiration of two fierce women – Becky Lenhart and Sally
Maison.
Funding for my graduate education and research has come from the National
Science Foundation SES #1261867 and a Burk Scholarship. In closing, I would like to
acknowledge the incredibly dedicated and creative people who are working to transform

v

the electricity system in the West, many of whom generously answered my questions and
offered their unique insights.

vi

ABSTRACT
In response to energy policies and technological innovation, electricity systems
are becoming more integrated and interdependent. In the Western United States, the
creation of an energy imbalance market (EIM) is a significant move towards electricity
grid integration. The question of how to govern this newly forming market has been
deliberated in multiple decision-making venues. Through these deliberations,
stakeholders engaged in the process of policy implementation and shaped the structure of
the EIM as a policy intervention. To understand how this initiative unfolded and why this
effort succeeded where others failed, this research explores policy implementation as the
outcome of the social negotiation of authority. To accomplish this, this research combines
policy implementation, boundary work, and field theories and develops an empirical
investigation of how actors reconciled multiple and often conflicting authorities to enact
policy change. This study asks how actors, using social practices and strategies, created
and legitimated sources of authority to establish a governing body for this new market
service. This case study relied on qualitative methods, including document review,
participant interviews, systematic observation of decision-making in context, detailed
observation fieldnotes, and the self-reflexive awareness of the role of the researcher. The
dissertation demonstrates that: 1) dominant yet deficient narratives provided a rationale
for ongoing resistance to regional governance in the West and prevented collaboration; 2)
actors overcame and transformed deficient sources of authority by enacting social
strategies that allowed alternative interpretations of the EIM construct and enabled
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organizations to begin collaboration; 3) actors using social negotiation interpreted and
adjusted the EIM policy intervention and co-created emergent forms of authority that are
flexible and dynamic; and 4) field interdependencies surfaced taken-for-granted
assumptions and provided critical resources for innovative forms of collective action. The
implications of these findings highlight the importance of the social negotiation of
authority in energy policy implementation. Specifically, the research makes several
theoretical and practical contributions: 1) multi-organizational policy implementation is a
social process of transforming, negotiating, and co-creating authority, and relational
authority can be an important rationale for enacted practices; 2) strategic actors engage in
communicative and social processes in which authority is emergent and abstraction
enables collective action without requiring consensus; 3) routine field interdependencies
can bring attention to taken-for-granted assumptions and create a moment of coauthoring; and 4) regional electricity system governance structures evolve as they balance
the inherent tensions of organized market participation.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Electricity systems around the world are becoming more integrated and
interdependent. Complex networks of infrastructure, markets, and regional governance
manage systems that provide real-time balancing of electricity supply and demand. In
most of North America, Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) manage the
wholesale electricity system. However, the electricity system in the Western United
States has remained relatively decentralized (Borenstein & Bushnell, 2015).
The seating of the Energy Imbalance Market Governing Body in the summer of
2016 marked a significant move towards electricity grid integration in the West. The
energy imbalance market (EIM) is the first successful extension of organized electricity
markets in the Western United States beyond California. The EIM differs from other
organized markets in two important ways. It is limited to real-time transactions and does
not include the forward and ancillary services markets or many of the other coordinated
functions that are used by RTOs. Additionally, the EIM emerged after the recent growth
of renewable resources transformed the resource mix and operating constraints of the
electricity system, whereas other organized markets originated primarily from pressures
to improve system reliability and efficiency.
To understand how this initiative unfolded and why this effort succeeded, while
previous efforts to introduce organized markets failed, my proposed research began with
an interest in three empirically linked questions: 1) Who were the actors that participated
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in the negotiation of EIM development? 2) How did non-market participants, like public
interest stakeholders and state regulators, engage in the debate? 3) How are the interests
of diverse stakeholders reflected in the EIM governance structure? These questions
emerged as a more specific way of exploring the overarching paradox of why
stakeholders in the Western Interconnection created an EIM, when fully organized
markets and regional governance provide greater economic efficiencies and more
operational flexibility.
1.1. Western Energy System Infrastructures
The tension over organized markets and regional governance in the West has
existed since 1996, when the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authorized
independent system operators (ISOs) and later, regional transmission organizations
(RTOs) as voluntary organizations to ensure open access to the transmission grid.1 RTOs
conduct infrastructure planning, ensure system reliability, centrally and dynamically
dispatch generation, and operate wholesale energy markets. As the electricity system has
become more integrated and interdependent, RTOs improved reliability and economic
efficiency by increasing data sharing, communication, and transparency and by
identifying and dispatching least cost resources (Hogan, 2002, 2014).
The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) is a nonprofit public
benefits corporation authorized in 1996 through California state statute and FERC tariff.
CAISO is the largest balancing authority and the only FERC-authorized RTO in the
interconnected electricity system in the Western United States. In the rest of the U.S.

1

For the purposes of this paper I will use RTOs to denote both RTOs and ISOs.
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Western Interconnection, 33 balancing authorities are responsible for matching supply
and demand in real-time and coordinating with each other for infrastructure planning and
flexible reserves. These balancing authorities do not have organized electricity markets,
but instead rely on a combination of short-term and long-term bilateral contracts. Despite
multiple attempts to extend or create new organized markets, the Western Interconnection
has, until recently, resisted these efforts, and continued to operate with a decentralized
decision-making and coordination structure.
Since RTOs were first established in the late 1990s and early 2000s, wind and
solar resources have transitioned from emerging technologies to major wholesale
electricity resources in many regions. In the West, state policies encouraging renewable
resources, coupled with decreasing costs of renewable technologies, have expanded the
share of these resources in the overall resources mix to more than 12%, and the West has
a larger share of solar resources than any region except Hawaii (U.S. Energy Information
Agency, 2017). Consequently, increasing attention is now being focused on how to
integrate these resources into the electricity system, while maintaining reliability and
affordability (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2015; Western Electricity
Coordinating Council, 2011).
Wind and solar resources are more variable than conventional resources and
require the electricity system to be more flexible and dynamic. Because electricity is
expensive to store, the grid precisely matches supply and demand in real time. As
demand increases or decreases, resources are dispatched up or down. Electricity system
infrastructure, rules, and processes were designed around relatively predictable and
controllable resources, like coal and nuclear. Therefore, integrating high levels of
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variable wind and solar resources creates a need for other resources to ramp up and down
more quickly, creates shorter peaks for cost recovery by conventional resources, and can
lead to negative prices and curtailment of wind and solar resources that would otherwise
be available to meet clean energy policy goals. This affects investment opportunities and
the value of existing assets. Maintaining reliability, maximizing the economic efficiency
of a new resource mix, and achieving progress toward clean energy goals requires
technological, institutional, and policy change to overcome the inflexibility of the legacy
electricity system. Utilities, regulators, RTOs and other stakeholders are exploring a
range of policy implementation options to enact such changes. For example, electricity
system flexibility can be increased through forecasting, sub-hourly economic dispatch,
distributed energy resources, energy storage, flexible generation, transmission, and
regional coordination. These options require implementation of technological solutions,
but they also all require implementation of new policy. RTO decisions about which
options to pursue and the details of how implementation occurs, will shape the relative
value of different resources, the location of infrastructure, and the incentives for
developing new technologies at scale.
Originated to provide efficiency and reliability benefits, RTOs are now playing a
critical role in integrating variable wind and solar resources into the electricity system
and creating market pathways for technological innovations such as storage, demand
response, and other distributed energy resources (Cifor, Denholm, Ela, Hodge, & Reed,
2015; Cochran et al., 2013; Dworkin, Sidortsov, & Sovacool, 2013; Mai, Sandor, Wiser,
& Schneider, 2012; Moot, 2014). Relative to the decentralized decision-making
structures in the West, RTOs provide geographic and resource diversity that helps
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balance the variability of wind and solar, greater access to flexible reserves, coordinated
infrastructure planning to bring renewable resources to distant load centers, market
signals to encourage investment in new technologies, and more operational awareness
and flexibility.
Despite these economic and reliability benefits of RTOs, stakeholders in the West
did not form a Western RTO, but instead decided to create an EIM that extends CAISO
real-time market services to participating balancing authorities. The EIM allows the
economic dispatch of resources in 15 minute and 5-minute market intervals, but does not
allow balancing authorities to participate in the forward energy market (i.e., the day
ahead and hour ahead markets) or the ancillary services markets. Participating in the EIM
is voluntary and the choice to participate is made by individual balancing authorities that
maintain autonomy from FERC rate regulation and responsibility for reserve obligations.
To date, six investor-owned utilities with operations in seven states, other than California,
have decided to participate in the Western EIM.
1.2. Policy Implementation
RTOs sit at the interface of federal, state, and local regulation. RTO operating
protocols, market designs, and planning procedures comprise the complex processes of
change and methods of coordination that translate policy inputs into outcomes. In other
words, the outcomes of state policy initiatives, like renewable portfolio standards (RPS)
or affordability goals, are shaped by the policy implementation decisions of RTOs and
the numerous stakeholders that engage in organized wholesale power markets and
determine the amount, value, and location of electricity resources.
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Implementation of the EIM involved formal and informal conversations among a
broad range of stakeholders including CAISO, investor-owned utilities, municipal power
agencies and electric cooperatives, federal power marketing administrations, independent
power producers, other asset owners, private power marketers, state and federal
regulators, energy policy offices, and environmental advocates. The question of how to
govern the newly forming market was deliberated in multiple decision-making venues
including formal stakeholder engagement processes and a committee facilitated by
CAISO. Through these deliberations, stakeholders engaged in the process of policy
implementation and shaped the structure of the EIM as a policy intervention.
This dissertation takes up questions of policy implementation, political control,
and democratic accountability through the lens of social negotiation of authority. In
particular, my research asks how RTO stakeholders negotiated multiple and conflicting
sources of authority to legitimate certain actions. In broad terms, I am interested in
understanding how actors within policy implementation systems reconcile ambiguous
and often conflicting authorities to produce change and pursue collective interests. This
process is central to understanding how state organizations within governance systems
seek to exercise discretion and sustain accountability to the public interest.
1.3. Rationale
The rationale for this research is two-fold. First, the Western EIM initiative is a
rich case of evolving electricity system governance and provides a unique opportunity to
study policy implementation and interorganizational collaboration as they unfold in
practice. By studying a complex governance system that requires interorganizational
collaboration, this research seeks to provide insight into the social mechanisms that shape
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implementation processes and outcomes. In particular, this research is focused on
examining the social negotiation of authority, how strategic actors engage in these social
negotiations, and how interdependencies and external events influence social
negotiations.
Much of the policy literature highlights the importance of understanding
implementation through the causal relationships between processes, outcomes and the
formal and informal authorities that form through centralized organizations and local
contexts (Bardach, 1977; Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Hill & Hupe, 2014; Matland, 1995;
Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980; Schneider & Ingram,
1990). However, the interdependent and dynamic nature of electricity policy
implementation requires action by multiple organizations engaging at different levels and
within a context of multiple and often conflicting sources of authority (Goldthau, 2014).
Understanding policy implementation in these complex systems requires a framework
that also incorporates the social process of reconciling different sources of authority in
order to explain how and why things get done in a particular way. The understanding of
authority as a negotiated phenomenon is well established in field theory and
organizational communication literature (e.g., Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Taylor & Van
Every, 2014) and is being explored in policy implementation literature (Moulton &
Sandfort, 2017). This dissertation seeks to extend these ideas to the context of multiorganizational regulatory policy implementation and to provide empirical evidence of the
process.
Second, the EIM initiative is of interest because it is fundamentally changing the
decision-making processes and relative influence of stakeholders in the West. The
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decisions about how to structure EIM governance will shape the region’s response to
climate change and the distribution of benefits and burdens across the region for years to
come. RTOs and their governance structures are increasingly important, yet understudied,
policy environments. Aligning federal organized power markets with state policy
initiatives is a critical energy policy challenge. It has been the subject of multiple FERC
technical conferences, legal challenges, and Supreme Court decisions (e.g., Hughes v.
Talen Energy Marketing, 2016; FERC v. Electric Power Supply Association et al., 2016;
FERC Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO
New England Inc., New York Independent System Operator, Inc., and PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C. May, 2017). This dissertation seeks to provide insight into how
RTO governance structures are evolving, the nature of the interface between state and
federal regulators, and how energy policy implementation can be facilitated.
Chapter 2 provides additional background on the electricity system in the West,
the growth of renewable resources, and explains the case study presented in this
dissertation. Chapter 3 reviews policy implementation literature and connects it to field
theory and boundary work literature to help make sense of policy implementation that
spans the responsibilities of more than one organization as the social negotiation of
authority. Chapter 4 explains the methodology used to collect and analyze data. Chapters
5 and 6 provide the findings from the analysis and Chapter 7 discusses the findings and
the practical and theoretical implications of this research.
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND AND CASE

In recent years, many researchers have been interested in the shift in patterns and
styles of governing to include multi-actor and multi-layered networks (Hill & Hupe,
2014; Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2001; Meier & O’Toole, 2006; Moran, Rein, & Goodin,
2006). This shift has led to governance systems that are less hierarchical and more
dependent on coordination and cooperation. To better understand how change occurs
within these complex systems, scholars have called for policy implementation research to
go beyond descriptions of context and process to investigating the complex social
mechanisms that explain why things are done in a particular way (DeLeon & DeLeon,
2002; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017; O’Toole, 2004). To answer that call, I am interested in
understanding how stakeholders, within bounded policy implementation systems,
dynamically produce and reproduce rules and resources to reconcile conflicting
authorities and pursue collective interests. This process is central to understanding how
organizations within governance systems seek to exercise discretion and sustain
accountability to the public interest.
To further my driving interest, this study focuses on a specific intervention, the
expansion of organized electricity market services in the West, and how stakeholders
created and legitimated sources of authority to establish a Governing Body for this new
market service. This chapter provides the background and case description for the study.
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Wind and solar resources now account for an important share of capacity and net
generation in many western states (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). Consequently,
increasing attention is being focused on how to integrate these variable resources into the
electricity system, while maintaining reliability and affordability. Recent research
demonstrates that high levels of wind and solar can be integrated with existing
technologies, but this transition will require institutional and policy change. This presents
a critical challenge for the West. Wind and solar integration can be facilitated by the
automation, expanded communication, and regional scale provided by regional
transmission organizations (RTOs). However, outside of the California Independent
System Operator (CAISO), the West has long resisted the tight regionalization and
organized markets of RTOs. The barriers to organized markets include concerns about
retaining political control, maintaining affordability, and cultural differences. This history
of resistance makes the decision in early 2013 to create a Western Energy Imbalance
Market (EIM) a rich case of evolving electricity system governance and a unique
opportunity to study multi-organizational policy implementation in practice. The EIM
initiative is fundamentally changing the decision-making processes, relative influence of
stakeholders, and energy federalism in the West.
This chapter describes the energy resources, electricity system infrastructures, and
legal authority that provide context for the EIM initiative. First, the chapter highlights the
growth of wind and solar resources in the West and the challenges of integrating these
resources into conventional infrastructures. Second, it describes the two distinct
electricity system infrastructures in the West. Third, the chapter explains the federal
authorization of RTOs. Finally, the chapter describes the implementation of an innovative
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EIM mechanism that leverages the CAISO infrastructure and the initial steps toward the
creation of a Western Regional System Operator (RSO).
2.1. Pressure to Integrate Wind and Solar Resources
Since RTOs were first established in the late 1990s and early 2000s, wind and
solar resources have transitioned from emerging technologies to become major resources
for wholesale electricity deployed at utility scale in many regions. This section describes
the growth of wind and solar resources in the West and the challenges of integrating these
resources into conventional infrastructures.
Growth of Wind and Solar in the West
In the West, state policies encouraging renewable resources, coupled with
decreasing costs of renewable technologies and institutional innovations, have expanded
the share of wind and solar in the overall resources mix. In the U.S., wind and solar
capacity increased from 7,200 MW to more than 101,000 MW between 2004 and 2015
and grew as a share of total capacity from 0.7% to more than 9% (U.S. Department of
Energy, 2015, 2016). In comparison, wind and solar capacity in the CAISO footprint is
now more than 13,600 MW, accounting for approximately 19% of total installed
capacity. In the non-RTO portion of the Western Interconnection, wind and solar capacity
exceeds 18,400 MW, accounting for approximately 9% of total capacity (Figure 2.1).
In addition to growth in capacity, wind and solar now account for 7% of annual
net generation in the U.S. and more than 12% of annual net generation in the U.S.
Western Interconnection (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2017). In comparing
electricity regions, only the Upper Midwest, Hawaii, and Texas have a higher total share
of generation from wind and solar resources, and only Hawaii has a higher share of solar
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generation (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2017). Given this growth in both capacity
and generation, increasing attention is now being focused on how to integrate wind and
solar into the electricity system, while maintaining reliability and affordability (National
Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2015; National Renewable Energy Laboratory &
Economics+Environmental Economics, 2015; Western Electricity Coordinating Council,
2011).
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Figure 2.1. Comparison of Resources Mix1
Wind and solar are a more significant share of total net capacity in CAISO, than
in the remaining regions of the Western Interconnection.
1. Western Interconnection data includes the 37 balancing authorities in North America.
Source: Data from California Independent System Operator, n.d.-a; Western Electricity Coordinating
Council, 2016
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Integration Challenges
The electricity system infrastructures in the West were designed around
predictable and controllable conventional resources, like coal, natural gas, and nuclear.
However, the level of wind and solar generation that now exists in the West requires
more flexibility in electricity system operations, planning, and markets. Wind and solar
resources pose certain challenges due to the variability of their generation coupled with
limitations in technology. Specifically, systems that are integrating high levels of variable
resources need generation that can rapidly ramp supply up or down as wind and solar
generation fluctuates. Systems can also face the potential for overgeneration when the
combination of available wind, solar, and conventional resources exceed demand. CAISO
is projecting significant overgeneration and ramping constraints driven by variable
resources (California Independent System Operator, 2013d) and as an example of
pressure in other regions of the West, the Bonneville Power Administration has already
experienced overgeneration constraints during certain periods with both high wind and
high water resources (Duane & Griffith, 2013). Ramping and overgeneration constraints
can challenge reliability and affect economic efficiency.
These challenges can be addressed with existing technologies, but require
infrastructure and policy change (see E3 Advisory Panel, 2014; Mai et al., 2012; National
Renewable Energy Laboratory & Economics+Environmental Economics, 2015). For
example, a National Renewable Energy Laboratory analysis found that:
...renewable electricity generation from technologies that are
commercially available today, in combination with a more flexible electric
system, is more than adequate to supply 80% of U.S. electricity generation
in 2050 while meeting electricity demand on an hourly basis in every
region of the United States (Mai et al., 2012).
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As explained by NREL, integrating high levels of renewable resources requires
policy changes to enable system flexibility. However, creating a more flexible electric
system is a difficult challenge in practice. To avoid ramping constraints, overgeneration
and electricity system failures, grid operators have traditionally relied on flexible reserves
or curtailed generation to remove the electricity from the system. However, the growth of
energy from wind and solar has shifted the implications of these practices. For example,
during periods of high wind or solar generation, wholesale electricity prices for all
resources can be negative and low-cost, clean wind and solar resources can be curtailed
(shut down) in order to maintain reliability. This creates operational challenges and
affects economic efficiency, the value of wind and solar investments, cost recovery for
conventional resources, and progress toward clean energy goals (Stafford & Wilson,
2016).
Alternative approaches that improve electricity system flexibility, economic
efficiency, and the integration of renewable resources include sub-hourly scheduling and
dispatch, advances in forecasting, new transmission, economic dispatch of renewables,
flexible gas generation, time-of-use pricing, new technologies like storage and demand
response, and coordination across larger operating areas (Cochran, Denholm, Speer, &
Miller, 2015; Loutan et al., 2007; Piwko, Clark, Freeman, Jordan, & Miller, 2010). Many
of these alternative approaches require or can be facilitated by the improved automation,
data sharing, expanded communication, and regional scale provided by RTOs. However,
much of the West lacks the tight regionalization and organized markets of RTOs.
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2.2. Electricity System Infrastructures in the West
In the late 1990s, efforts to promote electricity system restructuring began to
transform the relationships between regulators and utilities. Through a series of orders,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) encouraged the formation of RTOs
to manage transmission and oversee wholesale power markets. Additionally, many state
restructuring efforts introduced generation and retail competition for electricity.
Across the United States, RTOs formed in seven regions and these organizations
now manage approximately 70% of the bulk power supply (U.S. Energy Information
Agency, 2013). In contrast, the West has largely resisted this transition to organized
markets and regional governance through RTOs. The California Independent System
Operator (CAISO) is the only RTO operating in the U.S. segment of the Western
Interconnection. Although originally envisioned as a pathway to a west-wide RTO, this
expansion has not yet materialized and multiple efforts to form another western RTO
have failed.2 Consequently, in the West electricity transmission infrastructures are
managed within two distinct paradigms: areas managed by an RTO and areas managed
through coordination among separate balancing authorities. This section describes each
of these paradigms in more detail.
A Single State Regional Transmission Organization
CAISO organized in 1996 as one of the first RTOs. It is the largest balancing
authority in the U.S. portion of the Western Interconnection. Balancing authorities are
responsible for operating a portion of the grid and matching supply and demand in real

2

Including Desert STAR in the southwest and IndeGo, RTO West, and Grid West in the Northwest.
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time. Most are either RTOs or electric utilities and most serve more than one utility. As
both an RTO and a balancing authority, CAISO provides organized market services,
coordinates transmission infrastructure planning, maintains reliable operations, ensures
open-access to transmission, and manages the flow of electricity for about 80% of
California and a small part of Nevada (Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2.

CAISO is the Only RTO in the U.S. Western Interconnection
CAISO manages the flow of electricity for about 80% of
California and a small part of Nevada.

Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, n.d.-a

Like other RTOs, CAISO does not own generation or transmission; rather
transmission owners relinquish operational control and allow CAISO to control their
assets. CAISO administers organized electricity markets in which generation resources
are cost-optimized subject to operating and reliability constraints and dispatched jointly.3

3

Dispatching refers to the operating control of an integrated electric system involving operations such as
(1) the assignment of load to specific generating stations and other sources of supply to effect the most
economical supply as the total or the significant area loads rise or fall (2) the control of operations and

17
This method of centrally determining which generation is used is known as securityconstrained economic dispatch (SCED) (Blumsack, 2007). The CAISO market
framework includes three interdependent organized markets: a day-ahead market based
on forecast demand, a real-time market used to address imbalances not covered in the
day-ahead market, and an ancillary services market for products that help maintain grid
stability and reliability. The real-time market centrally and automatically dispatches
power every 15 minutes and every 5 minutes. This basic market model for organized
electricity markets is used across most RTOs. While this approach is not without
challenges, it generally has served to improve reliability and economic efficiency by
increasing data sharing, communication, and transparency and by identifying and
dispatching least cost resources (Blumsack, 2007; Hogan, 2002, 2014).
The Non-RTO Regions of the West
Outside of CAISO, 33 separate balancing authorities manage the transmission of
electricity in the U.S. segment of the Western Interconnection (Figure 2.3).4 These
balancing authorities are significantly smaller than CAISO in terms of managed
electricity supply. While CAISO manages more than 30% of electric supply in the U.S.
Western Interconnection, the Bonneville Power Administration, PacifiCorp West,
PacifiCorp East, and Nevada Energy each manage between 6% and 7% of electric

maintenance of high-voltage lines, substations, and equipment; (3) the operation of principal tie lines and
switching; (4) the scheduling of energy transactions with connecting electric utilities (U.S. Energy
Information Agency, n.d.))
4
The Western Interconnection includes 37 balancing authorities: CAISO, 33 other balancing authorities in
the U.S., two balancing authorities in Canada, and one in Mexico.
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supply. All

other balancing

authorities

manage 5% or less

of the electric

supply in the

Western

Interconnection

(Table 2.1).

Figure 2.3. Balancing Authorities in the West1
In the U.S. portion of the Western Interconnection, 34 balancing
authorities manage the bulk transmission grid for all or part of 14 states.
1. See Appendix A for legend identifying each balancing authority.
Source: Adapted from Western Electricity Coordinating Council, n.d.

Table 2.1.

Size of Balancing Authorities in the West (2014 data)

U.S. Western Interconnection
Balancing Authorities

Sales

Share of

(Annual

Sales

Gigawatt Hours)
TOTAL

776,336,511
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California Independent System Operator

247,685,664

32%

Bonneville Power Administration

54,576,108

7%

PacifiCorp West

49,538,710

6%

Nevada Energy

47,766,286

6%

PacifiCorp East

43,626,329

6%

Other Balancing Authorities

333,143,414

43%

Source: Data from Form 861 (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2014)

In the non-RTO regions of the West, power trading, planning, and reliability are
managed through decentralized institutions and decision-making processes. For example,
the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) serves as an umbrella
organization over five voluntary groups of utilities that coordinate transmission planning
in the West and it oversees compliance with mandatory reliability standards. 5
Additionally, several sub-regional organizations, such as the Northwest Power Pool, the
Western Systems Power Pool, and the Committee on Regional Electric Power
Cooperation, act as voluntary organizations to facilitate regional coordination on certain
aspects of power trading, operations, and reliability.
In non-RTO regions, entities trade wholesale power through a combination of
self-scheduled generation and bilateral contracts or brokerage agreements that range in
terms from hourly to multi-year. Bilateral transactions can also occur in CAISO regions,
subject to CAISO rules. Under this market construct, transmission congestion is managed
through the purchase of physical transmission rights and actions of the transmission
owner (Blumsack, 2007). Compared to the CAISO organized markets, data sharing,

5

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 established Section 215 of the Federal Power Act requiring compliance
with mandatory reliability standards. FERC certified the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC), a non-profit organization, was certified to carry out these responsibilities and NERC has
delegated the authority to create, monitor and enforce these standards in the Western Interconnection to the
Western Electricity Coordinating Council.
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communication, reliability, and transparency between balancing authorities is
fragmented, and consequently, these balancing authorities are less operationally flexible
than CAISO.6
2.3. Federal Authorization of Regional Transmission Organizations
RTOs are relatively new organizations that are formed by voluntary market
participants, defined by technological system boundaries, and span political jurisdictional
boundaries. They are authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
under the Federal Power Act of 1935 and are central to energy policy implementation.
This section describes the relationship between RTOs and state and federal authority for
electricity rate regulation.
The Federal Power Act established a division of authority over rate regulation
between federal and state agencies. FERC was responsible for interstate electricity sales,
whereas state and local regulators were responsible for intrastate electricity sales.
Because utilities typically had few interstate sales, FERC responsibilities were limited.
State and local agencies were the primary electricity regulators responsible for protecting
the public interest (Lyons, 2014). However, electricity industry restructuring has
transformed this division between federal and state authority.
In the late 1990s, FERC required utilities to provide open, non-discriminatory
access to transmission customers and encouraged the formation of RTOs to manage

6

In 2014, two important actions were taken to improve economic efficiency and reliability. FERC issued
Order 764 requiring intra-hourly transmission scheduling to reduce barriers to integrating variable
resources and other market inefficiencies. However, liquidity in these markets has been limited.
Additionally, NERC authorized the bifurcation of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council leading to
the founding of Peak Reliability to serve as a reliability coordinator for the Western Interconnection with
responsibilities to provide situational awareness and real-time monitoring.
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transmission and oversee wholesale electricity markets (Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 1996a, 1996b, 2000). 7 As a result, all independent power producers,
including renewable energy generators, can purchase transmission services at the same
rate that the utility charges itself and utilities can voluntarily chose to participate in
organized wholesale electricity markets managed by RTOs.
RTOs and electricity industry restructuring complicate the distinction between
federal, state, and local regulatory responsibilities (Table 2.2). FERC Order 888, which
required open access to the transmission grid, and subsequent interpretations and
clarifications have established FERC authority over all investor-owned utility
transactions made through the interconnected interstate transmission grid (Greenfield,
2010).8 Thus, investor-owned utilities are subject to FERC regulation of transmission and
wholesale electricity rates and state regulation of distribution and retail electricity rates.
Table 2.2.

Regulatory Authority by Type of Utility and Region

Investor-Owned Utility
Publicly Owned Utility2
1.

7

CAISO1

Non-RTO

State

State

FERC

FERC

Local
FERC3

Local4

CAISO itself is a regulated utility as defined in the Federal Power Act and operates through an

FERC Order 888 reinterpreted provisions in the Federal Power Act to require FERC-jurisdictional
utilities to provide open, non-discriminatory access to transmission customers (Eisen, 2016; Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 1996a; Lyons, 2014). Additionally, Order 888 encourages, but does not require,
the formation of independent system operators (ISOs) to manage transmission and oversee wholesale
power markets. Subsequently, FERC Order 2000 further defined the requirements for an entity to qualify as
an ISO or RTO (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2000).
8
To implement this requirement, Order 888 requires all jurisdictional utilities to file a pro forma openaccess transmission tariff (OATT) that contains minimum terms and conditions of non-discriminatory
access. Thus, all investor owned utilities are subject to FERC regulation through OATTs. In contrast,
government agencies, certain electric cooperatives, and federal power marketing administrations are not
universally required to file OATTs (Eisen, 2016).
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open-access transmission tariff. CAISO is also subject to a California state organic statute.
2.

Publicly-owned utility (POU) for the purposes of this study include government agencies,
certain electric cooperatives, and federal power marketing administrations. This definition
departs from the formal definition in the Federal Power Act.

3.

FERC has authority to review a non-jurisdictional utility’s rates if they are a component of an
RTO’s rate design (Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 306 F.3d 1112, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
Transmission Agency of N. Cal. v. FERC, 495 F.3d 663, at 671-72 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).

4.

FERC authority over POUs is limited to compliance with mandatory reliability standards and
controls to prevent market manipulation (FPA 215 (16 USC 824o) FPA 222 (16 USC 824v)).

In contrast, government agencies, certain electric cooperatives, and federal power
marketing administrations are generally exempt from federal rate regulation.9 These
types of utilities are often referred to as non-jurisdictional utilities and for the purposes of
this study will be referred to as publicly owned utilities. Local agencies and boards of
directors regulate transmission, distribution, and all sales for municipal utilities and
electric cooperatives.10 However, a publicly owned utility that voluntarily chooses to
participate in an RTO is subject to full rate review by FERC. Thus, for publicly owned
utilities, joining an RTO involves relinquishing autonomy over rate regulation.

9

The Federal Power Act uses the term ‘public utility’ in a manner that departs from common usage. The
Act defines a public utility as "any person who owns or operates facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission," that is, "any person who owns or operates" facilities for the transmission of electric energy
in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce. Furthermore,
the Act exempts federal, state, and local agencies, electric cooperatives, and federal power marketing
administrations, with limited exceptions, from the plurality of FERC authority (Eisen, 2016). For the
purposes of this study, publicly owned utility (POU) or public power utility refers to government agencies,
certain electric cooperatives, and federal power marketing administrations.
10
Federal Power Act Section 211A, established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, expands FERC
jurisdiction over the transmission system by authorizing FERC to order an unregulated transmitting utility
to file changes to or replace its voluntarily-filed Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) to address
undue discrimination regarding access to its transmission system. This provision was used for the first time
in 2011 when FERC ordered the Bonneville Power Administration to revise its wind curtailment practices
to comply with the undue discrimination standards in Section 211A and file an OATT. These curtailment
practices, orders, and revisions are still under dispute (Dennis & Brecher, 2015).
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Furthermore, experience in RTOs across the U.S. has demonstrated the blurring of
federal, state and local responsibilities around certain policy issues and technology
innovations. The operation of organized wholesale markets affects policy decisions that
traditionally have been under state jurisdiction, such as resources adequacy and
transmission planning. Additionally, many new technologies, like storage and demand
response, cannot be identified as providing only wholesale or retail services. With the
expansion of organized markets and regional governance, the clear division of authority
between federal and state regulators has given way to a more complex regulatory system
that includes multiple and indirect authorities (See Rossi, 2016).
2.4. The Western Energy Imbalance Market
The Western EIM initiative that began in 2013 and the seating of the Energy
Imbalance Market Governing Body in the summer of 2016 mark a significant move
towards electricity grid integration in the West. The EIM is the first successful extension
of organized electricity markets in the Western United States beyond California. The
EIM differs from an RTO and other organized markets in important ways. An RTO is an
organization that takes operational control of participating transmission assets and
provides a full range of organized market services, infrastructure planning, and reliability
functions to participating utilities, which are subject to FERC rate review. In contrast, the
EIM is a mechanism that extends limited real-time market services to participating
entities and preserves their autonomy from FERC rate review, operation of transmission
assets, and responsibility for reserve obligations. Additionally, the EIM differs from other
organized markets operated by RTOs because it emerged after the recent growth of
renewable resources transformed the resource mix and operating constraints of the
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electricity system; whereas, RTOs originated primarily from pressures to improve system
reliability and efficiency. This section provides a broad overview of the case and
describes the decision-making processes for each of the phases of the case.
Overview of the Energy Imbalance Market Initiative
Following efforts in the 1990s and early 2000s to create a west-wide RTO,
attention began to focus on alternative mechanisms for integrating renewable resources
and improving market efficiency (Cochran et al., 2013; Linvill, Candelaria, & Spalding,
2011; Mai et al., 2012; Milligan et al., 2013; Piwko et al., 2010; Porter et al., 2012;
Samaan et al., 2013; Western Electricity Coordinating Council, 2011). From this work,
an EIM emerged as an alternative that could contribute to these goals through real-time
automated dispatch, improved communications, increased system visibility, and sharing
of resources. As designed by the CAISO-PacifiCorp implementation process,
participation in the EIM is voluntary and there is no exit fee. Balancing authorities retain
functional and planning control over their transmission and retain responsibility for
reserve and capacity requirements. Participating balancing authorities do not have access
to the CAISO day-ahead or ancillary services markets.
In February 2012, western regulators held an initial meeting of the Public Utilities
Commission-Energy Imbalance Market (PUC-EIM) Group. The formation of this Group
marked the beginning of formal discussions specifically related to the CAISO EIM
initiative that is the focus of this study. In 2013 CAISO and PacifiCorp signed a bilateral
agreement to implement an EIM. The EIM creates opportunities for California exports
during periods of high renewable resource generation and provides access to flexible
capacity needed to accommodate variable renewable resources. In contrast, new market
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participants are motivated to join the EIM by a range of interests, including greater
efficiency, operational flexibility, access to additional markets, and the ability to integrate
wind and solar resources. However, for many of these stakeholders an ability to maintain
a level of autonomy from FERC, CAISO, and California policy institutions is critical.
By April 2016, six investor-owned utilities had agreed to participate in the EIM,
extending these services to seven states (Figure 2.4). The balancing authorities in
remaining regions of the West that are not participating in either an EIM or CAISO
manage approximately 30% of the electricity supply in the West (U.S. Energy
Information Agency, 2014).

Figure 2.4.

Voluntary Participants in the Western Energy Imbalance Market
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Source: California Independent System Operator, n.d.-b

EIM transactions between CAISO and PacifiCorp began in November 2014 and a
Governing Body was appointed in June 2016. The EIM provides economic, reliability,
and environmental benefits for CAISO and participating entities. In the second quarter of
2016, total benefits were estimated to be $88.19 million, and the EIM allowed CAISO to
avoid curtailment of 158,806 MWh of renewables (California Independent System
Operator, 2016a). However, the anticipated expansion of wind and solar generation to
achieve California’s 50% RPS and greenhouse gas emission goals continues to present
challenges. CAISO is now engaged in multiple initiatives to further improve system
flexibility (Loutan, 2015). Additionally, the EIM has elevated fundamental questions
about CAISO governance, and the region is now engaged in discussions of a fully
organized market across a broader region in the West.
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The case focuses on the collective action that occurred around the formation of a
new regional Governing Body for the Western EIM (Figure 2.5).

Technical Implementation
Emergence of a New EIM Governing Body
February 2012
PUC-EIM Group
Formed
February 2013
CAISO-PacifiCorp
EIM Agreement
November 2013
Board Approves
Market Design
November 2014
EIM Live Operation

August - December 2013
Stakeholder Engagement
May 2014
Transitional Committee
Appointments
July 2014 - October 2015
Transitional Committee
Meetings

Transformation to an RSO
April 2015
PacifiCorp to Study Full
Market Participation
October 2015
SB 350 Defines Process for
Governance Reform

February - July 2016
Stakeholder Meetings and
September 2015
Board Approves Governance Integration Studies

June 2016
EIM Governing Body
Appointed

July 2016
Joint Agency Workshop
August 2016
Governor Delays Initiative
Pending Further Work

Figure 2.5. Timeline of Interdependent Decision-Making Fields
Technical implementation of the EIM infrastructure proceeded while governance
continued to be deliberated. Announcement of plans to explore a regional system
operator occurred while the Transitional Committee was still developing governance
recommendations.
Technical Implementation
In March 2013, CAISO management brought the EIM implementation agreement
to their Board of Governors for approval and initiated a stakeholder engagement process.
In CAISO, policy implementation issues are deliberated in ad-hoc processes that are open
to any interested organization or individual and subject to California open meeting and
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open record statutes. Professional CAISO staff support deliberation of issues and move
the discussion through an iterative process of straw proposals, comments, and revisions.
There is no voting in stakeholder processes. Staff present proposed tariff changes to the
board for disposition and any interested person or organization has the ability to provide
written or verbal comments on proposals.
In April 2013, CAISO released a straw proposal and issue paper that included
detailed proposals for many technical market design and operational implementation
issues. This document also identified several policy questions that required additional
stakeholder input and discussion. Among these were governance issues, transmission cost
allocation procedures, and greenhouse gas (GHG) emission accounting. In reaction to this
proposal, stakeholders requested “a more in-depth discussion” regarding governance
issues and CAISO established a parallel stakeholder process specifically dedicated to
governance (California Independent System Operator, 2013a, 2013c). CAISO, PacifiCorp
and other stakeholders focused on implementation of technical issues through the
standard CAISO decision-making process. These deliberations were relatively
uncontroversial. The CAISO Board of Governors approved the EIM market design
changes in November 2013, and as noted above, EIM transactions began in November of
2014.
Emergence of a New Energy Imbalance Market Governance Body
In August 2013, CAISO proposed establishing a Transitional Committee
(henceforth “the Committee”) that would be authorized as an advisory committee to the
CAISO Board and charged with developing recommendations for a long-term
independent governance structure. This bifurcation of the decision-making process
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recognized a need to foster a space for collaboration, while allowing EIM implementation
with PacifiCorp to proceed without delay. This shift in how policy implementation
decisions would be negotiated narrowed the issues that needed to be addressed, allowed
new stakeholders to play a more meaningful role in the process, and established a
separation from CAISO. Between August and December of 2013, CASIO facilitated a
process to develop a charter for the Committee. The Committee was appointed in May of
2014 and comprised a total of 13 members including four members from balancing
authorities participating in the EIM, two from incumbent CAISO investor-owned utilities
and private marketers, two from potential EIM participants, and five from public power,
state agencies, or public interest organizations.
The Committee held 16 meetings between July 2014 and October 2015. During
this time period two important events occurred. First, the actual EIM market mechanism
became operational after only four Committee meetings. Second, in April of 2015
PacifiCorp signed an agreement to explore the feasibility of full participation in the
CAISO organized markets. This occurred after the Committee’s ninth meeting and in the
midst of stakeholder comments on the initial governance structure straw proposal. The
Committee decided to continue their work, despite this change in context, and it
submitted a recommendation that was approved by the CAISO Board of Governors in
September of 2015. The EIM Governing Body was appointed in June of 2016.
Transformation to a Regional System Operator
Following the PacifiCorp decision to explore full participation in CAISO, the two
organizations worked from April to October of 2015 to define issues and communicate
with stakeholders. These steps included initiating bi-weekly regional update calls, issuing
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a discussion paper, developing a benefits study, and holding two stakeholder meetings.
Additionally, CAISO shared eleven regional grid studies with interested stakeholders.
Although this initiative did not follow the standard CAISO decision-making process,
CAISO accepted comments on the benefits study.
In October of 2015, the California Legislature and Governor enacted SB 350 (CA
SB350, 2015) defining a process for CAISO governance reform to support its
transformation into a regional organization. In support of this legislation, CAISO initiated
detailed studies of the economic and environmental impacts of regionalization.
Additionally, CAISO and PacifiCorp held a joint web conference and the California
Energy Commission convened three workshops and a joint agency workshop between
February and July of 2016. These workshops provided key stakeholders with the
opportunity to present issues and allowed stakeholders to provide oral and written
comments. This decision-making process was structured around the requirements and
timelines imposed by SB 350 and stakeholders were working to develop a
recommendation for the 2016 Legislative Session. In August of 2016, the California
Governor notified the Legislature that a regionalization proposal would not be available
for debate in the 2016 Session, but that state agencies, including CAISO, would continue
to work on a proposal for the 2017 Session.
2.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I explain the growth of wind and solar resources in the West and
the pressure this creates for policy change; the distinct electricity infrastructure
governance approaches within CAISO and in non-RTO regions of the West; and the
complexity that RTOs introduce to electricity system regulation. CAISO is perceived as
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tightly aligned with California policy making. It operates within a single state, is
authorized by state statute and FERC, and is dominated by three large investor-owned
utilities and a partially restructured industry. In contrast, the non-RTO regions of the
West are diverse. The balancing authorities are much smaller than CAISO, are located
across 13 states with diverse energy policy goals, and the region is shaped by public
power and a vertically integrated industry. These differences in infrastructure, regulation,
policy goals, and resource mix mean that any expansion of organized markets involves
complex negotiations and different perspectives regarding potential political and
economic benefits risks of collaboration, as well as the complications introduced by
California statute and FERC jurisdiction in relation to public power.
This chapter also introduces the unique concept of the EIM and explains that it
differs from an RTO in critical aspects. An EIM provides more limited market services
than an RTO, but allows participating utilities to retain autonomy over rate regulation,
transmission operations, and reserve capacity for reliability. This chapter also explains
the three interdependent phases in the implementation of the EIM market mechanism and
the decision-making process that resulted in seating of an innovative EIM governance
body and in legislation authorizing the first steps toward the creation of a Western RSO.
This transition marks a significant shift in the relationships among federal regulators,
state regulators, and utilities in the West. It represents a successful effort to enable policy
change after nearly 20 years of stability in which stakeholders resisted organized
electricity markets despite their widespread adoption in other regions of the U.S. and
around the world. To understand how this policy change occurred, Chapter 3 reviews
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theoretical literature on policy implementation, action fields, and organizational studies
that provide a framework for my research.
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW

Regional transmission organization (RTO) governance structures and their
accountability to the public interest have been an ongoing source of debate (Dworkin &
Goldwasser, 2007; Eisen, 2016; Rossi, 2016). In this debate, considerable attention has
focused on how to improve accountability to the public interest and the appropriate
balance between state and federal regulatory jurisdiction. The difficulty in addressing
these issues is compounded by the rapid transition of the electricity system over the past
two decades and the evolving relationships between RTOs, policy goals, and technology.
My research takes up questions of political control and democratic accountability through
the lens of social negotiation and authority. In particular, I ask how RTO stakeholders
themselves negotiated multiple and conflicting sources of authority to legitimate certain
actions. In broad terms, I am interested in understanding how stakeholders within policy
implementation systems reconcile ambiguous and often conflicting authorities to produce
change and pursue collective interests. This process is central to understanding how state
organizations within governance systems seek to exercise discretion and sustain
accountability to the public interest.
The purpose of this chapter is to review several bodies of literature that provide
the background for this research. In particular, because RTOs inherently involve
voluntary coordination of multiple organizations, I explore the topics of authority, social
negotiation, and subsystem interdependencies within the context of policy

34
implementation that spans the responsibilities of more than one organization. Policy
process and institutional theories use the concept of policy entrepreneur to identify the
importance of individual agency in driving policy change and are generally focused on
understanding policy implementation through competing coalitions and instrumental
motivations. However, these theories have little to say about the strategies and actions of
actors that contribute to change. Because the concepts of policy entrepreneur, identity,
and voluntary cooperation are under-theorized in the policy process literature, I draw on
field theory, and an application of these ideas to policy implementation, to provide a
framework for investigating the complex social mechanisms that explain why things are
done in a particular way.
This dissertation thus departs from most theories of policy implementation or
policy process in three important ways. First, unlike rational choice approaches, this
research does not presume that rules and resources are known or fixed, but rather that
they are produced, reproduced, and altered by socially skilled actors in relation to
collective interests. In addition, rather than theorizing individual agency as motivated
only by self interest, individual and collective action is theorized as being driven by a
desire to construct meaning in relation to others and interests are defined and negotiated
in relation to others (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Giddens, 1984; Moulton & Sandfort,
2017). Second, this research focuses directly on the interdependencies among policy
subsystems. Recognizing the ties among related social systems and the social system that
forms around any given policy implementation intervention, this research explores how
these ties routinely introduce discursive resources and different sources of authority
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Hardy, Lawrence, & Grant, 2005; Moulton & Sandfort,

35
2017). Third, this research adopts a discursive perspective, which builds on
communication and interorganizational collaboration literature, to identify how
discourses produce identities, shared meanings, and lead to particular practices. This
approach shifts attention from the intentions of individuals to their observable
communication practices and the effects of those practices on social relations (Hardy et
al., 2005; Koschmann & Burk, 2016).
Regional transmission systems (RTOs) represent an interesting case of complex
governance and provide an opportunity to focus on the social interactions that are part of
implementation in practice. For example, the California Independent System Operator
(CAISO) is a space for organizations to negotiate market, planning, and operational rules.
CAISO decision-making relies on open stakeholder participation, staff-driven processes,
and Board approval of tariff changes. FERC requires RTOs to be both independent of and
responsive to stakeholders (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2000, 2008). As
such, RTOs must balance the interests of direct market participants with those who may
not be direct participants but are affected by market transactions nonetheless.
The stakeholders that participate in CAISO decision-making processes include
investor-owned utilities, publicly owned utilities, generators, marketers, alternative
energy providers, new technology suppliers, trade associations, state policymakers and
regulators, and civil society organizations. CAISO does not have a formal concept of
member and uses the term stakeholder to refer to any interested individual or
organization. Following this convention, my research uses the same broad definition of
stakeholder to refer to the wide range of private, public, and civil society organizations
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and individuals interested in clean energy, organized markets, and electricity system
reliability and affordability.
This dissertation draws from several theoretical traditions relevant to public
policy, action fields, and organizational studies. In this chapter, I examine where these
various theoretical concepts intersect, and why this intersection is significant for
understanding RTO governance. First, this chapter provides an overview of policy
implementation literature focusing on definitions and theoretical concepts used to explain
change and stability. Next, I review the literature on field theory as it relates to multiorganizational policy implementation and particularly to implementation that requires
cooperation and innovation. Then, drawing on field theory concepts, I review research on
authority, social negotiation, and field interdependencies. Next, the chapter explains the
discursive approach in organizational studies, its relevance to multi-organizational policy
implementation, and its connection to understanding social negotiation, strategies and
practices. Finally, drawing on the concepts from these literatures, the chapter identifies
several research questions that serve as the basis of the empirical investigation.
3.1. Policy Implementation
This section describes policy implementation, with a specific focus on the social
processes and interdependencies that explain change and stability within policy
implementation systems.
Definitions
Public policy implementation has been defined as the “carrying out of a basic
policy decision” (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980, p. 540). Traditional public policy
scholars focus on the role of implementation as a stage in the policy process falling
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between selection and evaluation and as something distinct from policy formulation
(Brewer, 1974; Lasswell, 1956) (Figure 3.1).
Policy
Maintenance,
Succession
or
Termination

Agenda
Setting

Policy
Formulation

Evaluation

Implementation

Figure 3.1.

Legitimation

Policy Process Cycle

Source: Adapted from Cairney, n.d.

This research focuses on centralized policy formulation and goal achievement (Bardach,
1977; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980) and has expanded to
include research on policy design choices (Ingram & Schneider, 1990; Schneider &
Ingram, 1990) and levels of ambiguity and conflict (Matland, 1995). This research
highlights the importance of causal theory.
In contrast, other scholars have challenged the definition of implementation as a
distinct stage in the policy process. These scholars emphasize the interaction between the
stages that occurs in practice and focus on implementation as a process of negotiation
(Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Hill & Hupe, 2014; Nakamura, 1987). This implementation
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research seeks to provide local explanations for empirical variations in outputs or
outcomes (Berman, 1978; Hjern & Porter, 1981). It has drawn attention to administrative
discretion and the role of coordinating mechanisms (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Lipsky,
2010; Milward & Provan, 2003; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Sandfort, 2000) and highlights
the complexity of local contexts and the existence of multiple policies and authorities
within an implementation subsystem.
Policy implementation is further defined by the problem of multi-actor or multiorganizational action. Scholars have long recognized that implementation inherently
involves the “complexity of joint action” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). The more
recent shift in the pattern and style of governing to relationships between actors and
levels that are less hierarchical and involve implementation that spans the responsibilities
of more than one organization add to this complexity (Hill & Hupe, 2014; Lynn et al.,
2001; Meier & O’Toole, 2006). This move toward governance alters the locus of decision
making, expands the scope of delegated authority, draws attention to how processes are
carried out in practice, and requires more reliance on cooperation and negotiation (Meier
& O’Toole, 2006; Moran et al., 2006).
Social Processes and Interdependencies
Drawing on these definitions and concepts, implementation research often closely
ties to questions of political control and democratic accountability or focuses on
identifying structures to improve outcomes either in terms of alignment with formal
policy or integration into the implementation system (Hill & Hupe, 2014). Policy process
literature brings attention to the idea of implementation as policy change. Broadly, this
research focuses on the interactions between public policy and actors, events, contexts,
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and outcomes (Weible, 2014). These frameworks and theories are not specific to
implementation or to a specific stage in the policy process, but provide concepts and
insights for understanding different aspects of policy change or stability and therefore,
can be useful in understanding implementation. For example, the Advocacy Coalition
Framework (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) was designed to
integrate findings from earlier implementation research and is most useful for
understanding coalitions, learning, and policy change in high-conflict situations.
Several policy process frameworks and theories draw attention to the role of
individuals in driving policy change (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Kingdon, 2011;
Lindblom, 1959; Lindblom, 1968; Olsen & March, 1989; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith,
1993). These actors behave strategically to influence decisions, enable policy learning, or
shape outcomes and are sometimes referred to as policy entrepreneurs or policy brokers.
For example, the Multiple Streams Theory introduces the concept of a policy
entrepreneur and conceptualizes policy change as a dynamic interplay between human
agency and enabling and constraining organizational structures embedded in situational
contexts (Sætren, 2016). These theories, with notable exceptions, have little to say about
what strategies and actions by actors contribute to change (Kingdon, 2011; Mintrom &
Norman, 2009; Pierce et al., 2014; Sætren, 2016). Suggested strategies include framing
decisions as gains or loses, manipulation of sequential decision making, use of symbols
to appeal to emotion and cognitive meanings, assigning values, creating narratives,
typifying, displaying social acuity, defining problems, building teams, and reducing the
perception of risks (Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2005;
Schneider & Ingram, 2005; Zahariadis, 2003).
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Most policy process frameworks and theories focus on a single policy system or
subsystem as the level of analysis (Cairney & Heikkila, 2014). Several of these theories
also highlight the role of stable and dynamic external effects on change or stability
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Kingdon, 2011; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Schneider
& Ingram, 2005). For example, the Advocacy Coalition Framework conceives of policy
subsystems as semi-independent with the potential for overlaps and nesting with other
subsystems. This framework acknowledges that subsystem decisions are affected by and
can affect external subsystem affairs and highlights the importance of spillover effects
from other policy subsystems (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). While empirical research has
supported the importance of external events or shocks in driving policy change (Barke,
1993; Bischoff, 2001; Nohrstedt, 2005; Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010), there is a need for
additional research on the role of subsystem interdependencies in driving change
(Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). Interdependencies occur within and across
subsystems and are theorized to shape identities and result in coordination among actors
with shared beliefs (Fenger & Klok, 2001; Litfin, 2000; Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998).
Coordination is defined as an actor altering its own strategies to accommodate the
activity of others in pursuit of similar goals (Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998).
Interdependencies can be understood as a boundary or frontier, in terms of the resources
that enable actions, or in terms of functional ties in which actions are linked or causally
related to each other (Fenger & Klok, 2001; Litfin, 2000; Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998).
This research highlights the importance of understanding implementation through
the causal relationships between processes, outcomes and the formal and informal
authorities that form through centralized organizations and local contexts. It also brings
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attention to an understanding of implementation as policy change driven by various
interactions among contexts, actors, events and outcomes. It provides important insights
for understanding the role of social skills and interdependencies in policy implementation
and also highlights that these are two areas where additional research is needed. The next
section reviews literature from field theory that provides insight into each of these issues.
3.2. Strategic Action Fields
The electricity infrastructure and institutions of the 20th Century were designed
with a particular: 1) scale reflecting geographic reach, 2) structure reflecting the
relationship between public institutions and private industry structure, and 3) policy
scope aligned to the technologies and energy system values of the time which included
equal access to electricity, affordability, and reliability of service (Figure 3.2 see
Dworkin et al., 2013; Hirsh, Sovacool, & Badinelli, 2010; Hughes, 1987; Stephens,
Wilson, & Peterson, 2015). The responsibilities and authorities of RTOs, regulators, and
energy policymakers are deeply enmeshed with one other and with the decisions of actors
in the electricity sector. As the electricity sector transitions to clean energy resources,
new technologies are shaping policy implementation through electricity grid planning,
operations, and market rules; at the same time, these policy implementation decisions are
determining the value, development, and operation of existing system assets and
emerging technologies. This co-evolution of technology and policy is a fundamental
aspect of energy policy change.
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Figure 3.2. Shift in Electricity System Values
The co-evolution of technology and energy system values shapes the scale,
structure and scope of the electricity system. Clean energy values are reshaping
this complex socio-technical system.
In this complex sociotechnical system, policy implementation spans the
responsibilities of more than one organization and involves multiple, interconnected
levels of action. Therefore, it is essential to consider energy policy implementation from
a governance framework in which policy implementation spans the responsibilities of
multiple organizations and the boundaries between public and private have blurred (Hill
& Hupe, 2014; Lynn et al., 2001; Meier & O’Toole, 2006; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017;
Ostrom, 2011).
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Policy implementation literature from a policy process perspective focuses on
identifying causal relationships and predicting outcome effects (Jenkins-Smith et al.,
2014; Kingdon, 2011; Sabatier, 1986; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 1999; Sabatier &
Weible, 2007; Zahariadis, 2003). These literatures emphasize how political control,
power, and authority contribute to implementation success or failure. However, the
interdependent and dynamic nature of energy policy implementation requires action by
multiple organizations engaging at different levels and within a context of multiple and
often conflicting sources of authority (Goldthau, 2014; Ostrom, 2011). Understanding the
interaction among these authorities based on fixed descriptions of rules or resources can
be difficult. Policy implementation in complex systems requires a framework that also
incorporates the social mechanisms that explain how and why things get done in a
particular way.
Moulton & Sandfort (2017) propose a strategic action field framework as a way
of making sense of this complexity and the variations of local implementation in practice
by focusing on which authorities are activated, or perceived to be legitimate. This
framework identifies two components that are useful in defining a bounded system for
the study of policy implementation: a focus on a public service intervention and decision
making at multiple levels of strategic action. The framework also describes change driven
by the use of social skills to legitimize various sources of authority, which is addressed in
Section 3.3.
Public Service Intervention
Moulton & Sandfort (2017) focus on the interaction between structure and action
as an ongoing emergent process at key sites within the implementation system. Using this
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perspective, research is centered on a public service intervention that embodies ideas
about creating change. The EIM extension of organized market services can be
conceptualized as this type of a public service intervention. An important aspect of this
approach is the recognition that policy implementation often requires change to existing
interventions as well as modifications to a proposed intervention. Like policy process
theories, implementation is defined in terms of policy change, but the level of analysis is
a public service intervention around which collective action occurs. This shift focuses
attention on the social processes and negotiations that drive change. Specifically, policy
implementation is defined as “deliberate, institutionally sanctioned change to a public
service intervention that is legitimated in part by political authority” (Moulton &
Sandfort, 2017, p. 145). From this perspective, a particular public service intervention
both shapes implementation dynamics and is shaped by social interactions. For example,
the EIM extension of organized market services requires technical and policy changes to
the existing mechanisms for power trading in CAISO and in the non-RTO regions of the
West, which engaged particular actors in specific processes, and details of these market
mechanisms were negotiated and altered through the implementation process.
Strategic Action Fields
Drawing on Fligstein & McAdam (2012) and Moulton & Sandfort (2017),
strategic action fields can be understood as bounded social systems that form around
shared understandings about purposes, relationships among members, and rules
governing legitimate action. Field boundaries are emergent and are produced and
reproduced through the interaction of actors. Multiple and often overlapping strategic
action fields form around any given policy implementation intervention and enable or
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constrain what is possible to change (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, 2012; Moulton &
Sandfort, 2017). For example, the expansion of organized market services was
implemented through multiple stakeholder processes each focused on different aspects of
the public service intervention and involving various combinations of stakeholders
orienting to the intervention based on the unique rules, resources, and social interactions
that serve to define the stakeholder process as a distinct strategic action field.
Importantly, policy implementation outcomes are viewed as the result of dynamic
interactions between structures and socially skilled actors. This perspective draws on
organizational sociology and emphasizes that structures, which consist of rules and
resources, are emergent and shaped by human agency (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991;
Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Giddens, 1984). From this perspective, organizational
structures are continually produced through interaction and also shape that interaction.
Within a system of competing values and belief systems the groups with the most power
are those that have best integrated their interests into the structuring of the organization
(Mumby, 1987, p. 116). Thus, in policy implementation systems that involve ambiguous
or competing authorities, the ability to integrate a particular interpretation of an authority
into the structuring of the organization serves to legitimate the practices that are enacted.
The implementation of clean energy policy is complex and can occur
simultaneously in multiple fields and at multiple levels. Moulton & Sandfort (2017)
differentiate three levels of fields based on scale of action: policy, organizational, and
frontlines. Organizations may participate in more than one field, at multiple levels, and
engage in implementation activities in different fields simultaneously. In this way
implementation can be understood as a system in which the levels of implementation are
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connected and influence each other. For example, the expansion of organized markets in
the West can be understood through the initial policy field level conversations in which
stakeholders determined which policy options to pursue, the logic of change, and which
processes are desirable. It can also be understood through a focus on where and when
implementation occurred at the organizational level as policy ideals were reconciled and
integrated with existing market products and protocols.
3.3. Drivers of Change: Authority, Social Skills and Interdependencies
The field theory literature proposes three drivers of change: authority, social skills
and interdependencies. Each of these is addressed below.
Authority
The Strategic Action Field Framework focuses on the activation of legitimate
authority as fundamental in shaping how policy implementation occurs in practice. As
defined by Weber authority can be understood as a legitimate form of power (cited in
Benoit-Barné & Cooren, 2009, p. 6) and within a given policy subsystem or strategic
action field, policy implementation often involves ambiguous authority relationships or
competing sources of authority (Benoit-Barné & Cooren, 2009; Koschmann, 2012;
Moulton & Sandfort, 2017; Ostrom, 2011).
Authority can derive from a range of non-material sources, including legal
instruments, hierarchical position, political relationships, economic incentives, norms,
and shared beliefs. From the perspective of structuration theory, the significance of any
particular source of authority is interpreted in context. Social structures consist of rules,
which are the patterns people follow, and resources, which control people or objects.
Social structures are emergent and form through interaction with actors (Fligstein &
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McAdam, 2012; Giddens, 1984). According to Moulton & Sandfort (2017) “...the
significance of any rule or resource is not predetermined; actors make decisions about the
relative importance...” (p. 146). For example, RTOs are required to balance the interests
of direct market participants, state regulatory policies, FERC policy directives, and the
interests of those affected by market transactions. These interests are reflected through a
combination of state and federal formal political authorities, the distribution of benefits
and costs associated with power market transactions and transmission infrastructure, and
various organizational norms and beliefs that enable and constrain what is considered
possible. Policy implementation is thus understood as a process of negotiating which
sources of authority provide rationale for practices that are enacted and involves actors in
a process of interpreting what is and what is not possible.
In voluntary collaborations, such as an RTO or the EIM, formal authority from
political or economic mechanisms is limited and cultural authority derived from shared
meanings and collective identity becomes more important in providing the rationale for
collective action (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; Hardy, Lawrence, & Grant, 2005;
Koschmann, 2012). This is of particular relevance for understanding RTOs and the
expansion of EIM markets. The stakeholders involved in discussion of market rules and
governance are engaged in collaborative relationships that are voluntary and only bound
within certain limits by formal authority or exchange of resources. This type of
collaborative relationship to determine market structures is identified by Lawrence,
Phillips, & Hardy (1999), which clarifies that it is possible for organizations to engage in
voluntary collaborative relationships that are critical to joint success in the marketplace.
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These formal and informal sources of authority can be theorized as more than just
structural properties of the strategic action field. We can also analyze them as discursive
resources that actors draw on as a rationale for action around a public service
intervention.
Social Skills
To go beyond identifying the sources of authority that provide rationale for
certain actions or constrain what is perceived as legitimate action, and gain insight into
how change occurs, the Moulton and Sandfort (2017) framework focuses on the social
skills of actors as drivers of change or stability. From a field theory perspective, action
within fields can occur through competition, coercion, and cooperation, and consideration
of all these different types of coordination is fundamental to analysis. However,
collective action among voluntary participants depends on cooperation. Actors induce
cooperation and achieve negotiated authority through interactions in which members
work to convey purpose, shared meanings, and collective identities (Cooren, 2010;
Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Koschmann & Burk, 2016; Kuhn, 2008; Taylor & Van
Every, 2014). Social skills can include tactics such as framing, agenda setting, brokering
resources, or seizing opportunities (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 46). This construct of
social skills is based on a model of the individual that differs from the model used in
most policy process frameworks and theories.
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) suggest that any adequate model of the individual
or theory of human strategic action must account for both instrumental and existential
motives (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 43). Instrumental motives reflect individual and
collective self-interest and form the basis for the rational choice and bounded rationality
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models used in most theories of the policy process. Existential motives reflect the human
need to fashion shared meanings and identities. This model of the individual, which
recognizes both instrumental and existential motives, is particularly useful in
understanding voluntary collaboration that depends on cooperation. Importantly, given
the assumption that humans seek sociability and define meaning in relation to others,
legitimacy is an important driver of strategic action.
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) challenge scholarship that focuses on the
disposition or personal qualities of an individual and suggest instead that “entrepreneur”
is a role in which socially skilled actors vary in their ability to recognize the structural
situation, produce shared meanings, and take advantage of their resources, positions,
relationships, and rules. In particular, Fligstein and McAdam (2012) challenge the
traditional concept of human agency as entrepreneurship, in which agency is only
relevant at particular moments or for particular individuals. From a field theory
perspective, “individuals and groups are always acting and they are always looking for an
edge” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 180). The structure of the field determines what
actions make sense and social skills give actors an understanding of their opportunities
and constraints.
Interdependencies
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) conceive of fields as embedded within a complex
web of other fields that can be distant or proximate and can be dependent, interdependent
or independent. From this perspective, “the stability of any given field is largely a
function of its relations to other fields” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 19). The ties
among fields impose constraints and opportunities that are routinely affected by actions
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in other fields. Thus, stability is a dynamic process of interaction among actors and the
opportunity for change occurs through interactions that involve “innovative and
previously prohibited forms of collective action” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 21).
Drawing on field theory, the Strategic Action Field Framework allows researchers
to explore how policy implementation processes occur across multiple fields and focuses
attention on how the horizontal and vertical ties among these fields affect the purposes of
the field, the actors who are involved, what is possible, and introduce new discursive
resources and sources of authority (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Moulton & Sandfort,
2017).
3.4. Discursive Approach and Collaboration
The strategic action field framework brings attention to policy implementation as
a collective action and to the dynamic interaction between social structures and actors.
Fligstein and McAdam (2011, 2012) consider shared understandings about purpose and
relationship to other actors as fundamental to the emergence, stability, and transformation
of strategic action fields. Interorganizational collaboration theory extends this
conceptualization by focusing on communicative practices and providing additional
insight into how actors create shared meanings and collective identities (Hardy et al.,
2005; Hardy, Lawrence, & Phillips, 1998; Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003;
Koschmann, 2012; Koschmann & Isbell, 2009). This literature examines the role of
conversations and discourse in creating the shared meanings and collective identities that
lead to collective action. Discursive practices and skills include the following: metaphor,
symbolic contrast, abstraction, ideological rhetorical strategies, negative or positive
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framing, self-referencing rationalities, privileging, recognition, resistance, translation,
and boundary spanning (see, for example, Koschmann, 2016).
Within this literature, collaboration is defined as “a cooperative
interorganizational relationship that relies on neither market nor hierarchical mechanisms
of control” (Lawrence et al., 1999, p. 481) and collaboration can be understood as “the
discursive negotiation of the issues to be addressed by the collaboration, the interests
relevant to the collaboration, and the actors who should represent these legitimate
interests” (Lawrence et al., 1999, p. 479). Building on these ideas about the central role of
discourse, Hardy, Lawrence and Grant (2005) provide a model that uses a discursive
approach to describe the formation of collective identity and shared meanings. A
discursive approach allows researchers to track language in use, rather than attempt to
understand stakeholder beliefs. A discursive approach also allows a researcher to focus
on various levels of interaction, within an organization or at a broader societal level, and
explore interrelationships among these levels (Hardy et al., 2005). Drawing on a
discourse perspective emphasizes the dynamic nature of implementation and provides a
useful way of understanding individual and collective meanings, policy learning, and
how social skills are enacted in practice.
The social negotiation of authority involves stakeholders in a process of
interpreting what is and what is not possible. Interactions and conversations produce
discursive resources that stakeholders draw on to create and legitimate courses of action
(Hardy et al., 2005). These discursive resources are produced to make sense of issues on
which there is general agreement and to reflect other issues in disparate or conflicting
terms. Drawing on Hardy et al. (2005), socially skilled actors employ discursive
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strategies to develop shared understandings of collective identities, agreements about key
issues, and constructions that attach key issues to individual participants and their
particular perspectives. In this model, innovation occurs when the process of change
leverages differences among participants and balances divergent stakeholder concerns.
When stakeholders have different interpretations of how policy implementation
should proceed, these negotiations bring into focus the different meanings for particular
issues or material things (Nelson-Marsh, 2017). The concept of boundary objects has
been developed to makes sense of cases where actors are coordinating work without
reaching consensus and to help understand the social practices involved in negotiating
these differences and managing the tensions between different viewpoints (Bowker &
Star, 1999; Susan Leigh Star & Griesemer, 1989). A boundary object incorporates the
interpretive flexibility of a loosely structured common concept, more specific local
interpretations that make the concept useful for work that is not coordinated, and a
process of tacking between these forms of the object to coordinate work without
consensus (Star, 2010; Star & Griesemer, 1989). Stakeholders must explore and discuss
the symbolic boundary formed by different meanings before they can collaboratively
construct a shared understanding of the object and develop a legitimate course of action
(Nelson-Marsh, 2017).
Interorganizational collaboration literature also provides insight into
understanding how interdependencies among fields drive stability and change. In this
context, socially skilled actors engage in boundary spanning to sustain discourses, sustain
collaborative spaces and provide symbolic interpretation of legitimacy (Koschmann,
2012; Koschmann & Isbell, 2009; Nelson-Marsh, 2017; Schneider, 2009; Susan Leigh
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Star & Griesemer, 1989). Incorporating these concepts within the strategic action field
framework provides a useful way of examining how different stakeholders engaged in the
implementation process.
3.5. Conclusion and Research Questions
In summary, this dissertation combines literature on policy implementation,
action fields, and interorganizational collaboration to extend two concepts in policy
process literature that have been under-theorized. First, many policy process and
institutional theories use the concept of policy entrepreneur or policy broker to identify
the importance of individual agency in driving policy change. However, this concept is
not well developed (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Sætren, 2016; Weible et al., 2009).
Second, much of the policy process theory, and in particular the Advocacy Coalition
Framework, addresses the complexity of implementation by partitioning the analysis into
specific policy subsystems or contexts and focusing on competition among interests
within the subsystems. These theories provide limited insight into understanding
subsystem interdependencies or cases, in which cooperation and the need for innovation
is a driver of change (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Weible et al., 2009). The research
approach outlined in Chapter 4 provides additional insight into the role of agency and
cooperation in policy implementation by focusing on the social negotiations used by
actors to promote change or enable stability. It also provides additional insight into field
interdependencies by focusing on the horizontal and vertical ties among overlapping
bounded social systems that work to implement policy.
To further my driving interest in policy implementation, this study focuses on a
specific intervention, the expansion of organized energy imbalance market services in the
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West, and asks how stakeholders, using social practices and strategies, created and
legitimated sources of authority to establish a Governing Body for this new market
service. This study sought to answer the following research questions:

RQ1: What sources of authority provided rationale for the practices that were
enacted?

RQ2: What social practices or strategies did stakeholders use to de-authorize or
legitimate these sources of authority?

RQ3: What influenced the definition of boundaries around the separate strategic
action fields?
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODS

This chapter presents the research methodology used for collecting and analyzing
data. It explains the selection of methods, describes the selection of the case, sampling,
data collection, data analysis, and interpretation.
4.1. Selection of Methods
This research uses a single case study and a qualitative methodology. A single
case study approach is particularly useful for my interest in understanding the process
and dynamics of a unique change in energy system governance. Additionally, a
qualitative methodology is selected based on my interest in understanding the dynamic
interaction among organizations during energy policy implementation; the social
practices and strategies used to induce cooperation and create shared meanings; and the
negotiation of authority.
This research has a combined purpose. First, the aim is to conceptualize a context
that is itself of interest. In this way my research is primarily an intrinsic case (Stake,
2005). However, the case is also of interest in advancing our understanding of how multiorganizational policy implementation and interorganizational collaboration occur in
practice and in this way serves as an instrumental case (Stake, 2005). Furthermore, while
the aim of the research is to conceptualize a context, the approach and methods allow me
to demonstrate how and in what ways my findings may be transferable to other contexts
or used by others (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Merriam, 2009; Simons, 2009). In particular,
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the discussion of my findings identify concepts and processes that can be generalized to
other regulatory policy implementation contexts and provide empirical evidence of and
extend our understanding of theories that have not been validated with many studies.
This approach responds to calls for energy research to focus on the human
dimensions of the system, address questions that are relevant to real world problems, and
recognize the complex contexts, histories, and multiple perspectives within which the
electricity system is embedded (Goldthau, 2014; Sovacool, 2014). Sovacool (2014)
reviewed 4,444 research articles in three leading energy journals from 1999 to 2013 and
found that only 12.6% utilized qualitative methods and less than 5% used qualitative
methods other than survey analysis (Sovacool, 2014). This research also responds to an
identified need in policy implementation and interorganizational collaboration literature
to investigate the social mechanisms that explain how organizations collaborate and why
things get done in a particular way (deLeon & deLeon, 2002; Goggin, Bowman, Lester,
& O’Toole, 1990; Hardy et al., 2003; Lewis, 2006; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017; O’Toole,
1986).
Qualitative case study research can be characterized as particularistic, descriptive,
and heuristic (Merriam, 2009). As such, qualitative case studies are appropriate for
exploring problems in practice (Cronbach, 1975; Merriam, 2009; Simons, 2009; Stake,
2005) and for exploring unique phenomenon (Merriam, 2009; Simons, 2009; Stake,
2005). My study takes a problem-based approach by examining how negotiations among
stakeholders shaped the EIM governance structure that emerged and the role and
strategies of utilities, generators, regulators, policymakers, advocates, and non-asset
owning stakeholders in these conversations.
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The qualitative methods selected for this research rely on multiple sources of
information and thick description, immersion in the context, and the self-reflexivity of the
researcher (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011; Tracy, 2013). These methods are used to study the
performance and practices of communication. By observing what people actually do and
the discursive practices they engage in, these methods allow me to go beyond description
to focus on interpretation of how and why processes unfolded as they did, the tacit
understandings of a culture, and the ways in which communication constructs or
constitutes cultures and organizations (Kuhn, 2005; Lindlof & Taylor, 2011; Tracy,
2013). My research is focused on understanding the policy implementation process that
occurred in establishing the EIM governance structure and the ways in which the ongoing
communicative processes among participating stakeholders provide insight into “the
ability to induce cooperation by appealing to and helping to create shared meanings and
collective identities” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012).
4.2. Research Site and Selection of the Case
The Western EIM initiative is a rich case of evolving electricity system
governance and provides a unique opportunity to study policy implementation and
interorganizational collaboration as they occur in practice. Furthermore, the initiative is
of interest because it is fundamentally changing the decision-making processes and
relative influence of stakeholders in the West. The decisions about governance will shape
the distribution of benefits and burdens across the region for years to come.
My qualitative case study is defined by the collective action that occurred around
the formation of the new regional governance structure for the EIM. It is bounded by the
initial meeting of the Public Utilities Commission-Energy Imbalance Market (PUC-EIM)
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Group in February 2012 and by the decision by California Governor Jerry Brown in
August 2016 to delay submission of a broader regionalization proposal pending further
work on the issue (see Section 2.4 for additional detail on the case). Before 2012, there
were informal discussions and several analyses regarding the potential benefits of energy
imbalance markets; however, the formation of the PUC-EIM Group marked the
beginning of formal discussions specifically related to the CAISO EIM initiative that is
the focus of this study.
The EIM initiative is an excellent research site because the organizations involved
in the implementation effort provided many opportunities for any interested member of
the public to access many of the documents and meetings that shaped the process. I was
able to gain access to the research site by signing up for meeting notifications, reviewing
documents available online, observing public meetings, and reviewing audio recordings
or transcripts of meetings made publicly available on the CAISO website. The only
meetings that required pre-registration for participation were the two on-site meetings I
observed.
4.3. Sampling and Data Collection
The qualitative data collection methods for this research project include
participant interviews, immersion and systematic observation of decision making in
context, detailed observation fieldnotes, and document review. All data for this study was
collected with approval from and in accordance with Boise State University Institutional
Review Board policies and procedures (IRB protocol number: EX 042-SB11-132 and EX
042-SB11-016). All interview and meeting observation data was managed and reported in
a manner that maintains the confidentially of the interviewees and participants.
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Participant Interviews
I conducted semi-structured interviews to gain an understanding of the decisionmaking processes at CAISO, the actual experiences of those who participate in CAISO
stakeholder processes, and the experiences of those who are now within the EIM
footprint (see interview protocol provided in Appendix B). The protocol included
questions on experience, the process for decision-making, stakeholder groups, and
influences. The protocol was revised twice during the process as I gained experience with
the issues to ensure the questions were relevant to both the respondents and my research.
The protocol used a flexible guide to encourage respondents to share their view of how
decision making occurs and questions were adjusted or improvised to accommodate the
widely varying experience and expertise of the respondents (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p.
200).
Initial interviews were selected through repeated conversations with field experts,
including our research advisory committee, and purposive sampling (Lindlof & Taylor,
2011) to recruit interviewees across the different stakeholder sectors as identified in other
RTOs and the CAISO Board nomination process. Subsequent interviews were identified
through referrals from interviewees and included in the study to the extent they achieved
our purposive sampling objectives. As the importance of the EIM case emerged and a
group of EIM Transitional Committee members was named the sampling criterion was
expanded to include a range of individuals participating on the Committee and
perspectives from entities that do not actively participate in CAISO processes, but are
now within the service area of the EIM and therefore, in a position to consider whether or
not to engage with the EIM market.
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Of the 21 interviews I conducted, two were in-person and 19 were by phone. Each
interview was approximately one hour and all interviews were recorded, professionally
transcribed, and scrubbed for accuracy, resulting in 419 single-spaced pages of interview
data. The interviews are distributed across six stakeholder groups and include six EIM
Committee members and six individuals from organizations that are not currently
participating in CAISO or EIM organized markets (Figure 4.1). A more expansive data
set would include current staff from CAISO and Bonneville Power Administration, who
unfortunately declined to participate in the study. CAISO perspectives were obtained
from former CAISO staff members.
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Industry
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Figure 4.1.

Industry
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Distribution of Interviews Across Stakeholder Sectors

Observations
CAISO staff facilitated the stakeholder engagement processes used to develop the
EIM Transitional Committee Charter, the deliberations of governance alternatives by the
Committee, and the nomination process used to seat the EIM Governing Body. These
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processes, though modified to encourage broader regional participation, followed
CAISO’s standard procedures for engaging stakeholders. Furthermore, each of these
processes followed, to the extent applicable, CAISO records availability and open
meeting policies. The initiative and meetings were announced through CAISO market
notices and the meetings were open to public participation either in-person or through
WebEx or teleconference with the exception of topics appropriate to executive session,
working groups, and Nominating Review Committee discussions. Because stakeholders
are located in a wide geographic area and several meetings are held each week, many
stakeholders participate via teleconference or WebEx. Observation of stakeholder
interactions in these meetings provides an opportunity to “create a record of
communication” by “describing and interpreting the observable relationships between
social practices and systems of meaning” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 134) and gain
insight into the social skills and discursive strategies used to either introduce or block
change, as well as the iterative nature of collaboration as a social accomplishment (Hardy
et al., 2005; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017).
For my research, observations were selected to include each of the common
CAISO decision-making venues including Board of Governors meetings, Market
Surveillance Committee meetings, stakeholder engagement processes, and inter-agency
workshops. Additional focused attention is given to the EIM Transitional Committee
meetings. These data consist of 27 field observations including 10 of the 13 public EIM
Transitional Committee meetings. Of these observations, one is an on-site visit to a Board
of Governors meeting at the CAISO Offices in Folsom, California, another is an on-site
visit to an EIM Transitional Committee meeting in Portland, Oregon, one is an on-site
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visit to an EIM Regional Issues Forum meeting in Boise, Idaho, and the remaining
observations are via WebEx or publicly available audio recordings. These observations
are documented in 261 single-spaced pages of field notes and 718 double-spaced pages of
professional transcription of four regional grid operator and governance workshops (see
summary of field observation data in Appendix C).
Document Review
Throughout the initiative, stakeholder input was solicited through an iterative
process of developing straw proposals, facilitating discussion in public meetings,
providing opportunities for oral and written comments, responding to comments, and
revising proposals. Additionally, CAISO staff provided regular informational updates and
briefings on special topics for the Transitional Committee. All briefings, presentations,
proposals, and draft charters were made available through the CAISO website (see
Appendix D for a list of documents analyzed in this study). In the stakeholder processes,
communication performances and practices occur as an iterative back and forth between
meeting participation, written proposals, presentations, written stakeholder comments,
and written responses. These documents act as “aids in speech acts” and convey
communication practices among stakeholders (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). The documents
analyzed in this study include reports and presentations that provide an accounting of
agency and stakeholder positions, and primary stakeholder comments and interviews that
provide first-person descriptions of their own communications.
4.4. Data Analysis and Interpretation
Taken together, the interviews, meeting observations, foundational documents,
proposals, stakeholder comments, responses to comments, and other texts provide insight
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into the communicative process as it occurs (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011; Tracy, 2013).
Consistent with a qualitative approach, my data analysis is iterative, alternating between
emic (emergent) analysis of the data and etic (external) uses of existing models and
theories, and was conducted along with data collection. I used two complementary
methods for making sense of the data. First, the interviews, stakeholder comments, and
fieldnotes were coded through a cyclical process. Second, other documents were
analyzed through progressive focusing to generate issues and themes.
The data analysis for the interviews, comments and fieldnotes used grounded
theory and the constant comparative technique, in which meanings and claims are
grounded in codes and categories that emerge through cumulative coding cycles and
analytical memo writing (Charmaz, 2003; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In this method, data
are reviewed line-by-line and assigned a code, which is a word or short phrase, that
identifies the “summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or evocative attribute” of a
portion of data (Saldaña, 2009). My primary-cycle coding focused largely on the use of
open, process, and in vivo coding to “fracture” the data. Open coding serves as a first step
in identifying similarities and differences in the data and naming my interpretation of the
data (see examples in Table 4.1). Process coding identifies action and is especially
appropriate for understanding ongoing interactions. In Vivo coding is based on actual
language in the data and is especially appropriate for understanding worldviews.
Simultaneous coding is used when the content suggests multiple meanings. My primary
coding cycle resulted in 95 codes related to authority and social skills.
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Table 4.1.

Primary Coding Examples

Type of Code

Interview Text

Code

Unfortunately the ISO stakeholder processes are usually
focused on narrow issues. One of the frustrations- and
people involved in energy policy in California who've
Open

been doing it a long time, most of them will agree- that

Stakeholder

what we've had is a bunch of disjointed policy decisions

Process Narrow

without taking a broad overview and a lot of decisions
that work at cross purposes and unintended
consequences.
They’ve been extremely creative in looking at how to
apply demand response and demand side management
resources as a way to deal with the variability on the
Process

distribution grid and on the load side as part of their
portfolio of ways to integrate large amounts of

Crediting CAISO

renewables. Finally perhaps the most important thing
that they have done was extending their Energy
Imbalance Market to the rest of the West.
They’re in the middle of the market simulations they’re
doing right now to make sure that the interactions
between PacifiCorp’s controls and Cal ISO’s system
In Vivo

controls can operate the system automatically and deal

Game Changing

with settlements that are going to be necessary in such a
rapidly moving market. This is creative stuff. This is game
changing stuff.
What has been more influential, in my opinion, about how
decisions get made is the ISO has really had to engage
more heavily with the state regulatory bodies- such as the
Versus

RTO

CPUC, and the Energy Commission, Air Resources Board,

Independence vs.

and things like this. Sometimes in order for the ISO to get

Coordination with

what it wants on certain issues, it has to give a little on
what the state agencies want, and that’s not always a
good thing. It detracts from the independence a little bit.

State Regulators
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Subsequent cycles of coding compared and reorganized the primary codes
according to similarities or patterns to create categories that facilitate the analysis of the
connections among codes and the development of themes, concepts, and claims. These
cycles of coding also drew on theoretical constructs and were guided by my research
questions relating the theoretical constructs to the broader questions for the study. These
coding cycles resulted in 24 subcategories and 11 categories that were grouped into the
four themes presented in Chapters 5 and 6 (see codebook in Appendix E). To strengthen
the validity of the analysis, I went back to the data throughout the project to see if there
were any instances that contradicted the developing results (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p.
278). For example, my initial analysis identified “expansion of governance” as important
to a wide range of stakeholders. However, in subsequent analysis it became evident that
the taken-for-granted meaning behind these statements differed among stakeholders and
the codes were divided between “transformation” and “constitution” of the market.
Finally, I used NVIVO software to maintain the code list, organize codes into categories,
and associated concepts and themes. Classification tables were created to allow the data
to be analyzed by stakeholder sector, organization, or CAISO-affiliation status.
Data collection and analysis ended following the seating of the EIM Governing
Board in July 2016, the on-site observation of one of the first Regional Issues Forum
meetings in August 2016, and the California Governor’s announcement that a
recommendation for expanding CAISO to a broader multi-state region would be delayed.
Additionally, after 32 months of observations, interviews, document review, and
preliminary analysis, I decided the research had achieved theoretical saturation and that
additional data collection and analysis had reached a point of diminishing returns (Tracy,
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2013) In particular, after 21 interviews, the data provided rich contributions to my
research and little new data seemed to emerge regarding my research questions.
4.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I review the case study approach and qualitative methodology
used in my research. The data collection and analysis process allowed me to
systematically explore how the policy implementation process unfolded in practice and
gain insight into the taken-for-granted understandings of stakeholders as they worked
together to form a new governance structure. These insights are described in Chapters 5
and 6.
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CHAPTER FIVE: TRANSFORMING EXISTING AUTHORITY

Policy implementation involving coordination or collaboration among
organizations often involves ambiguous authority relationships or competing sources of
authority (Koschmann, 2012; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017; Ostrom, 2011). In such cases,
policy change requires efforts to overcome or transform existing authorities that would
otherwise prevent collaboration (Koschmann & Burk, 2016). Sources of authority include
public policies, economic incentives, norms or beliefs.
The analysis of stakeholder interactions presented in this chapter identifies how
stakeholders worked to transform a dynamic of individual jurisdictional interests and
mistrust among actors in the West and opened the possibility for collaboration and
expansion of the EIM. The first section of this chapter identifies the values and
jurisdictional relationships that provide a rationale for the long-standing resistance to
regional organized markets in the Western Interconnection. This section demonstrates
that the rationale for stability persisted in both the CAISO and the non-RTO regions and
across differences in local circumstances, preventing collaboration. The second section
introduces the concept of a boundary object as a way of understanding stakeholder
interactions and demonstrates how stakeholders in the West engaged in three discursive
strategies to overcome and transform the existing sources of authority: 1) shifting the
discourse, 2) symbolic contrast, and 3) boundary spanning. These strategies made
collective action possible by allowing diverse interpretations of EIM governance, but
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were not sufficient to enable durable policy change. To enact a long-term governance
structure, stakeholders had to explore these alternative interpretations. Chapter 6
examines the rationale and external events that provided legitimacy for a new EIM
governance structure.
5.1.

Existing Authorities that Prevent Collaboration

Understanding how authority is negotiated among stakeholders involves
investigating how particular sources of authority are created or legitimated and how
established authoritative influences are overcome or transformed (Feldman & Quick,
2009; Koschmann & Burk, 2016; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017). This research extends
these ideas of authority as a negotiated and emergent phenomenon that involves
transforming, negotiating, and co-creating authority to the context of multi-organizational
regulatory policy implementation.
The long-standing resistance to organized markets in the Western Interconnection
reflects not only a fundamental tension between the energy system values of
policymakers in the West, but also a shared mistrust of multi-state electricity governance
and a resistance to ceding additional authority to FERC. The first theme that emerged
from my data involves this dynamic of mistrust and how a narrative that jurisdictional
independence serves energy policy goals influences collaboration. Diverse energy system
values and complex jurisdictional relationships have prevented states in the West from
forming regional organized markets, reinforced the boundary between CAISO and nonRTO regions in the West, and reinforced a shared mistrust of multi-state RTOs. However,
this dynamic is being challenged by clean energy policy, innovative technology, and
market changes.
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Diverse Energy System Values
Western states, municipalities, electric cooperatives, and federal power marketing
authorities and the constituents that they serve have diverse energy system values. The
following exchange regarding the shifting economics and over-generation problems
associated with integrating variable renewable resources reflects some of these
differences:
If California gets into an over-generation situation in the afternoon and
they are paying more for solar as a source, then when solar decreases they
will need replacement energy and they are going to have to pay more for
that. What is the benefit to the ratepayer of paying such high prices?
(Field Observation, 11/17/15)
This statement highlights the conflicting priorities among stakeholders in the West as
they work to balance affordability, reliability, and sustainability within the electricity
system. Policymakers across the West who see traditional thermal generation, such as
coal, as a preferred approach for maintaining affordability do not share the clean energy
policy goals enacted by the California Legislature.
Across the West formal energy policy goals are diverse (Figure 5.1). The West
has some of the most aggressive clean energy policies in the United States. California and
Oregon require 50% of electricity to be procured from renewable resources by 2030 and
2040, respectively (California Energy Commission, n.d.; Oregon Department of Energy,
n.d.). California has an energy-resource loading order that gives preference to renewable
resources over fossil-fuel generation and a greenhouse gas reduction mandate (California
Energy Commission, n.d.; State of California, 2003). Oregon is requiring its two major
investor-owned utilities to phase-out coal-fired electricity generation from in-state and
out-of state sources by 2030 (OR SB1547, 2016).
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Renewable portfolio standard
Renewable portfolio goal

*
†

Figure 5.1.

Extra credit for solar or customer-sited renewables
Includes non-renewable alternative resources

Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies in the West

California and Oregon have some of the most aggressive RPS
policies in the U.S. In contrast, Idaho and Wyoming are among 13 states
that do not have an RPS goal or mandate.
Source: Adapted from NC Clean Energy Technology Center, n.d.

In other parts of the West, regulators, publicly owned utilities, and other
stakeholders are focused on “least cost/least risk” energy policy and Idaho and Wyoming
are among 13 states that do not have an RPS goal or mandate (NC Clean Energy
Technology Center, n.d.). In many of these jurisdictions, it is not simply that clean energy
is not a policy priority, but rather that regulators and policymakers have established
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affordability and reliability as energy policy goals that are reflected throughout their
decision-making processes. For example, a state regulator characterized the energy policy
values in the West in this way: “ ...Cost is, you know, 95 percent the driver of energy
policy on the part of state commissions in the Western United States, outside of
California” (Respondent 207). A public power stakeholder also noted that for public
power the mission is “energy at the lowest cost” (Field Observation 10/01/2014). In other
words, regulators and policymakers in California are primarily focused on clean energy,
whereas in much of the West regulators and policymakers are primarily focused on the
affordability and reliability of the electricity system.
Furthermore, some regions of the West are heavily dependent on hydroelectric
generation, which has different environmental impacts than thermal generation. Although
hydropower lacks the carbon and air pollution impacts associated with thermal
generation, these resources are typically limited or not included at all in state clean
energy policy goals because of the competing demands on water resources. In the
Northwest Power Pool, hydropower accounts for nearly 50% of the generating capacity
as compared to only 8% of generating capacity in the U.S. (U.S. Energy Information
Agency, 2016a). These resources are used for multiple purposes in addition to electricity
generation, including irrigation, fisheries, flood control, and recreation, and are subject to
a wide range of state and federal policies. Although these other uses and regulations do
not prohibit hydroelectric generation from participating in organized markets, they are
often cited as a barrier to effective participation. A Northwest stakeholder expressed this
concern as follows:
I think there’s just some concern that could you really put a complex
system like that into a market and get much out of it. Because it is already
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so heavily coordinated and controlled by all of these other things.
(Respondent 216)
Specifically, for jurisdictions that rely on clean and flexible hydropower, organized
markets lack many of the environmental and economic benefits they provide elsewhere
and raise unique concerns about the ability to maintain operational flexibility for other
uses.
The distinct approaches to energy policy across the West contribute to division
and mistrust among stakeholders. Furthermore, as explained below, underlying the policy
preferences in both California and in non-RTO regions is tension around complex
jurisdictional relationships and a belief that maintaining jurisdictional independence
serves the public interest.
Jurisdictional Relationships
Both stakeholders within and outside of California express concern about
engaging in a multi-state RTO and ceding additional authority to FERC. A long-time
observer of CAISO pointed out that since the founding of the organization the resistance
to expansion has been mutual: “The original thought was that this ISO thing was going to
be west-wide. Nobody liked that idea outside of California. Few people inside California
liked it either” (Respondent 209). Many stakeholders across the Western Interconnection
believe that their own political and market interests are served by retaining jurisdictional
independence, rather than engaging in the collective activities of an EIM or an RTO. This
can been seen in the resistance among states to engaging with each other; in the divisions
across federal, state, and local levels of regulatory authority; and in the inherent risks of
engaging in a more dynamic governance system.
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Regulators, policy makers, utilities, and other stakeholders in the non-RTO
regions of the West have concerns about relinquishing state or local control and engaging
with states that have very different energy policy goals. These stakeholders commonly
refer to a preference for “local control,” “homegrown” solutions, and “anything but
California.” Many stakeholders suggest this resistance to collective action is driven by
concerns that California would dominate any multi-state governance structure because it
could control a decision-making mechanism based on electricity load or population.
Other stakeholders explained that lingering tensions from the 2001 energy crisis continue
to have salience throughout the West and noted the wide differences in retail electricity
prices across the region. While many western states, including Idaho, Washington, and
Wyoming have some of the lowest average retail electricity prices in the U.S., California
has some of the highest average retail prices (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2016b).
In particular, stakeholders outside of CAISO are concerned that relinquishing
jurisdictional independence would open them to political and economic risks from
engaging with jurisdictions that not only have different energy system values but also
have the ability to control the decision making process.
However, another important barrier to collective action in the West is the
fundamental tension between public power utilities and FERC. Investor-owned utilities
and publicly owned utilities are subject to different regulatory structures.11 Investorowned utilities are already subject to rate regulation through state utilities commissions
and FERC. In contrast, most public power utilities are exempt from state and federal rate

11

For the purposes of this paper, publicly owned utility or public power utility will be used to denote
municipal, state, and federal electric utilities, rural electric cooperatives, and federal power marketing
administrations.

74
regulation. For these utilities, joining an organized market means relinquishing some
control to an RTO that is authorized by FERC and becoming subject to FERC rate
review. It also means engaging in an organization that is influenced by state regulators.
One long-time participant in CAISO processes observed that: “The biggest boogeyman in
the room is FERC. They [California public power utilities] don’t want to be FERC
jurisdictional any more than Bonneville Power does” (Respondent 213). These concerns
have been a significant barrier to expanding organized markets in the West.
The ownership pattern within CAISO stands in sharp contrast to the importance of
public power in non-RTO regions of the West (Table 5.1). CAISO is designed around the
three large investor-owned utilities in California and a partially restructured industry.12
Within CAISO, the three largest investor-owned utilities manage more than 80% of the
electric supply and public power utilities manage only 8% (based on analysis of U.S.
Energy Information Agency, 2014). In contrast, the non-RTO regions of the West are
shaped by public power and a vertically integrated industry.13 Outside of CAISO, public
power utilities manage 48% of the electricity supply in the West (based on analysis of
U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2014). Of the six largest public power utilities outside
of CAISO, two are in California and one is a state agency. Public power also includes
two federal Power Marketing Administrations that manage transmission and market

12

As part of the industry restructuring in the late 1990s, California required divesture of generation assets.
However, following the energy crisis of 2001 this requirement was amended and investor-owned utilities
can own or contract for generation. California now has a hybrid industry structure in which utilities
purchase 41% of generation output from independent power producers and own the remaining generation
(Borenstein & Bushnell, 2015).
13
Outside of California, the industry structure in the West is mostly vertically integrated with
companies that own generation, transmission, and distribution assets. The extent of independent power
ownership of generation in the West ranges from 27% in Idaho to 6% in Wyoming and is notably less than
the more than 40% in California (Borenstein & Bushnell, 2015).
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Table 5.1.

Comparison of Utility Ownership in the West (2014 data)
CAISO

TOTAL
Share of CAISO Sales1
Investor Owned Utilities and
Power Marketers

Non-RTO
244,405

92%

TOTAL
Share of Non-RTO Sales1
Investor Owned Utilities and
Power Marketers

534,260

52%

Pacific Gas & Electric Co

42%

PacifiCorp

11%

Southern California Edison Co

33%

Portland General Electric Co

5%

San Diego Gas & Electric Co

7%

Public Service Co of Colorado

5%

Noble Americas Energy Solutions

3%

Arizona Public Service Co

5%

Constellation NewEnergy

2%

Puget Sound Energy Inc

4%

Shell Energy North America

2%

Nevada Power Co

4%

Other Investor Owned

3%

Other Investor Owned

17%

Public Power Utilities

8%

Public Power Utilities

46%

City of Santa Clara

1%

Emerald People's Utility District

5%

Modesto Irrigation District

1%

Salt River Project

5%

City of Anaheim

1%

Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power

4%

City of Riverside

1%

Colorado River Commission of NV

2%

City of Vernon

<1%

Sacramento Municipal Utility District

2%

City of Pasadena

<1%

Seattle City Light

2%

Other Public Power

2%

Other Public Power

25%

Federal Power Marketing
Administrators

0%

Federal Power Marketing
Administrators

2%

Bonneville Power Administration

1%

Western Area Power Administration

1%

1. Based on annual GWh sales. Does not include behind the meter, customer sited, or adjustments.
Source: Data from Form 861 (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2014)

power primarily to public utilities. The Bonneville Power Administration and the
Western Area Power Administration manage 2% of electric supply in non-RTO regions
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of the West (based on analysis of U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2014). These
divisions across federal, state, and local regulatory jurisdictions create additional barriers
to collective action.
Finally, in addition to the jurisdictional tensions among western states and
between public power and FERC, state and local officials across the region share
concerns about FERC limiting their authority as organized markets evolve. CAISO is
authorized not only by FERC, but also by California state statute and it has a Board of
Governors appointed by the Governor of California and confirmed by the California State
Senate. The authorization in state statute is unique and makes CAISO more like a quasigovernmental agency than other RTOs (see Dworkin & Goldwasser, 2007). Although
California statute originally contemplated the potential expansion to a west-wide RTO, a
change in CAISO governance would require new legislation. In practice, this has led to a
tight relationship between CAISO and California policy-making processes and a
perception that jurisdictional independence facilitates California’s aggressive clean
energy policy goals. For example, one CAISO stakeholder stated:
...there are ways in which once you go down that path [to a multi-state
RTO] – at least it's definitely my perception and the perception of others –
that it limits the flexibility of states to pursue their state energy policies.
Because those markets tend to try to treat everything on exactly the same
basis to the extent they can, and sometimes the rules that work for
generators don't work as well for demand response or for renewables or
what have you. (Respondent 201)
As this response highlights, many stakeholders within California are skeptical of
expanding CAISO to a multi-state RTO not only because it would involve sharing control
with other state regulators, but also because the fuel-neutrality norms for market design,
which require a level playing field for all resource types, would be more difficult to
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negotiate in a multi-state RTO. Stakeholders within California repeatedly expressed
concern that expanding to a multi-state RTO or allowing autonomous decisions by the
EIM Governing Body would be ceding additional authority to FERC to arbitrate
conflicts. In particular, stakeholders are concerned that relinquishing jurisdictional
independence would open CAISO decisions to more frequent challenges in FERC
proceedings and the courts, thereby limiting progress toward clean energy policy goals.
These concerns about engaging in a more dynamic market and FERC regulation
are also central to the perspective of many jurisdictions outside of CAISO. A
Northwestern stakeholder used a multi-state RTO in the Eastern Interconnection as an
example of the perceived political and market risks associated with engaging in an RTO.
From this perspective, over time as market rules have evolved, utilities have been caught
in the middle of a conflict between the RTO and state and local officials over control of
resource procurement and how they ensure that there are adequate energy resources in the
system (Respondent 221). This example highlights one of several policy issues for which
RTOs have blurred the traditional divides between federal, state and local jurisdictions.
For these jurisdictions, stakeholders are concerned that relinquishing jurisdictional
independence would risk their ability to maintain affordable and reliable energy policy
goals.
Rationale for Continued Fragmentation in Energy System Governance
These examples highlight that engaging in an organized market inherently
involves risks because market rules evolve over time and it is difficult to condition
participation on a specified economic benefit, guaranteed affordability of rates, or
protection of certain state and local authority. Individual utilities in the Western
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Interconnection vary in their market positions, administrative capacities to engage in the
complexity of an organized market, and assessment of the economic and political risks of
engaging in a multi-state governance structure. However, many regulators, policymakers,
and utilities share a belief that jurisdictional independence serves the interests of their
constituents by furthering explicit energy policy goals and this provides a rationale to
justify decisions not to engage in a multi-state EIM or multi-state RTO.
5.2. Transforming Existing Authority
The social negotiation of authority involves stakeholders in a process of
interpreting what is and what is not possible. When ambiguous or conflicting authorities
exist, actors make decisions about the relative importance of different authorities as they
create and legitimate courses of action. In practice, researchers have observed that
boundary objects arise directly from such conflicts and serve to enable cooperation across
intersecting communities (Bowker & Star, 1999). Central to understanding cases where
actors are coordinating work without reaching consensus is an examination of the
interpretive flexibility of a particular material thing, issues, or policies. Stakeholders must
explore and discuss the symbolic boundary formed by different meanings before they can
collaboratively construct a shared understanding of the object and develop a legitimate
course of action (Nelson-Marsh, 2017). Thus, the social practice of boundary spanning
involves an ability to create a shared understanding while maintaining elements of
alternative interpretations (Bowker & Star, 1999).
The second theme that emerged from my data involves the loosely structured
meaning of an EIM and the alternative interpretations that allowed stakeholders to begin
engaging in the initiative. The Western EIM is a unique and complex set of material

79
practices developed through diverse venues over the course of nearly a decade. These
material practices have been reified through various taken-for-granted meanings among
stakeholders in the West. Thus, my analysis of stakeholder interactions conceptualizes
the EIM as a boundary object and identifies how stakeholders worked to transform the
existing authorities that have prevented collaboration and to develop alternative
interpretations for how EIM implementation should proceed.
Specifically, CAISO, state regulators, utilities, other stakeholders, and the
Committee needed to transform long-standing beliefs that jurisdictional independence
served the public interest in order to open the possibility for stakeholders to engage in a
regional initiative. This analysis demonstrates that they did this using three discursive
strategies: 1) shifting the discourse, 2) symbolic contrast, and 3) boundary spanning.
Shifting the Discourse
The EIM was initiated in early 2013 through a bilateral agreement between
CAISO and PacifiCorp, rather than a broad agreement among stakeholders and market
participants. I suggest that this was a strategic action intended to trigger a critical shift in
the discourse around organized markets in the West. Previous failed market
collaborations had attempted to resolve governance, market design, and operational
issues before moving forward with an agreement to form a market. These initiatives
suffered from a deficient discourse that revolved around uncertainty about market
participation, design, and operation, all of which affect the distribution of benefits and
costs (Cifor et al., 2015). These uncertainties increased concerns about economic and
political risks and reinforced the authority of jurisdictional independence.
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The CAISO-PacifiCorp agreement shifted this discourse by identifying major
market participants, designating CAISO as the market operator, and proposing a
relatively equal sharing of benefits between CAISO and PacifiCorp. This strategic move
framed the EIM as a dynamic, multi-state market that generates economic and
environmental benefits.
The CAISO-PacifiCorp agreement structured the EIM initiative to reflect certain
interests by privileging the position of a large investor-owned utility and marginalizing
the Bonneville Power Administration. PacifiCorp is the largest investor-owned utility in
the non-RTO region of the West and the largest transmission owner and operator in the
West. It operates in six states and is one of several businesses managed by Berkshire
Hathaway Energy. In other words, PacifiCorp has experience working with multiple state
regulatory commissions, was already subject to FERC rate regulation, and its parent
company has experience operating a business that participates in an RTO.14 By engaging
in the EIM, PacifiCorp brought the issue of organized markets to the fore for regulators in
six states.
The Bonneville Power Administration is also an important electricity system
stakeholder in the West. It owns and operates three-quarters of the transmission in the
Northwest, generates electricity primarily from hydropower, and is not subject to state or
local regulation. So, although Bonneville Power Administration faces limited economic
or political pressure to engage in regional markets, its dominant position as a
transmission operator means that its involvement is necessary for the proposed EIM. The

14

Berkshire Hathaway Energy also manages NV Energy, which was the second utility to join the EIM, and
MidAmerican Energy, which participates in the organized market operated by the Midcontinent
Independent System Operator.
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CAISO-PacifiCorp agreement not only aligned two of the largest balancing authorities in
the West, it marked PacifiCorp’s withdrawal from an alternative EIM initiative that it cochaired with the Bonneville Power Administration.15 This led to a situation in which
Bonneville Power Administration was engaged in technical implementation, but
marginalized in governance discussions.
In addition, the CAISO-PacifiCorp agreement bifurcated the EIM technical and
governance implementation efforts and defined the question of governance in terms of
the relationship between the EIM and CAISO. Technical implementation proceeded
through conventional CAISO stakeholder processes and was relatively uncontroversial,
whereas, governance was deliberated through a newly created Transitional Committee.
Through this separation of the issues, the EIM mechanism became operational after only
four Committee meetings and more than a year and a half before the EIM Governing
Body was appointed.
These strategic actions framed the EIM as a dynamic, multi-state market. It
brought the expansion of organized markets to the attention of regulators and stakeholder
across six states, yet was always described as an initial step, with expansion of the EIM
being fundamental to the design. For example, in a Board of Governors meeting a
stakeholder emphasized that, “We hope and expect that other entities in the West will
follow along and help expand the market in the coming months and years” (Field
Observation 9/18/14).

15

Bonneville Power Administration continued this exploratory initiative in various forms through
December of 2015. However, the withdrawal of PacifiCorp, and subsequently other investor-owned
utilities, shifted the scale and resource mix of the initiative so that it was no longer economically viable.
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These actions also framed the EIM as a market that generates economic and
environmental benefits. This framing became important in shifting the discourse and was
reiterated in each Committee meeting, and in many other venues across the West, as
CAISO reported on technical implementation progress, realized net benefits, and
reductions in carbon emissions. As an example, the conversation below highlights how
this framing was used to shift the discourse:
SPEARKER 1: We hope and expect that other entities in the West will
follow along and help expand the market in the coming months and
years...the interregional benefits [of the EIM] are highly dependent on
available transmission capacity, so we worked closely with CAISO and
Bonneville Power Administration to maximize these benefits...
SPEARKER 2: Thank you...We’re all at the beginnings of something very
good for consumers in the West.
SPEAKER 3: This particular initiative is transforming the way this grid is
going to operate and we will have a more integrated grid as a result of this
effort. I was talking this morning with the Northwest Power Pool and they
are taking action because things around them are changing and they can’t
sit it out and part of that is from the leadership from CAISO, PacifiCorp
and NV Energy.
(Field Observation, 9/18/14)
This exchange highlights the expectation that the EIM will generate benefits and implies
that this will translate into more affordability or more sustainable energy for consumers.
This message was reinforced each time CAISO reported on the economic and
environmental benefits of the EIM and it became a dominant narrative despite ongoing
settlement difficulties for utilities. It also points to how the “leadership” from CAISO and
the Berkshire Hathaway companies has reoriented discussions about organized markets
across the West and to the importance of further expanding the market. Finally, it
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highlights Bonneville Power Administration’s involvement as another indicator of the
shift in the long stalemate around organized markets.
The framing of the EIM around teamwork and benefits worked to shift the
discourse regarding potential economic risks of regional engagement and to overcome the
authority of jurisdictional independence.
Symbolic Contrast
In addition to shifting the discourse about the economic risks of regional
engagement, state regulators and policymakers needed to overcome existing authoritative
narratives about the political risks of regional engagement. They did this in conversations
about grid modernization and leading the transition to renewable energy. Specifically,
certain regulators and policymakers began to contrast the existing decentralized grid with
new technologies and regional coordination approaches that could better serve the public
interest. Through this practice of symbolic contrast in which the meanings for things are
derived through social interaction and modified by contrasting taken-for-granted
assumptions with new potential meanings actors transformed the dominant authoritative
narrative about political risks.
First, state regulators and policymakers began to describe the Western
Interconnection as “Balkanized” or as a “feudal kingdom” and contrasting it to the “21st
Century” technologies provided by RTOs. The negative characterizations of the Western
grid emerged from repeated interactions across the West, frustration with the inefficient
use of grid infrastructure, difficulties in building transmission lines, and failures of past
attempts to introduce organized markets. As one public interest advocate stated, “In the
Western United States the grid is Balkanized...we have a system that is just crazy...it’s
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slow...it’s dumb” (Respondent 215). Whereas, the positive characterizations of RTOs
result from the proven ability for advanced information, communication, and control
system technologies to improve economic efficiency and reliability. For example, state
policymakers and regulators describe the potential benefits of regional integration of the
electricity system this way: “it just really is time to move the grid operations to the 21st
Century” (Field Observation 6/16/16) and “...It’s just a piece of software, you know?
Let's just start using it” (Field Observation 5/6/16). This symbolic contrast not only
associates the authoritative narrative of local control with outdated and dysfunctional
approaches; it also de-emphasizes the political and market significance of the EIM by
focusing attention on the ability for its advanced information, communication, and
control system technologies to improve economic efficiency and reliability.
Second, regulators and policymakers began to describe the challenges of
balancing California’s resource mix in terms of “overgeneration risks” and as a potential
“political and economic failure” and contrasting it to the potential to “lead the transition
to renewable energy” through regional collaboration. The negative characterizations of
the current challenge are tied to the political risks associated with curtailing wind or solar
resources. California’s clean energy policies and transmission investments have been
designed to promote rapid growth of renewable resources and green economic
development within the state. Many in California see its role as leading the transition to a
low-carbon economy by acting as a model for others. As one California policymaker
noted: “We can certainly act as a model or example of how you can maintain a
sustainable economy and grow the economy while addressing climate issues” (Field
Observation 7/26/16). However, now that renewable resources are a significant share of
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the resource mix and are at times exceeding what the system can use, this construct of
leading by example is being challenged. As a state official explained:
We clearly don’t want to curtail that level of generation, we clearly don’t
want to throw away those renewables that we’ve spent so much time and
effort and cost putting on the system, and so we’re going to have to attack
this across the spectrum.
(Field Observation 9/18/14)
Without policy and institutional changes, available generation from renewable resources
will have to be turned off during certain periods because it exceeds what can be managed
on the system. The existing infrastructure, including current and anticipated investments
in renewable generation, can be used more efficiently if the footprint is expanded to take
advantage of geographic, load, and resource diversity. Therefore, California
policymakers and regulators have increasingly focused on their role in leading the
transition to low-carbon economy, redefining how they measure success, and engaging
regionally. The following comment reflects this effort:
...California is one percent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions...we
cannot solve things ourselves...it’s sort of game over unless we move out
of our comfort zone of California and reach out...Idaho is like 82 percent
renewable. Well, that’s not our definition. A lot of it’s large hydro. I mean,
but frankly, again, you can’t get much better from a greenhouse gas
perspective.
(Field Observation 7/26/16)
This symbolic contrast associates the authoritative narrative of local control with
inefficiency and reliability risks and associates regional integration with furthering
aggressive clean energy policy goals.
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Through these uses of symbolic contrast, regulators and policymakers worked to
provide other decision makers with the necessary authority to improve collaboration and
make it difficult for them to continue the status quo.
Boundary Spanning
The EIM is described most often as an extension of existing real-time market
services to other balancing authorities in the West. However, it is a unique and highly
technical construct that has evolved from discussions throughout the West. An EIM was
initially explored in studies by research institutions and regional governance entities (e.g.,
Cochran et al., 2013; Milligan et al., 2013; Porter et al., 2012; Samaan et al., 2013). It
was further developed through initiatives spearheaded by the Western Interstate Energy
Board and the Northwest Power Pool and proposals developed by various RTOs
including CAISO and the Southwest Power Pool. It is therefore not surprising that
differently situated stakeholders express a range of alternative interpretations of the EIM.
Through the social practice of boundary spanning, strategic actors explored these
alternative interpretations, created space for diverse perspectives, and worked to
transform authorities that prevented collaboration by allowing stakeholders to understand
how their particular interest connect to the EIM formed by CAISO and PacifiCorp.
In discussing the conflicting views regarding the EIM, one stakeholder drew a
distinction between the EIM as a project to create a clearly defined market product and
the EIM as a policy to promote regionalization of the grid by asserting:
It’s hard for people to understand EIM as a project, but it is a
project...EIM is not—they call it an initiative, EIM is not a policy
(Respondent 219)
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I suggest that this is a useful distinction in understanding the alternative
interpretations of the EIM and I identify boundary spanning across four types of local
interpretations reflecting this distinction. These alternative interpretations do not
represent fixed coalitions in competition with each other to drive decision making, but
rather represent different meanings that stakeholders explored as they sought to engage in
cooperative work. For example, CAISO used all four seemingly contradictory local
interpretations as it engaged with various stakeholders.
Discrete Product
In many venues, the EIM is described in terms of its differences from an RTO.
For example, at the first Committee meeting, CAISO staff explained that, unlike an RTO,
the EIM requires no critical mass, has no exit fees, is low-cost and low-risk, and does not
affect balancing authority autonomy (Field Observation, 7/1/14). These explanations
focus on the aspects of EIM market design that protect state and local autonomy to drive
reliability, affordability, and clean energy decisions. These explanations are important
because retaining this authority is critical for many potential EIM stakeholders. However,
these explanations do not convey the complexity of the EIM market design, but rather
characterize the EIM as a discrete market product that utilities can voluntarily chose to
use or not use.
Integrated Product
In other venues, the EIM is described as tightly integrated with CAISO’s other
organized markets. For example, in a stakeholder meeting, an experienced CAISO
participant questioned how the EIM would work:
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SPEAKER 1: CAISO operates three markets; the EIM is not a separate
market, it is participation in the real time markets. Does the committee see
this as one market? Or is it separate? Or might that change in the future?
SPEAKER 2: The Committee understands it is an extension of the real
time market and that is why we have considered how difficult it would be
to separate out. We recognize they are linked and a governance model
would consider this...because we do know they are not easily separable.
(Field Observation 1/12/15)
These explanations focus on aspects of EIM market design that are highly
interdependent and require market rules across products be kept compatible. These
explanations are important because ensuring the fully organized markets continue to
function efficiently and reliably and California’s investment in market infrastructure
retains its value is critical for incumbent CAISO participants and many California
stakeholders. However, the EIM market design work is highly technical and described by
experienced stakeholders as “wonky” or as “the deep end of the pool.” Furthermore, it
was carried out in a separate stakeholder process meaning that somewhat different action
fields formed around the technical and governance implementation efforts. As a result,
the functioning of the EIM as a highly integrated market product was not well understood
among stakeholders. For example:
SPEAKER 1: EIM is just on the hour – this is a full on day-ahead market.
SPEAKER 2: I don’t understand how they operate side by side.
SPEAKER 1: Imbalance is a product within the ISO. It’s not like being
full in. If you are a full ISO customer, it is like turning over the keys.
Imbalance is a separate market.
SPEAKER 2: If you are in hourly, what is left?
SPEAKER 1: In EIM you don’t have to bid everything in. With ISO you
are fully in. It is almost as if you are part of their balancing authority.
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SPEAKER 2: You are still operating your plants technically, but they tell
you what to do.
(Field Observation, 11/17/15)
Many stakeholders were unclear about the relationship between the EIM and
CAISO’s interdependent market framework. This confusion was compounded by the fact
that other RTOs started their organized markets by operating an autonomous EIM market
and then layering on other market productions. However, unlike other RTOs, CAISO was
leveraging previous investments in market development to offer EIM services at low-cost
and with easy entry and easy exit. These conversations focus on the complexity of the
organized market designs and characterize the EIM as an integrated market product that
must remain compatible with other real-time and day-ahead market services.
Transformation Policy
The EIM is also often described as an initial step toward a more integrated market
in the West. For example, in a CAISO Board of Governors meeting, CAISO staff noted:
“It’s a harbinger of the West working closer together” (Field Observation 9/18/14), and a
Committee member indicated some stakeholder discussions are revolving around this
issue: “Okay, this is just a small part of the market. Should there be broader engagement
in an RTO or an ISO, not just EIM?”(Respondent 214). These descriptions focus on the
aspects of EIM market design that create pressure for it to evolve over time to include
new participants and new market functions. Such an expansion would improve
efficiency, reliability, and importantly, enable the integration of higher levels of
renewables. This is clearly articulated by many clean energy advocates. For example, in
testifying about what it would take to reach climate change, affordability, and health
goals, one advocate declared:
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I don’t see another way to get there without taking this step. And I mean
by that, the entire step. The whole complement of markets that comes with
a regional RTO as well as the transmission planning pieces, and thinking
through the EIM, which has shown great benefits and potential, I don’t
think that goes far enough to get to that place.
(Field Observation 6/16/16)
Many clean energy advocates, like the one quoted above, are supportive of
regionalization to further clean energy and environmental policy goals, and some utilities
and FERC also support regionalization through creation of a multi-state RTO
(Respondent 205). These explanations are important because regionalization of the grid
provides a way to integrate high levels of wind and solar resources and achieve clean
energy policy goals. However, they do not convey the limitations of the EIM’s current
functionality, but rather focus on the expectation that the EIM will add functionality and
characterize the EIM as the first step in transforming the western grid into a fully
organized market.
Constitution Policy
Other stakeholders most often describe the EIM as requiring independence. For
example, a Committee member stated, “It’s got to be an independent board solely for the
Energy Imbalance Market. It can’t be a creature of the California Independent System
Operator, or no one would join it” (Respondent 215). These descriptions focus on the
aspects of EIM market design that allow participants to have a meaningful decisionmaking role in the future direction of the market. As described by CAISO staff in a
presentation to stakeholders, the guiding objectives for the Committee were intended to
drive a “long-term independent EIM” (California Independent System Operator, 2013b).
These conversations are important because the EIM is shifting market
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opportunities for utilities outside of California. For example, many California utilities are
motivated to participate in the EIM because it reduces the cost of integrating variable
renewable resources. In contrast, many utilities outside of California, particularly those
that rely heavily on hydroelectric resources, do not face significant challenges in
balancing variability within their system. For these utilities, an important motivation to
participate in the EIM is the opportunity to provide generation into the market. In
addition, expansion to a fully organized market could: reduce opportunities with
traditional energy contracting partners; continue to depress prices as more zero marginal
cost wind and solar enter the market; allow wind and solar from outside of California and
Oregon to be valued as resources that meet state renewable portfolio standard
requirements; and increase the value of flexible resources like hydroelectric. For these
reasons, utilities are anticipating changing market opportunities and are paying attention
to the market evolution. As one Northwest utility explained:
We need to see how to stay relevant and influence where that market goes.
We have a lot at stake. We need to be sure the value of hydro continues to
be recognized, and transmission value and emission value. We need to
continue to influence those big policy issues going forward.
(Field Observation 11/18/15)
As highlighted by this comment, the ability to influence EIM market rules and the future
evolution of the market is critical for some stakeholders. However, CAISO’s statutory
authorization by and accountability to the California Legislature makes the current
governance structure untenable. These conversations focus on the potential market
opportunities from the EIM and characterize the EIM as the first step in constituting a
new autonomous organized market within the western grid.
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Alternative Interpretations
These alternative meanings of the EIM focus on four fundamental local needs and
constraints of stakeholders: 1) preservation of political autonomy, 2) requirements for
market efficiency, 3) representation of market interests, and 4) representation of political
interests. The interpretive flexibility that permits the EIM to be understood as either a
product or a policy allowed stakeholders to come together and explore these alternative
meanings. However, these meanings also reflect two tensions (Figure 5.2). First, the
alternative interpretations reflect tensions around the scope and sale of the EIM, or in
other words, how tightly the market and operational design is integrated with existing
CAISO markets and whether it will only expand geographically or will also expand to
include additional market functions. Second, the alternative interpretations reflect
tensions around the structure of EIM decision-making and stakeholder interactions, or in
other words, who will influence EIM market design, planning, and operations.
As the Committee began deliberating specific options for EIM governance, the
conflicts in these alternative interpretations surfaced and made it difficult for
organizations to coordinate work. Although the interpretive flexibility of the EIM opened
the possibility for coordination and engaged stakeholders in the initiative, the EIM
requires a governance structure to make decisions about new market rules and to
encourage additional market participants to join. Defining the scope, scale and structure
for EIM governance required additional negotiation of authorities.
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Figure 5.2. Alternative Interpretations of the EIM
The ambiguity of EIM governance and future market design allow it to be
interpreted to meet widely varying local needs and constraints.
5.3. Conclusion
The unique design of the EIM allowed it to launch with only a single new market
participant – PacifiCorp. However, as other market participants join they are expected to
also increase the benefits for existing participants, and in fact, this did occur when NV
Energy entered the market because it added transfer capacity (California Independent
System Operator, 2016b). The efforts by strategic actors to shift the discourse, use
symbolic contrast, and engage in boundary spanning created discursive resources and
allowed different local interpretations of the EIM, which enable collaboration and
expansion. Between August 2014 and April 2016 five additional investor-owned utilities
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decided to join the EIM.16 These actions were important in overcoming and transforming
existing authorities that had prevented collaboration for nearly two decades.
However, the EIM operated without an independent governance structure until
June 2016. In the interim, implementation issues were deliberated through CAISO
stakeholder processes with advice from the Committee. This approach was untenable
over the long term and only accepted because of the work the Committee was
undertaking to develop recommendations for an alternative EIM governance structure.
Chapter 6 explores how the Committee and stakeholders legitimated existing authority
and created new sources of authority in developing recommendations for EIM
governance. In doing so, the Committee worked to maintain a common understanding of
the EIM while continuing to allow diverse local interpretations.

16

Announcement of intent to join: NV Energy (8/14), Puget Sound Energy (3/15), Arizona Public Service
(5/15), Portland General Electric (11/15), and Idaho Power (4/16).
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CHAPTER SIX: NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY

Authority provides actors with a rationale for the practices they enact (Fligstein &
McAdam, 2012; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017). Yet, in policy implementation, various
ambiguous or competing sources of authority must be reconciled and the significance of
any particular authority depends on how it is interpreted. Authority is thus co-created or
negotiated among organizations as it is interpreted within a particular context (Fligstein
& McAdam, 2012; Koschmann & Burk, 2016; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017). In other
words, skilled actors engage in social negotiation to interpret and adapt policy
interventions to build shared meanings, enable collective action and enact policy change.
Because the EIM is voluntary, the imposition of one governance-model or another could
threaten the success of the initiative. Therefore, to further coordination among western
stakeholders, it was necessary to collaboratively construct shared meanings that provide
rationale for particular governance structures, but also allow stakeholders to tailor
interpretations to address local needs and constraints (Bowker & Star, 1999; Fligstein &
McAdam, 2012; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017; Susan Leigh Star & Griesemer, 1989).
Chapter 5 identifies four alternative meanings of the EIM that address the local
needs and constraints of stakeholders: 1) preservation of political autonomy, 2)
requirements for market efficiency, 3) representation of market interests, and 4)
representation of political interests. The analysis of stakeholder interactions presented in
this chapter investigates how the Committee reconciled the tensions between political
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autonomy and market efficiency and negotiated conflicting norms for stakeholder
interactions that shape political and market influence. Based on my analysis, the
Committee can be said to have performed two transformative functions that contributed
to the acceptance of the EIM Governing Body as a legitimate structure. First, the
Committee transformed the concept of delegated governance to an opportunity for
shaping the future west-wide market evolution and legitimated new rationale that allowed
stakeholders to express conditional support for delegated, rather than autonomous
governance, as a pragmatic and temporary approach. Second, the Committee created new
governance structures for state regulators and regional stakeholders to interact with each
other, with the CAISO Board and with the EIM Governing Body. Somewhat counterintuitively, the Committee sought to achieve greater interaction and relational authority
by creating more hierarchical structure in the CAISO process, which has been highly
participatory and informal.
The first section of this chapter explains how alternative interpretations of the
EIM relate to different, initial preferences for EIM governance. The second section
identifies the constraints imposed by the inherent design of the EIM, demonstrates how
the Committee engaged in the discursive strategies of tacking and abstraction to create
new sources of authority necessary to legitimate EIM governance, and highlights the role
of interdependencies with other strategic action fields. The third section of this chapter
describes the conflicting organizational norms for interactions among stakeholders and
demonstrates how the committee enacted boundary spanning through questioning to
produce unique governance structures for coordinating interactions among stakeholders.
In these negotiations, interdependencies with other actions fields were also important.
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Finally, the last section of this chapter compares the new EIM governance structure to the
common elements of regional electricity governance across the seven RTOs in the United
States. It also draws implications for the ongoing negotiation of a west-wide organized
market and for the evolution of regional electricity system governance.
6.1. Governance Models
Organized markets require governance. A structure is needed to make ongoing
decisions about market rules and to align these rules with operations and infrastructure
planning. However, market governance is not only an issue of defining mechanisms and
procedures, but involves decisions about autonomy and the allocation of influence. The
Transitional Committee was created to define the relationship between CAISO and the
EIM and to establish structures to allocate influence.
The Committee framed stakeholder discussions around three conceptual models
of EIM Governing Body authority: advisory, delegated, and autonomous. In very broad
terms, California investor-owned utilities supported an advisory model of governance and
Northwest investor-owned and public power utilities supported an autonomous model.
However, specific stakeholder positions do not align well with generalizations based on
RTO participation, utility ownership, or region; and many stakeholders qualified their
positions or recommended alternatives (Appendix F). Furthermore, many stakeholders
suggested a need to consider changes to EIM governance or CAISO governance as the
market evolves.
Given the long history of failed attempts to extend organized markets in the
Western Interconnection, it is not surprising that these positions cannot be easily framed
as competing coalitions. The relationships among stakeholders are complex. Within
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general categories such as RTO-participation, ownership, or region, utilities differ in their
administrative capacity, transmission rights, resource capacity, resource flexibility,
bilateral market obligations, electricity costs, renewable energy requirements, and
exposure to carbon cost risks. These differences complicate collaboration. For example, a
clean energy advocate explained that reaching agreement on another organized market
initiative failed because, “all of the participants, the different utilities, are situated
differently” (Respondent 217).
Focusing on the alternative interpretations of the EIM provides a way of making
sense of these diverse stakeholder positions. The conversations and iterative comments
and responses in the EIM stakeholder process reveal how different proposed governance
models relate to the local needs and constraints of stakeholders (Table 6.1).
Stakeholders that primarily interpreted the EIM in terms of political autonomy
supported an autonomous governance model. These stakeholders commented on the
importance of limiting their participation to only imbalance services and the need for
EIM governance to be accountable to consumers outside of California. Because the
CAISO Board is appointed by the Governor of California and has statutory obligations to
the citizens of California, an autonomous governance structure was seen as essential.
Stakeholders that primarily interpreted the EIM in terms of market efficiency
supported an advisory model. These stakeholders commented on the value of
comprehensive market design, the potential economic and reliability risks associated with
disrupting the tightly integrated market framework, the obligation of CAISO to protect all
market participants, and the large investment the consumers of California have already
made in developing CAISO. Because the EIM is a limited market service, these

99
stakeholders sought to limit the influence of the EIM Governing Body, but also sought to
expand the EIM geographically and functionally.
Table 6.1.

Alternative Interpretations of the EIM Related to Governance Models

Alternative

Sample Quotes
“An autonomous governing model would clearly signal to potential market

POLITICAL
AUTONOMY
EIM is a discrete
product and
governance should be
autonomous

participants that this endeavor is solely focused on the development of an
EIM.” (Non-governmental Organization)
“The intent of this revision is to ensure that no single group or area can
force proposals on others...Overall, it creates an on-going risk that the EIM
will not return the maximum achievable benefits to EIM participants that
do not choose to participate in the other Cal ISO markets.” (Public Power
Organization)
“A separate autonomous governing board would ultimately lead to conflicts
resulting in inefficient administration of energy markets which leads to

MARKET EFFICIENCY
EIM is an integrated
product and
governance cannot be
separated

higher costs, reduced benefits, and create seams issues.” (California
Investor-Owned Utility)
“I emphasize the word seamless because it has two meanings – its normal
meaning and the meaning of not creating seams, and the hope that this
committee’s work will not introduce additional complexities or seams into
the framework of the EIM that we have worked so hard to achieve.” (CAISO
Staff)
“This evolution of the CAISO into an entity that provides wholesale electric

POLITICAL

market and operations services on a regional basis, and so is responsible to

INFLUENCE

a range of states, not just California, is already anticipated by California

EIM is a

law.” (California Investor-Owned Utility)

regionalization policy
and governance

“One of the most crucial functions for the EIM Governance committee is the

should be transformed

authority to recommend and expand the functionality of markets to
provide additional services...“ (Non-governmental Organization)
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Alternative
MARKET INFLUENCE
EIM is a
regionalization policy
and a foundation for
constituting a new
governance structure

Sample Quotes
“...It will require greater coordination and collaboration of a Governing
Body independent of CAISO’s Board and its obligations to protect California
interest.” (Northwest Investor-Owned Utility)
“...The EIM governance committee will be the sole body tasked with
ensuring representation and protection of EIM interests in the CAISO
markets.” (Northwest Investor-Owned Utility)

Stakeholders that primarily interpreted the EIM in terms of political influence
were divided in their governance model preferences. These stakeholders supported
regionalization to further clean energy, reliability, and affordability policy goals. They
sought a governance approach that would encourage geographic and functional expansion
of the EIM. For some of these stakeholders, the delegated or autonomous governance
models seemed most likely to encourage regionalization, while others supported
transformation of CAISO governance.
Finally, stakeholders that primarily interpreted the EIM in terms of market
influence supported autonomous governance. These stakeholders emphasized the need
for a neutral market or level playing field. Like the stakeholders that sought political
autonomy, these stakeholders objected to California’s role in EIM governance and
supported autonomous governance, but rather than seeking a limited market, these
stakeholders viewed the EIM as the first step in constituting a new autonomous organized
market within the western grid.
What is interesting about this analysis is that initially stakeholders associated their
local needs and constraints with particular governance approaches. Stakeholders
fundamentally concerned with political autonomy supported an autonomous governance
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model, whereas stakeholders primarily focused on the constraints imposed by market
efficiency supported an advisory governance model. Other stakeholders who were
focused on ensuring political or market influence supported a delegated or autonomous
model. With the exception of stakeholders focused on political autonomy, stakeholders
were united in support of the long-term transition to regionalization of markets. Part of
the challenge for the Committee was to align the different interpretations of the EIM with
a common governance structure.
6.2. Defining the Relationship between CAISO and the EIM
In conversations about which governance model to use, the Committee worked to
define the relationship between CAISO and the EIM in a way that would encourage EIM
expansion, while maintaining the efficiency and reliability of the market. The third theme
that emerged from my data involves this tension between political autonomy and market
efficiency and how it shaped the legitimacy of a delegated governance model. I suggest
that Committee conversations about the value proposition of the EIM, the feasibility of
amending the California statutory authorization of CAISO, and connection between the
EIM and the future evolution of a west-wide organized market transformed the concept
of delegated governance and legitimated a shared governance model as a pragmatic and
temporary approach.
This section identifies the formal economic and political authority of the EIM
value proposition that was initially offered as a rationale for a delegated approach to
governance. The section also examines how the social practices of tacking and
abstraction shaped how the Committee and stakeholders understood the alternative
models for EIM governance. Finally, this section explains how field interdependencies
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altered the potential for the EIM to further regionalization and brought attention to takenfor-granted assumptions.
Authority of the EIM Value Proposition
The EIM value proposition provided a rationale for supporting a delegated, rather
than autonomous, governance model. The EIM leverages the complex market platforms
paid for by California ratepayers. By extending existing systems and market processes to
a wider footprint, CAISO is able to offer an EIM that is low-cost, has easy entry and
exist, and can be extended incrementally to voluntary participants. These features are
important for potential market participants focused on political autonomy. However, this
value proposition imposes two constraints on EIM governance. First, the EIM must
remain tightly integrated with other CAISO markets. Second, supervision of the EIM
tariff cannot be transferred to an autonomous Governing Body without change to
California statute.
Negotiating Authority for Shared Governance
The authority of the EIM value proposition conflicted with other sources of
authority that are important to stakeholders outside of CAISO, including the potential
economic and environmental benefits from EIM expansion and state and local obligations
to serve their constituents. Consequently, stakeholders did not agree on the significance
of the EIM value proposition as they began to deliberate a governance recommendation.
However, the Committee used two discursive practices that shaped how stakeholders
interpreted it: tacking and abstraction. I suggest that these practices revealed important
aspects of local interpretations and shaped the rationale for participating in a delegated
form of governance.
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Tacking
The concept of a boundary object incorporates the interpretive flexibility of a
loosely structured common concept, more specific interpretations that make the concept
useful for work that is not coordinated, and a process of tacking between these forms of
the object to coordinate work without consensus (Star, 2010; Star & Griesemer, 1989).
The EIM stakeholder engagement process provides a unique opportunity to analyze how
actors “tack” between common and local interpretations as they construct and use a
boundary object to facilitate coordinated work. The Committee is comprised of
stakeholders. The members were nominated by stakeholder sectors and appointed by the
CAISO Board of Governors. The members deliberated in working groups and public
meetings, worked together to draft iterative governance proposals that were shared
widely with any interested stakeholder, and presented the proposals in meetings. These
members were selected not to represent their individual organizational interests, but
rather were to selected to represent “...a diverse, well-qualified group that can promote
the objectives of a successful EIM” (California Independent System Operator, 2013c).
However, the home organizations and in some cases the actual committee members, also
participated in the process as stakeholders by submitting written comments or identifying
positions representing their individual interests. For example, the organizations that
employed nine of the thirteen Committee members submitted written comments on the
governance proposals.
In the first six months, the public meetings of the Committee primarily consisted
of updates from CAISO staff on the operation of the EIM. Committee members
interacted very little with the public or with each other in these public venues. During this
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time period, the Committee was gathering information and engaging in private working
group sessions. After this period of learning about legal and economic constraints,
structures of other RTOs, and local concerns, the Committee referenced this experience
to provide legitimacy to their proposed course of action. For example:
This is not something that occurred overnight. There was a lot of
debate...while many of us came from different lines of organizations the
criteria is that we be independent on the transitional committee and that is
what we are looking for going forward.
(Field Observation, 1/12/15)
In the next eight months of Committee meetings, the members explained common
positions in public and to their home organizations and responded formally with
comments on the proposals. So while members had legitimacy within the Committee
because of their particular stakeholder experiences, they also had legitimacy with their
home organizations because of their ability to interpret positions of the Committee. This
tacking between meanings and how it shaped the interpretation of the EIM value
proposition can be seen in the following example, which traces the dialogue as
represented in iterative written documents between the Committee and local comments of
one Committee member between January and July of 2015:
COMMON: The model involving ‘Autonomous Separate Entity’
raises questions related to the additional costs. Those additional
costs could undermine a key premise for the EIM business model ...
Would these types of costs, or other potential costs, be worth
incurring in order to have the EIM governed through an autonomous
entity?
LOCAL: If there was significant critical mass of potential EIM
Entities ... then it may be that those benefits would justify additional
system, legal, administrative, and other supporting start-up costs.
This would be a factual inquiry.
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COMMON: At this time, we have mixed opinions about change to
the overall ISO governance. On one hand, if the ISO continues to
expand in its geographic reach, such a change seems both fair and
inevitable. At this time, however, a change may be premature...
LOCAL: It is appropriate...that the CAISO Board would maintain
the foundation of market governance until such time as regional
developments are sufficiently extensive that wholesale governance
changes may be considered further...
COMMON: One continuing point of disagreement is whether the
Transitional Committee should attempt to create an autonomous and
separate model of governance for EIM matters now. This is a
concept we rejected...A number of commenters reiterated their
desire for an autonomous model...We once again decline to adopt an
autonomous governance model, because the only way to do so
meaningfully is to obtain a legislative approval that is unlikely with
respect to the immediate need for EIM governance.
LOCAL: As currently constructed, the EIM is a bolt-on addition to
the CAISO Real-Time Market. It is not an RTO, yet...the Committee
faces a Hobson’s choice, and the failure to move forward with some
proposal seems untenable.
This exchange is interesting for several reasons. First, it highlights that
stakeholders confronting a need for political influence did not consider potential costs
sufficient justification to rule out an autonomous governance model. The comments of
many stakeholders reflected similar positions and asserted the need for the EIM to have
some degree of independent authority. Second, it demonstrates a shift in the formal
dialogue, which had previously omitted reform of CAISO governance from the range of
possible options. Many stakeholders did not accept the constraints imposed by existing
California statute, but instead repeatedly asked the Committee to recommend that
statutory changes be pursued. Finally, it illustrates how the Committee offered the limited
EIM functionality as a rationale for accepting more limited influence required by not
pursuing legislative action and how a local response reflected acceptance of this
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rationale. In this way, the Committee and stakeholders tailored the local meaning of the
EIM. By repeatedly referring to the EIM as a “bolt-on addition,” stakeholders reinforced
the limited scope of EIM functions relative to the full range of organized market services
offered by CAISO within California and the dependence of the EIM on this integrated
market platform.
Abstraction
Throughout the Committee process, stakeholders expressed diverse positions
about the evolution of the EIM market. While nearly all stakeholders expressed support
for expansion of the EIM, they had different understandings of what expansion meant.
Specifically, some stakeholders supported the EIM expanding geographically and
evolving to autonomous governance, but with functionality limited to current services. In
contrast, other stakeholders supported the EIM expanding both geographically and
functionally and evolving into a multi-state RTO. Rather than explicitly accepting or
rejecting differing expectations or explicitly designing governance to support a particular
pathway for market growth, the Committee repeatedly framed the governance
recommendation as being developed with “an eye toward the future” and “not an end
state.” By refraining from committing to one particular future and abstracting the concept
of market evolution, the Committee retained an element of interpretive flexibility in the
EIM.
Interdependencies Affecting Choice of Governance Models
The interdependence between the Committee processes and other action fields
imposed constraints on what was possible and shaped how stakeholders understood the
choice of governance models. In April 2015, PacifiCorp signed an agreement with
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CAISO to explore the feasibility of full participation in the CAISO organized markets.
This occurred after the Committee’s ninth meeting and in the midst of stakeholder
comments on the straw proposal. This changed the context of the Committee’s work.
PacifiCorp and CAISO began to evaluate benefits of a fully organized market and
discussions were initiated with California policymakers to consider the statutory reforms
necessary to transform CAISO into a multi-state RTO. Consequently, the EIM could no
longer be expected to evolve into a regional market with expanded functionality and
deliberations about statutory changes shifted to a different venue.
This external event required the Committee and stakeholders to discuss the future
of the EIM in more specific terms and disrupted the previous efforts to abstract the
concept of market evolution. The PacifiCorp announcement created a moment of coauthoring in which the Committee and stakeholders discussed their previously taken-forgranted assumptions about the future of the EIM. The limited functionality of the future
EIM and uncertainty about its long-term viability if market participants engage in a
multi-state RTO initially led some stakeholders and Committee members to question the
need for EIM governance. However, several Committee members suggested that their
work designing the EIM Governing Body should be viewed as foundational for regional
governance. A new rationale for delegated governance emerged. The success of EIM
governance was framed as critical for building the trust necessary for a wider regional
market (CAISO, 6/22/15). To further this end, the Committee innovated the concept of
shared governance, which places an emphasis on authority derived through ongoing
social negotiation.
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The shared governance mechanism was designed to “foster a collaborative
relationship” between the EIM Governing Body and the CAISO Board of Governors. It
gives the EIM Governing Body primary authority over EIM market rules, although any
approved changes are also subject to consent by the CAISO Board. It also requires joint
approval of market rule changes that affect both the EIM and other CAISO markets.
Additionally, the EIM Governing Body has a formal advisory role for market rules
applicable generally to CAISO markets. This shared approach avoids competing FERC
tariff filings and requires collaboration. By creating space for interactions rather than
creating hierarchical structures, the Committee sought to provide tangible relational
authority, while ensuring the EIM and other organized market rules remain coherent and
compatible.
Balancing Political Autonomy and Market Efficiency
The EIM value proposition provided a rationale for supporting a delegated
governance model and ensuring that the EIM remains tightly integrated with other
CAISO markets. However, this source of authority was not sufficient. For stakeholders
concerned about political autonomy, the distinction between the EIM and the full CAISO
market became important in accepting a delegated form of governance. Furthermore, the
initiative to consider comprehensive regional governance provided a rationale for the
Committee’s decision declining to recommend changes to California statute. By
repeatedly referring to the EIM as a “bolt-on addition,” stakeholders reinforced the
limited scope of EIM functions relative to the full range of the CAISO organized market,
the limited future evolution of the market, and the dependence of the EIM on the CAISO
market platform. Finally, the innovation of a shared governance model transformed the
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concept of delegated governance from the designation of limited authority to an
opportunity to shape the future west-wide market evolution and provided a rationale for
engaging in the EIM.
These new sources of authority did little to change stated stakeholder positions
regarding the end state for EIM governance. In particular, many stakeholders continued
to voice a preference for autonomous governance and requested that the Committee
recommend changes to California state law. However, these new sources of authority
allowed stakeholders to express conditional support for delegated, rather than
autonomous governance, as a pragmatic and temporary approach. For example,
stakeholders endorsed delegated governance because of the “practicalities of the
immediate need” or for a “limited duration.” Stakeholders faced a “Hobson’s choice” in
that a proposal was needed to address immediate EIM governance needs, but the broader
discussions of CAISO governance reform or autonomous west-wide governance had
shifted to a different venue.
The shared understanding of EIM governance as something temporary and open
to further modifications, but linked to the success of market reform in the wider region
provides a loosely structured shared meaning that allows stakeholders with different
beliefs about market evolution to participate together in the EIM.
6.3. Developing Structures to Coordinate Stakeholder Interactions
In conversations about governance structures to coordinate stakeholder
interactions, the Committee worked to reconcile conflicting organizational norms for how
to interact with market participants and public sector stakeholders. The fourth theme that
emerged from my data involves this tension between the influence of political interests
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and the influence of market interests. I suggest that the Committee sought to achieve
greater interaction and relational authority through decisions to create two new
governance structures: a body of state regulators and a forum for regional stakeholders.
This section identifies the conflicting organizational norms that contribute to a
rationale for the two new structures to coordinate stakeholder interactions. It also
identifies how the Committee enacted boundary spanning through the discursive practice
of questioning to reveal the importance of and differences between organizational norms.
Finally, this section explains how field interdependencies altered the likely scope of EIM
participation and brought attention to taken-for-granted assumptions.
Authority of Organizational Norms
Over the course of Committee deliberations, the structures and norms for how
multi-state RTOs interact with state policymakers provided a rationale for creating a new
EIM body of state regulators. In other parts of the United States, multi-state RTOs have
voluntarily established organizations of state regulators and policymakers that coordinate
information sharing and provide recommendations to the RTO and to FERC (for
explanation of purpose, see Smith, 2007). These organizations are actively involved in
issues that overlap with traditional areas of state purview, such as regional transmission
planning, transmission cost allocation, resource adequacy, and clean energy policies.
Although the EIM is a limited market product, establishing a mechanism to
represent diverse public interests was important for stakeholders focused on political
influence. State regulators and local officials are accountable to the public. If they
delegate influence to a new EIM Governing Body, they need a rationale that allows them
to align this decision with their obligation for accountability. When a regional market
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forms, the shift in the locus of control from state and local to federal regulation and the
new lines of accountability are difficult for public sector organizations to maneuver. For
example, one stakeholder speculated that the primary role of the governance effort was to
provide an accountability mechanism for state regulators:
Because they [state regulators] wanted to show their constituents and their
governor’s offices that we’re keeping a tab. We are not controlling. We’re
keeping a tab on this growing market structure... (Respondent 219)
The Committee initially proposed a body of state regulators to advise both the
CAISO board and the EIM Governing Body. The proposed body, like the state
organizations affiliated with multi-state RTOs, was designed to provide accountability to
the public, facilitate the work of state regulators, and inform RTOs on issues at the
interface with state priorities. However, the relatively large share of public power in the
Western Interconnection and the relationships formed through long-term participation in
voluntary power pools complicated this proposal.17
Negotiating Authority for Stakeholder Structures
While the proposal to create an elevated role for state regulators was widely
supported, stakeholders did not agree that this body alone would be sufficient to represent
the full range of public interests in the Western Interconnection or on how other political
and market interests should be represented. Through an iterative process of questioning
focused on differentiating positions, Committee members engaged stakeholders in
conversations that explored their preferences for stakeholder interactions. These
responses informed the Committee as it worked to construct governance structures with

17

Power pools establish relationships among electric power companies within a region with common
operational goals, such as maintaining system stability and service reliability. The Western Interconnection
includes the Northwest Power Pool and the Western Systems Power Pool.
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sufficient perceived legitimacy to attract new EIM market participants. I suggest that
through this practice of questioning and refining the recommendations, the Committee
enacted boundary spanning that shaped how stakeholder interactions with the EIM will
be coordinated. This can be seen in the following examples.
Interactions with Market Participants
The following exchange illustrates how Committee questioning revealed the
importance of differences between CAISO norms for interacting with market participants
and the norms in traditional power pools and other RTOs.
COMMITTEE MEMBER: The EIM governance is not yet set and while
concerns about governance are often raised, it is not clear what type of
governance is acceptable?
STAKEHOLDER: Something like the governance of the Southwest Power
Pool [a multi-state RTO] would be acceptable. They have lots of member
representation; stakeholders are heard and have real influence. We are
looking at getting away from a “California-centric” approach. We are
looking to be independent from looking at exclusively California.
(Field Observation 03/05/15)
This exchange highlights that for many stakeholders influence is equated with the
concepts of membership and representation. For example, utilities that are part of the
Northwest Power Pool have expressed support for the Southwest Power Pool governance
approach. The Southwest Power Pool, like other RTOs that evolved from existing power
pools, is structured around the concepts of membership, hierarchical committees, sector
representation, voting, and industry staff preparing position papers. It describes itself as
“member-driven.” During Board meetings, members of committees representing market
participants and state regulators sit intermixed with the Board and provide advisory
opinions before the Board votes. As a Committee member explained, these organizational
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norms are important for building relationships and creating legitimacy in formal
governance structures:
I think it facilitates that culture of engagement and inclusiveness. And it's
a lot easier to sit back in a stakeholder process, write comments, and then
file a pleading at FERC objecting to something than it is to sit in a group
of your peers and not compromise on a position.
(Field Observation 5/6/16)
These structures for how other RTOs have chosen to interact with market
participants stand in stark contrast with the CAISO stakeholder engagement process. The
CAISO process is structured around the concepts of open participation, open access to the
Board, and ad hoc initiatives driven by a professional staff. CAISO does not have a
concept of membership, a hierarchical committee structure, or voting, and sector
representation is only used for Board nominations.
These differences in how RTOs engage with market participants did not initially
surface as an issue for the Committee. Although the Committee was diverse in terms of
industry sector, expertise, ownership, and participation in organized markets, the
members were predominantly from organizations that were familiar with CAISO
processes. Of the original ten members, five were affiliated with organizations that
engaged regularly with CAISO; three were state regulators; one was affiliated with an
EIM participant; and one was affiliated with an investor-owned utility operating in both
the Western and Eastern Interconnection. The Committee viewed the CAISO stakeholder
engagement process in positive terms and proposed that the EIM use the same structures
for interacting with stakeholders. However, for many stakeholders not familiar with
CAISO processes the EIM proposal lacked sufficient hierarchical structures to be
perceived as legitimate.
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Interactions with Public Sector Agencies
Committee questioning also revealed the importance of differences between the
organizational norms of RTOs and the norms of public power utilities in the Western
Interconnection. In response to questions about whether representatives of public power
should be included on the body of state regulators, a wide range of stakeholders,
including an investor-owned utility, municipal utilities, and clean energy advocates,
replied that an advisory body, like the body of state regulators, should include the local
officials that regulate public power. Others noted that the proposed body of state
regulators unfairly elevated the interests of investor-owned utilities relative to public
power and that an advisory body should be “created in a balanced way to represent other
interests including those of non-jurisdictional utilities” (Stakeholder Comments and EIM
Transitional Committee Responses, 03/23/15). These comments are interesting because
they illustrate the inherent challenge of creating governance structures to coordinate
interactions among state regulators, state policymakers, and investor-owned utilities and
public power utilities, which at the local level comprise the roles of regulator,
policymaker, and market participant.
CAISO and other RTOs treat public power utilities as market participants, rather
than public sector representatives. These norms conflict with how many public power
utilities in the Western Interconnection view their responsibilities. Several stakeholder
comments highlight that, similar to state regulators, public power utilities face pressures
to ensure engagement in the EIM continues to support their clean energy, reliability, and
affordability goals. As one stakeholder explained:
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For local government structures, that's very challenging, not only to cede
to some other authority in the first place, but then to accept the risk, the
future risk, associated with those changes. (Respondent 221)
In other words, public power utilities have unique public accountability
responsibilities that differ from investor-owned utilities and affect their assessment of
market risks. From this perspective, the body of state regulators unfairly excluded elected
or appointed officials responsible for municipal or cooperative power. These comments
also highlight that some public power utilities see state regulators as not only
representatives of the public interest, but also as representatives of the investor-owned
utilities that they regulate. From this perspective the body of state regulators upsets the
level playing field of the market.
To address stakeholder concerns, the Committee proposed that the body of state
regulators include representatives from public power. This was framed as a way to
address the public accountability obligations of these utilities and provide representation
for their consumers. The proposal was supported by public power utilities, but opposed
by Bonneville Power Administration. As a federally authorized Power Marketing
Administration, Bonneville is often included with public power; however, it does not
have a clearly corresponding elected official that would have met the criteria being
discussed for participation on the body of state regulators. Other stakeholders asserted
that public power should be viewed, not as a representative of public interest, but
primarily as a market participant. From this perspective, including public power on the
body of state regulators would unfairly elevate the interests of a certain class of market
participants and would upset the level playing field of the market.
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Interdependencies Affecting Governance Structures
Interdependencies with other action fields altered stakeholder thinking about what
was possible and shaped how stakeholders understood alternative EIM governance
structures. While the Committee was developing its initial issue paper, the Northwest
Power Pool issued a solicitation to develop a separate EIM. The solicitation was closed
without a disposition in February 2015. Although some members of the Northwest Power
Pool continued to explore a more limited and less expensive alternative, it became less
likely that there would be a second EIM in the Western Interconnection and more clear
that Bonneville Power Administration would be unlikely to join the CAISO EIM.
These external events highlighted taken-for-granted assumptions that governing
structures, like the Body of State Regulators, would be designed around the geographic
scale of the EIM and brought attention to the concerns of stakeholders that do not intend
to participate in an organized market, but are critical for coordinating such services and
ensuring efficient use of transmission infrastructure. Committee interactions with
stakeholders around these issues, led to a fundamental shift in thinking about stakeholder
engagement. Rather than designing structures for stakeholder interactions around market
participants, the Committee began thinking about how to coordinate work with nonparticipants and the seams with these “neighboring balancing authorities.”
The increasing importance of clean energy in the West contributed to this shift in
thinking about stakeholder engagement. Stakeholders that interpret the EIM as a
regionalization policy to promote integration of wind and solar recognized the
importance of engaging across the boundaries between RTO and non-RTO regions. For
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example, a Committee member challenged others to think differently about the role of
EIM governance:
I think one of the biggest benefits that we eventually get from doing this is
the overall coordination of the system. We have PMAs [Power Marketing
Administrations] that control large parts of the western grid...I think it is
wise to have some sort of role for them to be heard...Probably, they
wouldn’t be interested in joining the market necessarily, but they facilitate
participation in the market and their systems are implicated. No more than
they can pretend that we’re not here. We can’t pretend that their not there
either.
(Field Observation 4/30/15)
This comment reflects a growing interest in innovating a uniquely Western approach to
electricity system governance that would coordinate bilateral markets, organized markets,
infrastructure planning, and operations at a regional scale.
The Committee was challenged with reconciling several conflicting positions:
objections to creating a body of state regulators while relying on CAISO stakeholder
processes; objections to including public power on the body of state regulators; and
support for coordinating among organized markets, bilateral markets, and transmission
systems. In response, the Committee chose to limit participation in the body of state
regulators, but departed from the CAISO norms for stakeholder engagement. The
Committee proposed a Regional Issues Forum to engage neighboring balancing
authorities, including Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs), and to provide a forum
for “face-to-face communication” among stakeholders.
The new forum is intended to augment CAISO’s existing stakeholder process,
which continues to be open to all interested stakeholders including representatives of
neighboring balancing authorities and PMAs. The Committee recognized that they
needed to interact in new ways in order for EIM governance to be perceived as legitimate

118
and to attract new market participants. By instituting new structures to increase
interactions among participating and non-participating stakeholders, the Committee
acknowledged the importance of communication, relationships and trust as emergent
sources of authority. One Committee member provided the following rationale for the
Regional Issues Forum:
I think as we have talked through some of the EIM start up issues and also
in this governance-centric process, I think we’ve determined that the more
discussion we have of these matters the better we facilitate understanding
and the better off we are and so that is really the underlying purpose...
(Field Observation 8/25/15)
As reflected in this comment, the success of the Committee process itself was seen as a
rationale for creating new structures to encourage stakeholder interactions and facilitate
coordination among stakeholders with different regulatory requirements and business
model demands.
Balancing Political Influence and Market Influence
EIM stakeholders had to negotiate conflicting norms for stakeholder interactions.
Other RTOs coordinate interactions with public sector stakeholders through organizations
of state regulators. This type of organization was important to state regulators, state
policymakers, and other stakeholders who sought a mechanism to ensure energy policy
values were represented in EIM governance. However, public power utilities did not see
this structure as representative of their interests or the interests of their consumers, but
rather viewed it as upsetting the level playing field of the market. Furthermore, these
stakeholders did not accept CAISO’s open stakeholder process as a legitimate
participation mechanism, but instead equated influence with membership and
representation. To reconcile these conflicting norms, the Committee created new
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governance structures for state regulators and regional stakeholder to interact with each
other, with the CAISO Board and with the EIM Governing Body. Somewhat counter
intuitively, the Committee sought to achieve greater interaction and relational authority
by creating more hierarchical structure in the CAISO process, which has been highly
participatory and informal.
6.4. Elements of Regional Electricity Governance
The alternative interpretations of the EIM focus on four fundamental local needs
and constraints of stakeholders: 1) requirements for market efficiency, 2) preservation of
political autonomy, 3) representation of political interests, and 4) representation of
market interests. I suggest that these needs and constraints are not only relevant for the
EIM, but are generalizable to RTO governance structures in the United States.
Across the United States, transmission organizations have formed seven different
RTOs. Despite being authorized under the same federal authority and early FERC efforts
to impose a standardized market design, each RTO is shaped by its context and is
somewhat unique (Appendix G). Of the seven RTOs, four serve market participants
across a multi-state region: Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), ISO
New England (ISO-NE), PJM Interconnection (PJM), and the Southwest Power Pool
(SPP). In contrast, three RTOs serve market participants within the boundaries of a single
state: CAISO, Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), and New York
Independent System Operator (NYISO). The scope of RTO operations ranges from PJM,
with more than 171,000 MW of generation capacity and a service population of
approximately 61 million customers, to ISO-NE, with 31,000 MW of generation capacity
and a service population of approximately 31 million (Independent System Operator of
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New England, n.d.; PJM Interconnection, 2016b).
The system architecture, market designs, and utility business models also differ
across RTOs. For example, NYISO has 11,000 miles of transmission lines, eight
transmission owners, and more than 400 market participants (Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, n.d.-b; Fernandez, 2011). In contrast, SPP has 60,000 miles of transmission
lines, 43 transmission owners, and 93 market participants (Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, n.d.-b; Southwest Power Pool, n.d.). In MISO, the utilities are largely
vertically integrated and regulated by the states, whereas many of the states in PJM have
more fully restructured generation and retail sales. Finally, RTOs differ in renewable
resource generation and capacity (Borenstein & Bushnell, 2015).18 For example, CAISO,
ERCOT, ISO-NE and NYISO have the largest share of hydroelectric and renewable
resources (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2016).
These differences create distinct organizational challenges for RTO governance
and decision-making. However, all RTOs have four common governance elements that
correspond to the unique combinations of local needs and constraints of stakeholders
within a particular region (Table 6.2).
First, RTO boards are designed to ensure market efficiency and promote a level
playing field. FERC Order 2000 requires RTOs to be independent of control by any
market participant or class of participants (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
2000) and RTO board members are nominated by stakeholders, but selected based on

18

Data is not available from FERC (2016) for the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). ERCOT
2015 generation use: 48% natural gas, 28% coal, 12% wind, 11% nuclear, and 1% other. ERCOT 2015
generation capacity: 53% natural gas, 22% coal, 18% wind, 6% nuclear, and 1% other (Electric Reliability
Council of Texas, n.d.)
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expertise and diversity.
Table 6.2.

Comparison of RTO Governance Structures
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Alternative
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State Relationship
Governor
appoints
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State PUC
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State policy
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regulator

body

body6

Competing

Delegated

State PUC
oversight

State

State

regulator

regulator

body

body

Consensus

Delegated

Shared Section 205 Filing Rights

1.

Consensus

Board includes 5 independent members, 10 stakeholder representatives and Chair of the Texas Public
Utilities Commission.
2. Appointed by Governor and confirmed by State Senate using stakeholder nomination process at Governor’s
discretion.
3. Typical sectors include transmission, generators, other suppliers, and end-users. Table highlights sectors of
interest.
4. Includes renewable energy, energy efficiency, demand response, and distributed generation.
5. Includes environmental and consumer advocates. MISO also explicitly includes state regulators as a
separate sector.
6. The Organization of MISO States consists of state regulators and associate members representing other
public policymakers.
* = CAISO uses sectors only for board nominations, which are considered only at the discretion of the Governor.
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CAISO

ERCOT

ISO-NE

MISO

NYSIO

PJM

SPP

Sources: (California Independent System Operator, 2014a, 2014b; E4 the Future and Synapse Energy Economics,
2016; Fernandez, 2011; PJM Interconnection, 2016a; Shonkwiler, 2016)

Second, RTO mechanisms for sharing authority to file changes to market rules act
to preserve political autonomy. The Federal Power Act authorizes RTOs to submit
market rule changes for regulatory approval by FERC, and in general RTOs have a
mechanism to share this formal authority.19 CAISO is an exception in that it does not
share Section 205 filing rights. In ISO-NE, NYISO and PJM, specific member
committees have either competing or consensus authority to make or request Section 205
tariff filings with FERC. For example, in PJM, the Members Committee has filing
authority over operating issues and the Board has filing authority over reliability and
rates. Similarly, the state regulator organizations affiliated with MISO and SPP have
delegated authority to request Section 205 tariff filings for specific policy issues. For
example, the Organization of MISO states has responsibility for transmission planning,
resource adequacy, and transmission cost allocation and has formally delegated authority
to request that MISO make a tariff filing with FERC for certain transmission projects.
Third, RTO structures for interacting with state regulators or policymakers
provide a formal mechanism for the influence of political interests. Experience across
RTOs demonstrates a nexus of formal regulatory authority among federal, state and local
entities around issues such as resource adequacy, capacity, transmission planning,
storage, and demand response. The multi-state RTOs interact with state officials through
organizations that coordinate information and recommendations among states. In
contrast, single-state RTOs are responsible to state officials through either direct statutory

19

ERCOT is not FERC jurisdictional. Thus, this mechanism is not applicable.
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authorization or regulatory oversight.
Finally, RTO stakeholder engagement processes provide a formal mechanism for
the influence of market interests. FERC Order 719 requires RTOs to be responsive to
stakeholders and to provide stakeholders with direct access to their boards (Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 2008). In response to this requirement, RTOs generally
have membership requirements, hierarchical committee structures, and industry or public
interest sector voting. Each RTO varies in the types of sectors represented and in the
weighting of sector votes. Again, CAISO is an exception to this approach to stakeholder
interactions.
CAISO is unique among RTOs because it does not ensure stakeholders a role in
selecting the board, it does not have a mechanism for sharing Section 205 filing rights, it
is authorized in California statute, and it has an open stakeholder engagement process
with a flattened organizational structure. The voting thresholds in typical RTO processes
promote coalition building and make it easier to sustain the status quo rather than enact
change; whereas, the CAISO process does not require consensus to enact change. In
addition, in typical RTO processes, the sector definitions and weighted voting structures
affect the balance of power; whereas, in the CAISO process the balance of power is
shaped by how staff responds to stakeholder input. As stakeholders in the Western
Interconnection contemplate creating a west-wide RTO, they are negotiating yet another
unique combination of governance elements to reflect local needs and constraints.
6.5. Conclusion
Like many policy implementation issues, EIM governance is not only an issue of
defining policy mechanisms and procedures, but involves decisions about autonomy and
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the allocation of influence. This research demonstrates that EIM governance was
designed to maintain a loosely structured construct with interpretive flexibility and
rationale that would encourage additional EIM participation without requiring consensus.
This indeed appears to have been successful. Since the EIM Governing Body was
appointed and despite continued support for autonomous governance, three public power
organizations – the Balancing Authority of Northern California, Sacramento Municipal
Utility District, and Seattle City Light – have announced their intent to join the EIM.
Additionally, the Baja California Norte grid in Mexico is also exploring participation.
This research also highlights that the success of the new EIM Governing Body
depends on its ability to co-create emergent forms of authority, rather than on hierarchies
and rules. This also appears to be proving successful. Participants in both the Body of
State Regulators and the Regional Issues Forum have commented on the value of
relational authority. For example, in the Body of State Regulators: “Communication and
education and as much talking as possible is helping us all get to the same place” (Field
Observation, 05/06/15) and in the Regional Issues Forum: “There is a fundamental trust
around that group that is more than the sum of its parts” (Field Observation, 06/20/16).
Finally, this research identifies a growing interest in innovating a uniquely
Western approach to electricity system governance. Stakeholders across the Western
Interconnection are discussing a “federated” approach to electricity system governance
and the possibility of creating a “Regional System Operator” rather than an RTO. The
EIM governance recommendation to create a Regional Issues Forum challenged
stakeholders to consider this type of innovation and created opportunities for public
power, civil society organizations, and adjacent balancing authorities to participate; but
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requires that these entities engage in the deeply technical work of market design,
operations, and planning.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter provides a brief summary of the purpose of my research, the central
research question, how the data were collected, and the approach to data analysis. The
remaining sections of this chapter discuss my major findings, the practical and theoretical
contributions of my research, limitations of the study, and directions for future research.
The West has a unique approach to electricity system design and governance. As I
discuss in Chapter 2, in the late 1990s, when FERC required open access to the
transmission grid, RTOs formed across most of the U.S.; yet, the West continued to rely
on more decentralized institutions and decision-making processes to manage transmission
planning and operations. Furthermore, outside of California, the West did not have access
to the real-time, automated scheduling and dispatch of organized wholesale electricity
markets.
In the 20 years since the first organized markets were formed, policies promoting
clean, low-carbon energy and technological innovation have spurred rapid growth in
renewable resources and critical advances in communication, information, and control
system technologies. These new resources and technologies are driving electricity
systems in many regions to become even more integrated and interdependent. In the
West, this evolution of policy and technology was instrumental in the decision of
regulators, utilities and stakeholders to create an EIM to optimize real-time balancing
services among voluntary market participants.
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Given that the EIM emerged after many states enacted clean energy policies, and
after the growth of wind and solar transformed the resource mix and operating constraints
of the electricity system, I initially became interested in how these differences in context
affected EIM implementation. Specifically, the purpose of my research was to explore the
issue of authority in energy policy implementation and the role of non-market
participants, like state policymakers and civil society organizations, in implementation
involving voluntary multi-organizational networks, like RTOs. To accomplish this, I
combined policy implementation, field theory, interorganizational communication, and
boundary work concepts in Chapter 3 and developed an empirical investigation of how
stakeholders reconciled multiple and often conflicting authority to enact policy change
and achieve collective purposes. The intent was to provide a better understanding of how
policy implementation occurs in practice and of the role of social interactions and
interdependencies in shaping implementation processes. Therefore, this study asks how
stakeholders, using social practices and strategies, created and legitimated sources of
authority to establish a governance structure for this new market service.
As outlined in Chapter 4, this research question was investigated through a 32month study of interactions among stakeholders in the West as they explored the
implications of an organized market and developed an EIM governance structure. The
research included 21 interviews with individuals across diverse industry and civil society
sectors, 27 field observations of public meetings, and extensive document review. The
data reflect perspectives of incumbent CAISO participants, key non-RTO actors, state
regulators, and regional clean energy advocates. The data were analyzed using two
complementary methods: the interviews, stakeholder comments, and fieldnotes were
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coded through a cyclical process; and other documents were analyzed through
progressive focusing to generate issues and themes.
7.1. Summary of Findings
This case study demonstrates how organizations were able to achieve a level of
perceived legitimacy in the new EIM governance structure, despite long-standing
mistrust among participants, a resistance to ceding authority to FERC, and conflicting
perspectives on how to structure the relationship between the EIM and CAISO and
relationships among stakeholders. Overall, this analysis demonstrates that policy
implementation is worked out in practice through a process of reconciling multiple
sources of authority and that in this process authority itself is an emergent and negotiated
phenomenon. The multi-organizational policy implementation effort led by the EIM
Transitional Committee resulted in governance structures intended to promote interaction
and relational authority and with sufficient perceived legitimacy to attract new
participants.
The data support four primary findings: 1) dominant yet deficient narratives
provided a rationale for ongoing resistance to regional governance in the West and
prevented collaboration; 2) actors overcame and transformed deficient sources of
authority by enacting social strategies that allowed alternative interpretations of the EIM
construct and enabled organizations to begin collaboration; 3) actors using social
negotiation interpreted and adjusted the EIM policy intervention and co-created emergent
forms of authority that are flexible and dynamic; and 4) field interdependencies surfaced
taken-for-granted assumptions and provided critical resources for innovative forms of
collective action. These findings provide important insights for understanding how public

129
sector and civil society organizations that are engaged in complex governance systems
seek to exercise discretion and sustain accountability to the public interest.
Common Resistance to Shared Authority
As I discussed in Chapter 5, in the U.S. and around the world, electricity systems
are becoming more integrated and interdependent with regional governance and
organized markets providing economic efficiencies and operational flexibility. Yet, some
regions, including the Western U.S., have remained relatively decentralized. Forming an
organized electricity market involves coordination or collaboration among organizations.
This type of policy implementation often involves ambiguous authority relationships or
competing sources of authority (Koschmann, 2012; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017; Ostrom,
2011), and policy change requires efforts to overcome or transform existing authorities
that would otherwise prevent collaboration (Koschmann & Burk, 2016). Thus,
understanding what has prevented regional collaboration and the expansion of an
organized electricity market in the West is central to understanding how policy change
occurred.
A key finding that emerged from my data is that a dominant narrative of
jurisdictional independence and mistrust of multi-state RTOs and FERC provided a
rationale for inaction and prevented collaboration. Stakeholders both within and outside
of California believe that retaining jurisdictional independence, rather than engaging in
the collective activities of a multi-state RTO, serves their political and economic
interests. This can been seen in the resistance among states to engaging with each other;
in the divisions across federal, state, and local levels of regulatory authority; and in
concerns about the inherent risks of engaging in a more dynamic governance system.
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These tensions and repeated interactions among stakeholders have reinforced a narrative
around a preference for “homegrown solutions” and “local control,” and the need to
“protect state interests.”
This dynamic of mistrust and resistance to the shared authority required by a
multi-state RTO emerges from the diverse energy system values and complex
jurisdictional relationships in the West. The region’s energy system values are reflected
in wide differences among states in formal clean energy policies, affordability of
electricity, and their resources mix. Furthermore, CAISO is authorized by state statute
and FERC, dominated by three large investor-owned utilities and a partially restructured
industry. In contrast, the non-RTO region of the West is shaped by public power and a
vertically integrated industry. These differences mean that any expansion of organized
markets to access the anticipated economic, reliability, and environmental benefits of
such a change involve complex negotiations. Stakeholders must negotiate different
perspectives regarding potential political and economic benefits and risks of
collaboration, as well as the complications introduced by California statute and FERC
jurisdiction in relation to public power. This finding from my analysis demonstrates that
rational positions can generate narratives that provide justification for inaction that can
persist even as economic and political tradeoffs evolve. These then become deficient
narratives that must be overcome or transformed to provide justification that will enable
policy change.
Transforming Existing Authority
CAISO, state regulators, utilities, and other stakeholders needed to transform
long-standing resistance to the shared authority of a multi-state RTO in order to open the
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possibility for stakeholders to engage in a regional initiative. The concept of a Western
EIM was developed through diverse venues over the course of nearly a decade and was
designed to overcome some of this resistance, yet stakeholders continued to be deeply
divided over how the EIM would be implemented in practice. The initial steps to
implement the EIM involved stakeholders in the social negotiation of authority and a
process of interpreting what is and what is not possible. Scholars have developed the
concept of boundary objects to help understand the social practices involved in managing
the tensions between different interpretations for how policy implementation should
proceed and coordinating work without reaching consensus (Bowker & Star, 1999;
Nelson-Marsh, 2017; Susan Leigh Star & Griesemer, 1989). Central to these social
practices is the ability to create a shared understanding of a loosely structured common
concept and to maintain elements of alternative interpretations that make the concept
useful for work that is not coordinated (Bowker & Star, 1999; Susan Leigh Star &
Griesemer, 1989).
Another key finding that emerged from my analysis in Chapter 5 involves the
loosely structured meaning of an EIM and the alternative interpretations that allowed
stakeholders to begin engaging in the initiative. My analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrates
that CAISO, state regulators, utilities, and other stakeholders did this using three
discursive strategies. First, the bilateral EIM agreement between CAISO and PacifiCorp
shifted the discourse by identifying major market participants, designating CAISO as the
market operator, and proposing a relatively equal sharing of benefits. This strategic move
framed the EIM as a dynamic, multi-state market that generates economic and
environmental benefits and worked to shift the discourse regarding the potential
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economic risks of regional engagement. Second, certain regulators and policymakers
began to contrast the existing decentralized grid with regional information,
communication, and control system technologies that could better serve the public
interest. In repeated conversations about the efficiencies of grid modernization and efforts
to lead the transition to renewable energy, actors used these symbolic contrasts to
transform the dominant authoritative narrative about the potential political risks of
regional engagement. Third, stakeholders engaged in boundary spanning to develop and
sustain alternative interpretations around a loosely structured concept of the EIM. These
alternative meanings of the EIM focus on four fundamental local needs and constraints of
stakeholders: preservation of political autonomy; requirements for market efficiency;
representation of market interests; and representation of political interests.
The interpretive flexibility of the EIM allowed stakeholders to come together and
explore these alternative meanings, which enabled collaboration and expansion. Between
August 2014 and April 2016, five additional investor-owned utilities decided to join the
EIM. These actions were important in overcoming and transforming existing authorities
that had prevented collaboration for nearly two decades. This finding from my analysis
demonstrates that multi-organizational policy implementation is a social process that
involves transforming deficient narratives that have prevented or could undermine
collaboration.
Negotiating Authority and Altering Interventions
Because the EIM is voluntary, the imposition of one governance model or another
could threaten the success of the initiative. Therefore, to further coordination among
stakeholders, it was necessary to collaboratively construct shared meanings that provide
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rationales for particular governance structures, adjust the policy intervention to reconcile
competing sources of authority, and allow stakeholders to tailor interpretations to address
local needs and constraints (Bowker & Star, 1999; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Moulton
& Sandfort, 2017; Susan Leigh Star & Griesemer, 1989). In this way authority is cocreated or negotiated among organizations as it is interpreted within a particular context
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Koschmann & Burk, 2016; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017).
The third finding from my analysis is that actors interpreted and adjusted the
policy intervention to co-create emergent forms of authority that are flexible and
dynamic. The analysis in Chapter 6 of the EIM initiative demonstrates two distinct
approaches for how actors interpreted and adjusted the policy intervention. In negotiating
the tension between political autonomy and market efficiency, actors did not
substantively alter the policy intervention, but instead interpreted existing authority and
co-created new authority to legitimate the structure of the proposed intervention. Critical
to acceptance of this structure was stakeholder engagement in a process that co-created
authority to enable collaboration, without reaching consensus. Specifically, the shared
understanding of EIM governance as something temporary and open to further
modifications, but linked to the success of market reform in the wider region, allows
stakeholders with different beliefs about market evolution to tailor local interpretations
and participate together in the EIM. These new sources of authority provided a rationale
for stakeholders to express conditional support for delegated, rather than autonomous
governance, as a pragmatic and temporary approach based primarily on relational
authority. In contrast, actors negotiating the tension between political and market
influence modified the proposed policy intervention to reconcile conflicting
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organizational norms and promote greater interaction and relational authority. The
Committee recognized that CAISO needed to interact in new ways in order for EIM
governance to be perceived as legitimate and to attract new market participants. By
instituting new structures to increase interactions among participating and nonparticipating stakeholders, the Committee acknowledged the importance of
communication, relationships, and trust as emergent sources of authority. Specifically,
the Committee created new governance structures for state regulators and regional
stakeholders to interact with each other, with the CAISO Board and with the EIM
Governing Body. Somewhat counter intuitively, the Committee sought to achieve greater
interaction and relational authority by creating more hierarchical structure than in the
CAISO process, which has been highly participatory and relatively flat in structure.
This research highlights that EIM governance was designed to provide
interpretive flexibility and a rationale that would encourage participation among
stakeholders with diverse perspectives and that success will depend on the Governing
Body’s ability to co-create emergent forms of authority, rather than on hierarchies and
rules. Since appointment of the EIM Governing Body, three public power utilities have
announced their intent to join the EIM and participants in both the Body of State
Regulators and the Regional Issues Forum have commented on the value of relational
communication. This finding from my analysis demonstrates that multi-organizational
policy implementation is a social process that requires interpretation of authority and
adjustment of policy interventions to enable collective action. This finding also highlights
that in complex systems, like organized electricity markets, it is difficult to define
hierarchies and rules to coordinate actions. In these systems, collaboration is facilitated
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by flexible and dynamic sources of authority that allow temporary and pragmatic
solutions and enable interactions and relational authority.
Field Interdependencies
Policy implementation processes occur across multiple fields and the horizontal
and vertical ties among these fields affect the purposes of the field, the actors who are
involved, what is possible, and introduce new discursive resources and sources of
authority (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017).
The fourth finding from my analysis is that routine field interdependencies
provided critical resources for innovative forms of collective action or, in other words,
policy change. The analysis in Chapter 6 identifies the critical importance of actions in
adjacent fields for surfacing taken-for-granted assumptions. This allowed new sources of
authority to be perceived as legitimate, and contributed to interpretations and adjustments
to policy interventions that enabled collective action. Specifically, the PacifiCorp
decision to explore the feasibility of full participation in the CAISO organized markets
meant that the EIM could no longer be expected to evolve into a regional market with
expanded functionality. This external event required the Committee and stakeholders to
discuss the future of the EIM in more specific terms and a new rationale for delegated
governance emerged. The success of EIM governance was framed as critical for building
the trust necessary for a wider regional market. In another example, the failure of the
Northwest Power Pool effort to create a second EIM meant that it became clearer that
Bonneville Power Administration would be unlikely to join an EIM. These external
events brought attention to the concerns of stakeholders who do not intend to participate
in an organized market, but are critical for coordinating such services and ensuring the
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efficient use of transmission infrastructure. Consequently, these events led to a
fundamental shift in thinking about stakeholder engagement. Rather than designing
governance around market participants, the Committee began thinking about how to
coordinate work with non-participants and the seams with these “neighboring balancing
authorities.”
This finding from my analysis demonstrates that field interdependencies can
affect the social processes of negotiating authority by surfacing taken-for-granted
assumptions, which provided discursive resources and new potential sources of authority
for innovative forms of collective action.
7.2. Theoretical and Practical Implications
The understanding of authority as a negotiated phenomenon is well established in
field theory and organizational communication literature (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012;
Taylor & Van Every, 2014) and is being explored in policy implementation literature
(Moulton & Sandfort, 2017). My contribution is to extend these ideas to the context of
multi-organizational regulatory policy implementation and to provide empirical evidence
of the process. Accordingly, my research makes several theoretical and practical
contributions: 1) multi-organizational policy implementation is a social process of
transforming, negotiating, and co-creating authority and relational authority can be an
important rationale for enacted practices; 2) strategic actors engage in communicative
and social processes in which authority is emergent, and abstraction enables collective
action without requiring consensus; 3) routine field interdependencies can bring attention
to taken-for-granted assumptions and create a moment of co-authoring; and 4) regional
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electricity system governance structures evolve as they balance the inherent tensions of
organized market participation.
Policy Implementation Involves Transforming, Negotiating, and Co-Creating Authority
My research provides empirical support for the idea that policy implementation
involves social negotiation of multiple, often conflicting or ambiguous, sources of
authority. Moulton and Sandfort (2017) introduce this idea in their strategic action field
framework for policy implementation, but the implications of this theoretical approach
are not well established in the policy process literature. The research in this dissertation
supports the usefulness of this theoretical approach in understanding drivers of policy
change and the aspects of a policy intervention that are ultimately enacted, particularly
within the context of policy implementation that spans the responsibilities of more than
one organization. It also applies the theory to new policy domains and provides empirical
evidence from application to regulatory policy implementation and to the complex sociotechnical system that shapes energy policy implementation.
This research also extends the Moulton and Sandfort (2017) theory of the social
negotiation of authority by introducing two established ideas from organizational
communication literature. First, this research provides empirical evidence that multiple
conflicting authorities and the complexity of work can prevent imposition of authority
through hierarchies and rules. Furthermore, it provides evidence that to enable collective
action in such cases, actors can establish structures designed to increase interactions and
relational authority. Here, my research provides empirical evidence of established ideas
within the organizational communication literature that conceptualize the negotiation of
authority as an ongoing process of producing emergent forms of influence and
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accountability that can “transcend boundaries and hierarchies” and extends these ideas to
the context of policy implementation (Benoit-Barné & Cooren, 2009; Koschmann &
Burk, 2016; Taylor & Van Every, 2014). Second, this research provides empirical
evidence that in complex policy implementation systems, actors using discursive
strategies overcome and transform established yet deficient authority that would
otherwise prevent collective action. Here, my research provides additional support to
preliminary research in the organizational communication literature on de-authoring to
overcome or transform existing authority (Koschmann & Burk, 2016).
Strategic Actors Engage in Social Negotiation to Enable Policy Change
An important implication of this research is that social negotiation of legitimacy is
a fundamental driver of policy change. My research provides evidence of authority as an
emergent phenomenon and of the use of abstraction to enable collective action. This
extends and complicates the policy process theory concept of a policy entrepreneur or
policy broker by drawing attention to the importance of communication in practice and of
considering both instrumental and existential motivations for individual actions.
Accordingly, this research provides empirical support for the strategic action field
framework proposed by Moulton and Sandfort (2017) and contributes to policy process
theory by extending the theoretical understanding of individual strategic action beyond a
focus on instrumental motives or the traits of a particular individual.
Using rational choice or bounded rationality models of the individual, several
policy process frameworks and theories draw attention to the role of individuals in
driving policy change and these actors are sometimes referred to as policy entrepreneurs
or policy brokers (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Kingdon, 2011; Lindblom, 1968; Olsen
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& March, 1989; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). However, this is an area of research
that is considered under-theorized (Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Pierce et al., 2014;
Sætren, 2016; Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). My research demonstrates that
policy implementation involving voluntary collective action is shaped by the strategic
actions of individuals interpreting sources of authority and adjusting policy interventions
to provide rationales and perceived legitimacy for the practices they enact. It identifies
several specific strategies used in the social process of negotiation, including shifting the
discourse, symbolic contrast, boundary spanning, and tacking. However, the primary
theoretical contribution is to make a distinction between instrumental and existential
motivations and to suggest that for strategic actors seeking to enable change by forming
shared meanings and collective identities, abstraction is an important strategy that can
enable collective action without requiring consensus among participants.
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) theorize a model of the individual that recognizes
both instrumental and existential motives. Instrumental motives reflect individual and
collective self-interest, whereas existential motives reflect the human need to fashion
shared meanings and identities. Adopting this model of the individual and applying the
Moulton and Sandfort (2017) framework, which draws attention to understanding how
authority gains perceived legitimacy, this research clarifies how such negotiations can
proceed in cases without consensus among actors. In social processes of negotiation that
require voluntary coordination, the interpretive flexibility of the policy intervention
allows stakeholders to develop alternative interpretations to serve their local needs and
abstraction of the rationale for collective action contributes to the perceived legitimacy of
the enacted policy intervention. Thus, the social skills of entrepreneurs are not particular
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strategies that are applied by particular individuals at particular moments, but emerge
through the interactions among actors and structures within the process of social
negotiation of authority.
The practical implication of this finding is that actors seeking to implement a
particular policy intervention within a complex implementation system are necessarily
going to be required to engage in a process of negotiation. As actors negotiate competing
and ambiguous sources of authority, modifications or adaptions of the policy
intervention, interpretation of authorities within context, and the emergence of new
rationale can enable collective action and innovative policy change. Furthermore, social
strategies that accept interpretive flexibility, alternative interpretations, and abstraction
can facilitate the coordination of work without driving decision making to consensus.
Rather than associating these changes and strategies with flaws in policy design or
departures from democratic accountability, these characteristics are inherent to multiorganizational policy implementation and the flexibility of structures and the emergence
of new rationales. The use of dynamic and emergent sources of authority can be critical
to innovative policy change in complex systems.
Interdependencies Critically Affect Social Negotiation
Another important implication of this research is that field interdependencies that
bring attention to taken-for-granted assumptions and create moments of co-authoring are
important drivers of policy change. This expands on the understanding of “external
shocks” and subsystem interdependencies in the policy process literature by providing
insight into the intervening steps between the external event and policy implementation
decisions. Thus, this research provides empirical support for the Fligstein and McAdam
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(2012) theory that suggests the ties among fields impose constraints and opportunities
that are routinely affected by actions in other fields. It also extends this idea to the
context of policy implementation to suggest that policy stability and change are the result
of dynamic interactions across interdependent action fields.
Several policy process theories focus on a single policy system or subsystem as
the level of analysis, while also highlighting the role of external effects on change or
stability (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Kingdon, 2011; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993;
Schneider & Ingram, 2005). However, researchers have called for additional
investigation into the interdependence among multiple policy systems or levels in a
system and the intervening steps between an external event and major policy change
(Hupe, 2014; Weible et al., 2009). Policy process literature has long recognized the role
external events or “external shocks” in fostering policy change by shifting material
resources, altering the power of coalitions, and changing beliefs. This research brings
new insight to the role of field interdependencies by focusing on how these ties routinely
introduce discursive resources and different sources of authority that affect social
negotiations among actors (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Hardy et al., 2005; Moulton &
Sandfort, 2017). Specifically, this dissertation demonstrates how interdependencies result
in new opportunities or constraints that shape the policy implementation process and
demonstrates how interdependencies can reveal taken-for-granted assumptions to enable
innovative policy change.
My research provides empirical evidence that routine actions in other fields
impose constraints and opportunities and suggests two ways in which this can occur.
First, the emergence of a new interdependent action field around creation of a west-wide
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organized market imposed constraints on what was possible and shifted material and
symbolic resources in ways that critically shaped the structure of the policy intervention.
Second, the elimination of a competing action field that had engaged actors in ongoing
negotiations to create an alternative EIM made new resources available and removed
informal sources of authority that had been introduced into and could have continued to
be leveraged in negotiations.
My research also provides empirical evidence that field interdependencies
required actors to explore taken-for-granted assumptions and enabled innovative policy
change. Other research theorizes that critical exchanges between actors in which they
socially negotiate conflicting or ambiguous authorities can be characterized as moments
of discursive attention, which distinguish exchanges involving the negotiation of areas
where actors disagree from exchanges involving the negotiation of areas where actors
have taken-for-granted agreement (Nelson-Marsh, 2006). This research expands on this
literature by suggesting that in relatively formal venues or when many social negotiations
occur in non-public settings, field interdependencies may trigger moments of discursive
attention and draw the researcher’s attention to exchanges that involve co-authoring and
are critical to understanding policy implementation responses.
My research demonstrates that field interdependencies not only imposed
opportunities and constraints, but also created moments of co-authoring that led to
innovative policy change. Specifically, my research provides empirical evidence that
actions in other fields not only imposed constraints and opportunities, but also influenced
the social negotiation among actors by revealing previously taken-for-granted
assumptions and justifications. Adopting the focus of Fligstein and McAdam (2012) on
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change requiring innovative action, my research identifies that following critical field
interdependencies and negotiation of taken-for-granted justifications for certain practices,
actors innovated new governance structure that had not previously been considered or
implemented elsewhere. Thus, rather than competing to impose one alternative or
another, actors engaging in a social process of negotiation co-created new sources of
authority and novel structures.
Regional Governance Structures Balance Tensions of Organized Market Participation
Finally, another implication of this research is that RTO governance structures
evolve as they balance the inherent tensions of organized market participation. RTO
political control and accountability to the public interest are served through common
governance structures adapted to the unique combinations of local needs and constraints
of stakeholders within a particular region. This contributes insights into how RTO
governance structures are evolving and informs the ongoing debate about RTO
accountability, aligning federal power markets with state policy initiatives, and
institutional change to support the current energy transition.
RTOs differ in how they work with utilities, state regulators, and other
stakeholders to adapt market rules in response to state policies and there are important
observed variations in how RTO processes prioritize implementation approaches. These
RTO governance structures and stakeholder processes are increasingly important, yet
understudied, policy environments. This research fills an important gap in energy policy
literature by identifying the formal and informal authorities that shaped the governance
structures of a newly forming regional electricity governance organization. My research
identifies common governance structures and variations across RTOs that serve to
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balance the inherent tensions of regional organized markets within our system of energy
federalism: 1) requirements for market efficiency, 2) preservation of political autonomy,
3) representation of political interests, and 4) representation of market interests.
This research provides empirical evidence that extends earlier work identifying
the challenge RTOs face in balancing accountability to a wide range of stakeholders who
are “not equally important,” critical dimensions in responding to pressures for
institutional change within the electricity system, and the complexity of public interest
accountability within the evolving federal and state regulatory relationships (Dworkin &
Goldwasser, 2007, p. 579; Dworkin et al., 2013; Eisen, 2016; Goldthau, 2014; Rossi,
2016).
This work also provides practical insights for ongoing deliberations involving
FERC, RTOs, state regulators, utilities and other stakeholders. The future of Western
electricity system governance continues to evolve. The initiative to create a west-wide
RTO based on the CAISO-PacifiCorp partnership is currently stalled; however, the EIM
is expanding and stakeholders are gaining experience with the new EIM governance
structures. Whatever emerges will be shaped by efforts to balance the inherent tensions of
organized market participation and by the actors that have been and will continue to be
engaged in this process.
The West has demonstrated a unique approach to energy system governance and
the EIM has been a critical part of the evolution of this complex system. For now, the
EIM is an innovative alternative to a fully organized market. As such, the EIM is
fundamentally reshaping interactions among CAISO, EIM participants, and neighboring
balancing authorities, Western electricity system governance, other aspects of CAISO
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market design, and the value of new technologies and existing assets. If the EIM evolves
into a separate RTO offering a full range of market services or, alternatively, if CAISO
expands to be a west-wide RTO, making the EIM obsolete, the EIM still will have served
a critical role in facilitating this transition. The EIM is providing experience with
innovative structures, new sources of authority, and building relationships that will shape
the governance of any future Western RTO.
7.3. Limitations and Future Research
Despite these contributions to understanding policy implementation and energy
policy, the research is limited by its focus on a single case study and a single policy
implementation problem. Furthermore, the research is somewhat limited by the
perspectives included. The interview participants were people actively involved in
CAISO, the EIM initiative, or the Northwest Power Pool EIM initiative. Therefore, the
perspectives of stakeholders in the Rocky Mountain west and southwest were only
included through formal written comments. Additionally, many informal and working
group interactions were not public. While this is typical of public sector
interorganizational collaborations and stakeholder engagement processes, the impact of
these conversations on the overall implementation process can only be discerned
indirectly through subsequent public interactions, comments, and personal reflections in
interviews.
There is much more to be learned about how RTOs engage with stakeholders and
how these processes shape energy policy implementation. Having established initial
concepts about how RTOs act at the border between federal and state authorities and are
responsive to the needs of voluntary market participants, further research should explore
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the idea of negotiated authority across additional RTOs and explore different policy
problems. It would be particularly important to examine how RTOs are responding to
other state policy initiatives—for example, mandates or incentives to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions or to encourage distributed energy resources. Additionally, further research
is needed to examine how RTOs relate to one another along jurisdictional boundaries or
“seams.” Finally, valuable insights could be gained from research assessing the policy
outcomes of the EIM Governing Body, the role of the Body of State Regulators, and the
Regional Issues Forum, as well as continued exploration of how the initiative to create a
Western Regional System Operator unfolds.
Additionally, there is much more to be learned about policy implementation that
spans the responsibilities of more than one organization. This dissertation highlights the
value of applying the strategic action field framework and boundary work concepts to the
context of policy implementation, but many questions remain. Additional research could
be undertaken using this framework to make sense of observed variations in
implementation approaches across electricity governance organizations, including across
RTOs and across newly emerging organizations to facilitate distributed energy resources.
More research could be undertaken applying these ideas to additional regulatory policy
setting and comparing these to the service delivery settings that were used to develop the
Moulton and Sandfort (2017) framework. Finally, research could be undertaken to further
evaluate how actors adjust their approach to social negotiation as they move across
interdependent action fields.
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7.4. Conclusion
The findings and implications of this research are relevant for policy and
management and are of interest to practitioners and researchers engaged in facilitating
implementation of energy policy. The conclusions are three-fold. First, engagement in
RTO processes is critical for ensuring effective policy implementation to achieve policy
goals for institutional innovations, the adoption of emerging technologies, and the pace of
electricity system change. Second, understanding RTO structures and social processes
critically underpins state and federal clean energy policy implementation and allows
evaluation and assessment of policy effectiveness. Third, cultural authority and social
processes are fundamental to RTO policy implementation and should be considered in
designing energy policies. Electricity market governance organizations, like RTOs, are
central to energy policy implementation and are fundamentally shaping the future
electricity system.
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Western Interconnection Balancing Authorities
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AESO - Alberta Electric System Operator
AVA - Avista Corporation
AZPS - Arizona Public Service Company
BANC - Balancing Authority of Northern California
BCHA - British Columbia Hydro Authority
BPAT - Bonneville Power Administration - Transmission
CFE - Comision Federal de Electricidad
CHPD - PUD No. 1 of Chelan County
CISO - California Independent System Operator
DEAA - Arlington Valley, LLC
DOPD - PUD No. 1 of Douglas County
EPE - El Paso Electric Company
GCPD - PUD No. 2 of Grant County
GRID - Gridforce
GRIF - Griffith Energy, LLC
GRMA - Sun Devil Power Holdings, LLC
GWA - NaturEner Power Watch, LLC
HGMA - New Harquahala Generating Company, LLC
IID - Imperial Irrigation District
IPCO - Idaho Power Company
LDWP - Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
NEVP - Nevada Power Company
NWMT - NorthWestern Energy
PACE - PacifiCorp East
PACW - PacifiCorp West
PGE - Portland General Electric Company
PNM - Public Service Company of New Mexico
PSCO - Public Service Company of Colorado
PSEI - Puget Sound Energy
SCL - Seattle City Light
SRP - Salt River Project
TEPC - Tucson Electric Power Company
TIDC - Turlock Irrigation District
TPWR - City of Tacoma, Department of Public Utilities
WACM - Western Area Power Administration, Colorado-Missouri Region
WALC - Western Area Power Administration, Lower Colorado Region
WAUW - Western Area Power Administration, Upper Great Plains West
WWA - NaturEner Wind Watch, LLC
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Introductory Questions
Establish you’ve done your homework, but that you’re a novice and you’re open to being
taught. It’s crucial to establish that the goal is to learn the ins and outs without
judgment.
Provide the consent form, allow them to read and sign. After consent given, START THE
RECORDER and begin.
Opening Script: The primary goal of our research project is to understand how the
decision making process works at RTOs. We’ve been trying to understand the formal
process; we need to understand better the experiences of those who participate in the
actual process. Our questions are really a conversational guide to help us understand
your experience at/with ___ [RTO].
Demographics/History
1. How have you been involved with _____ [RTO]?
a. Probe: How long have you been involved with ________ [RTO]?
Understanding the Process for Decision Making
2. How would you characterize the stakeholder process at _____ [RTO]?
a. Probe: What is a typical meeting like?
b. Probe: Are there any other elements in the process that I wouldn’t
understand from information on the website?
c. Probe:
i.It sounds like you’ve had a positive experience; can you tell me more
about what works well in the process? Is there anything that you
would change?
ii.It sounds like you’ve had a negative experience; what were some of
the challenges or what would you change in the process?
3. How would I know when a decision has been made?
a. Probe: Who is involved in deciding what items are put on the agenda or
how quickly issues move through the process?
b. Probe: Could you provide an example?
4. Do stakeholders or staff work on issues outside of the formal meetings?
[UNDERSTAND EXPERIENCE / SENSE OF RTOs]
a. Probe: How does that work?
b. Probe: Is it important to have certain stakeholders or staff involved in an
issue?
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Understanding the Stakeholder Groups
5. Who are the stakeholder groups involved [in the issues you are working on?
a. Probe: Who are the stakeholders frequently involved in stakeholder
processes?
6. How would you characterize the stakeholders?
a. How would you describe the influence of certain stakeholder groups?
b. How would I recognize different stakeholder groups in a meeting?
7. What is it like for newcomers to participate in the stakeholder process?
a. Probe: What have _____ [names of new stakeholder groups] had to do to
be part of the process?
b. Probe: How would you know if a newcomer is doing something wrong or
how would you help a newcomer figure out the process?
Understanding Influences
8. Are issues regarding transmission, markets and reliability related?
a. Are these coordinated in the decision making process?
b. What are some common disagreements you see in the process?
9. How do people enter into leadership positions?
a. I’m trying to understand leadership. Do stakeholder groups identify
formal or informal leaders?
b. Can you describe the board/advisory committee nomination process?

Conclusion
10. That’s all for my questions. What else should I know or be asking in order to
understand the ______ [RTO]’s processes, stakeholder groups and participation?
11. Is there anything you would like to ask me?
12. Would you mind recommending anyone else who you think I should speak with
that would be interested in particpating?
Thank you for your time. We really appreciate it!
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APPENDIX C

Summary of Field Observations

InPerson
Observation

Number of

Pages of

Type

Observations

Fieldnotes

or
Participation

Date

54 on WebEx

27-Feb-

Location

WebEx

Minutes

CAISO
Stakeholder
Engagement
Meetings and
Stakeholder
Workshops
Transmission
Planning Meeting

1

10

at opening

14

Folsom, CA

WebEx

180

1

16

NA

4-Apr-14

Folsom, CA

WebEx

240

1

9

NA

7-Apr-14

Folsom, CA

WebEx

60

Transmission
Planning
Standards
Meeting
Energy Storage
Interconnection
Opening Initiative

170

InPerson
Observation

Number of

Pages of

Type

Observations

Fieldnotes

Energy Storage

Participation

Date

Location

WebEx

Minutes

4-Sep-14

Folsom, CA

WebEx

360

WebEx

270

200 - 300 in-

Roadmap
Workshop

or

person and
1

23

201 WebEx

Second Storage
Roadmap
Workshop

66 on WebEx
1

18

after opening

CPUC, San
13-Oct-14

Francisco, CA

Board of
Governors and
Market
Surveillance
Committee
Meetings
Regular CAISO
Board of
Governors
1

13

NA

6-Feb-14

Folsom, CA

Audio

180

171

Meeting

Recorded

InPerson
Observation

Number of

Pages of

Type

Observations

Fieldnotes

or
Participation

Date

Location

WebEx

Minutes

Folsom, CA

WebEx

330

Folsom, CA

In-Person

240

Market
Surveillance
Committee
Meeting

19-May1

23

NA

14

Regular CAISO
Board of

About 35 in-

Governors
Meeting

1

11

person at

18-Sep-

opening

14

EIM Governance
and Transitional
Committee
Stakeholder
Engagement
Meetings
Governance
1

6

and 41 WebEx

Recorded
12-Jan-15

Phoenix, AZ

Audio

69

172

Recommendation

12 in-person

InPerson
Observation

Number of

Pages of

Type

Observations

Fieldnotes

or
Participation

Date

14 in-person

31-Mar-

Location

WebEx

Minutes

Issue Paper
Presentation
Governance
Recommendation
Straw Proposal
Presentation

X

X

and 56 WebEx

15

Folsom, CA

X

X

1

7

TBD

1-Jul-14

Folsom, CA

WebEx

78

Las Vegas, NV

WebEx

X

EIM Transitional
Committee
Meetings
EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting
EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting

26-AugX

X

X

14

173

InPerson
Observation

Number of

Pages of

Type

Observations

Fieldnotes

or
Participation

Date

Location

WebEx

Minutes

Teleconference

NA

NA

WebEx

122

EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting

Executive
Session

10-SepNA

NA

14

EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting

Sacramento,
1

14

TBD

23-Oct-14

CA

20-Nov-

San Francisco,

14

CA

WebEx

114

EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting

1

14

TBD

EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting

19-Dec1

5

TBD

14

Teleconference

WebEx

53

1

5

TBD

12-Jan-15

Phoenix, AZ

WebEx

63

EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting

174

InPerson
Observation

Number of

Pages of

Type

Observations

Fieldnotes

or
Participation

Date

Location

WebEx

Minutes

15

Teleconference

NA

NA

5-Mar-15

Portland, OR

In-Person

150

Teleconference

NA

NA

EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting

Executive
Session

17-FebNA

NA

EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting

About 20
1

7

including staff

EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting

Executive
Session

13-AprNA

NA

15

EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting

30-Apr1

16

TBD

15

Folsom, CA

WebEx

148

1

12

TBD

25-Jun-15

Reno, NV

WebEx

133

EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting

175

InPerson
Observation

Number of

Pages of

or

Type

Observations

Fieldnotes

Participation

Date

Location

WebEx

Minutes

NA

NA

20-Jul-15

Teleconference

NA

NA

Folsom, CA

WebEx

103

CA

WebEx

NA

Teleconference

WebEx

NA

EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting

Executive
Session

EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting

25-Aug1

9

TBD

15

EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting

Sacramento,
X

NA

NA

21-Oct-15

EIM Transitional
Committee
Meeting

19-NovX

NA

NA

15

Regional
Governance
Meetings and
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InPerson
Observation

Number of

Pages of

Type

Observations

Fieldnotes

or
Participation

Date

Location

WebEx

Minutes

Regional
Webinars
Market
Governance
Webinar PUC-EIM
Group

131-153 on

Recorded

1

4

Phone

1-Oct-14

Audio

WebEx

NA

1

15

97 at opening

8-Feb-16

Folsom, CA

WebEx

300

1

5

NA

8-Feb-16

Portland, OR

WebEx

60

Senate Bill 350
Studies Public
Meeting
PacifiCorp
Presentation at
NWPCC Meeting

177

InPerson
Observation

Number of

Pages of

Type

Observations

Fieldnotes

or
Participation

Date

Location

10-Feb-

Web

16

Conference

WebEx

Minutes

WebEx

88

WebEx

269

CAISO and
PacifiCorp Joint
Conference on
Governance
Development

1

9

NA

Regional Grid
Operator and
Governance

Sacramento,
1

TRANSCRIPT

NA

6-May-16

CA

Regional Grid
Operator and
Governance

Sacramento,
1

TRANSCRIPT

NA

16-Jun-16

CA

WebEx

209

1

TRANSCRIPT

NA

20-Jun-16

Denver, CO

WebEx

173

Regional Grid
Operator and
Governance

178

InPerson
Observation

Number of

Pages of

Type

Observations

Fieldnotes

or
Participation

Date

Location

WebEx

Minutes

Regional Grid
Operator and
Governance

Sacramento,
1

TRANSCRIPT

NA

26-Jul-16

CA

WebEx

315

1

10

NA

4-Aug-16

Boise, ID

In-Person

120

Regional Issues
Forum
TOTAL FIELD
NOTES SINGLESPACED PAGES

261

TOTAL
TRANSCRIPT
DOUBLE-SPACED
PAGES

718

TOTAL
OBSERVATIONS
AND MINUTES

27

4427
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APPENDIX D

Summary of Energy Imbalance Market Documents
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Document

Number of

Type

Documents

Pages

Source
Proposals and White Papers = 7
Transitional Committee Draft and

Governance
Foundational

14

511

Information

Final Charter = 3
Governance Sector Roster = 1
MOU = 1
Benefits Studies = 2
Proposals, White Papers, and
Presentations = 18
Draft Transitional Committee

Transitional
Committee

30

581

Development

Charters = 2
Board of Governors Decision
Documents = 5
FERC Opinion = 1
Agendas and Sector Templates = 4
Proposals, White Papers, and
Presentations = 33

Transitional

Market Surveillance Committee

Committee

Opinions = 4

Meetings and

77

641

Working Group Updates, Benefits,

Stakeholder

and Motions = 6

Engagement

Draft Charters, Bylaws, Selection
Policies = 4
Agendas and Minutes = 30

Stakeholder
Comments

28

459

Number of Comments = 136
Number of Stakeholders = 55
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APPENDIX E

Codebook
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THEME
Resistance to
Collective Action

CATEGORY

SUB-CATEGORY

Energy Values

Clean Energy Goals
Affordability/
Reliability
Environmental Goals Hydro

Jurisdictional Divides

California Dominating
FERC Dominating
Shift in Regulatory
Federalism

Transforming
Authority / Boundary

Shift in Discourse

Teamwork

Object
Benefits
Symbolic Contrast

Grid Modernization
Clean Energy Transition

Boundary Spanning

Discrete Product
Integrated Product
Transformation Policy
Constitution Policy

Political Autonomy vs.
Market Efficiency

Authorities

Value Proposition

184
THEME

CATEGORY

SUB-CATEGORY
California Statute
Limited EIM Functionality

Social Skills

Tacking
Ambiguity

Interdependence
Political Influence vs.
Market Influence

Authorities

No Expansion of
Functionality
Norms for Market
Participant Interactions
Norms for Public Sector
Interactions

Social Skills
Interdependence

Boundary Spanning:
Questioning
Relevance of
Non-Participants
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APPENDIX F
Initial Stakeholder Positions

Utility Name

Position

Position 2

Ownership

RTO

Advisory Southwestern Power Group

Support

Power Marketer

SOUTHWEST

Investor Owned

CAISO

Autonomous - Oppose

Investor Owned

CAISO

Autonomous - Oppose

Investor Owned

SOUTHWEST

Advisory - Opposed

Investor Owned

NWPP

Public Power

NWPP

Investor Owned

NWPP

Advisory Support
Pacific Gas & Electric Co

Transition
Advisory Support

Southern California Edison Co

Transition
Advisory Support

Xcel Energy Inc.

Transition
Autonomous -

Avista Corp

Support

Northwest Public Power

Autonomous -

Association

Support
Autonomous -

Portland General Electric Co

Support
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Utility Name

Position

Position 2

Ownership

RTO

Autonomous Powerex

Support

Power Marketer

CANADA

Public Power

NWPP

Public Power

NWPP
NWPP

Autonomous Public Power Council

Support
Autonomous -

Chelan County

Support
Autonomous -

Seattle City Light
Western Grid Group
Interwest Energy Alliance

Support

Advisory - Opposed

Public Power

Autonomous -

Autonomous -

Public Interest -

Support

Support

Environmental

BOTH

Delegated -

Renewable

Support

Generators

SOUTHWEST

Autonomous - Oppose

Investor Owned

SOUTHWEST

Autonomous - Oppose

Public Power

CAISO

Delegated PacifiCorp

Support
Delegated -

Six Cities
Sonoran Institute

Support
Delegated -

Public Interest -

Support

Environmental

BOTH
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Utility Name
Vote Solar
Western Resource Advocates

Position

Position 2

Ownership

RTO

Delegated -

Public Interest -

Support

Environmental

Delegated -

Public Interest -

Support

Environmental

BOTH

Advisory - Opposed

Investor Owned

SOUTHWEST

Advisory - Opposed

Public Power

BOTH

Public Power

NWPP

Regulator

SOUTHWEST

BOTH

Delegated Support
Arizona Public Service Co

Transition
Delegated -

California Municipal Utilities

Support

Association

Transition
Delegated -

Eugene Water & Electric Board

Support

Autonomous -

Transition

Support

Delegated Public Utility Commission of

Support

Nevada

Transition
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Utility Name

Position

Position 2

Ownership

RTO

Delegated Support
Puget Sound Energy

Transition

Investor Owned

NWPP

Delegated Support

Autonomous -

Public Interest -

Renewable Northwest

Transition

Support

Environmental

American Wind Energy

No Stated Model

Renewable

Association

Preference

Generators

California Office of Ratepayer

No Stated Model

Public Interest -

Advocates

Preference

Ratepayers

CAISO

California Public Utilities

No Stated Model

Commission

Preference

Regulator

CAISO

Wyoming Public Service

No Stated Model

Commission

Preference

Regulator

SOUTHWEST

NWPP
BOTH

189
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APPENDIX G
Comparison of U.S. Regional Transmission Organizations

Jurisdiction

CAISO

ERCOT

ISO-NE

MISO

NYISO

PJM

SPP

Single state

Single state

Six states

All or parts

Single state

All or parts

14 states

(~80% of CA

not synch-

of 15 states

of 13 states

and small

ronously

and one

and DC

part of NV)

intercom-

province

nected

Energy

1998

2002 Retail

1999

2005

1999

1997

2007

Market

Wholesale

2003

Wholesale

Wholesale

Wholesale

Wholesale

Imbalance

Wholesale

Operation

2014
Wholesale

Incorporation

Market

501 c (3)

501 c (4)

501 c (3)

501 c (4)

501 c (3)

LLC

501 c (3)

public

community

public

community

public

public

benefit

welfare

benefit

welfare

benefit

benefit

status

status

status

status

status

status

100+

160+

400+

175+

400+

>960

93

~30 million

~ 23 million

~14 million

~48 million

~19.5

~ 61 million

~18 million

Participants
Population
Served

million
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CAISO

ERCOT

ISO-NE

MISO

NYISO

PJM

SPP

60,000 MW

75,964 MW

31,000 MW

180,711 MW

39,000 MW

171,648 MW

78,953 MW

Peak Demand

50,000 MW

69,600 MW

28,000 MW

127,100 MW

31,100 MW

165,500 MW

45,300 MW

Transmission

26,000 miles

46,500 miles

8,500 miles

65,800 miles

11,000 miles

>81,000

60,000 miles

Generation
Capacity

miles

Lines
Transmission

18

8a

21

48

8

14 voting

43

38 affiliated

Owners
State

State

State PUC

NE States

Organization

State PUC

Organization

Regional

Regulator

Governor

Oversight

Committee

of

Oversight

of

State

Relationship

Appointment

on Electricity

MISO States

PJM States

Committee

of Board

and NE
Conference
of Public
Utilities
Commissioners
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Authorization

CAISO

ERCOT

ISO-NE

MISO

NYISO

PJM

SPP

1996 =

1995 = Texas

1997 = FERC

2001 = FERC

1998 = FERC

1997 = FERC

2004 = FERC

California

Stat.; Not

Stat.

subject to

1997 = FERC

FPA §203,
205, 206

History

Not a power

Texas

New England

Not a power

New York

PJM Power

Southwest

pool legacy

Intercon-

Power Pool

pool legacy

Power Pool

Pool (1927);

Power Pool

nection

(1971); ISO

(1965)

ISO (1997)

(1941)

System

(1997); RTO

(1941);

(2005)

RTO (2002)

ERCOT
(1970)

Industry
Structure:

41% = CA

57% = TX

> 66% = 5
states4

< 33% = 12

62% = NY

< 33% = 7

< 33% = 12

states

states

states

>33%< 66%

>33% < 66%

>33% < 66%

= TX

= WV

= TX

Output from
Independent
Power b, c

>66% = IL,
MT

>66% = DE, IL, >66% = MT
MD, NJ, PA
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Industry

CAISO

ERCOT

ISO-NE

MISO

NYISO

PJM

SPP

8% = CA

61% = TX

Zero = VT4

Zero = 11

25% = NY

Zero = 6

Zero = 11

states

states

states

< 33% = MA,

< 33% = IL,

< 33% = DE,

< 33% = MI,

NH

MI, MT

IL, MD,

MT

Structure:
Sales from
Retail Power
Marketers b, c

MI,NJ, OH
>33% < 66%

>33% < 66%

>33% < 66%

>33% < 66%

= CT, ME

= TX

= PA

= TX

Curtailment

Dispatchable

Dispatch

Curtail

Dispatchable

Dispatch

Dispatch

Dispatchable

of Variable

and non-

based on

generation

and non-

based on

based on

and non-

Generation

dispatchable

market offer

without day-

dispatchable

market offer

market offer

dispatchable

variable

ahead

variable

variable

generation

commitment

generation

generation

SOURCES: (Borenstein & Bushnell, 2015; California Independent System Operator, 2015; Electric Reliability Council of Texas,
n.d.; Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, n.d.-a; Fernandez, 2011; Independent System Operator of New England, n.d.;
Midcontinent Independent System Operator, n.d.; New York Independent System Operator, n.d.; PJM Interconnection, n.d.;
Potomac Economics, 2016; Southwest Power Pool, n.d., 2014; Utility Variable Generation Integration Group, 2015)
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